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Abstract
Our criminal justice system resolves most of its cases through
plea bargains. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has not required that
any evidence, even exculpatory or impeachment evidence, be
provided to the defense before a guilty plea. As a result, state rules
on pre-plea discovery differ widely. While some jurisdictions
follow an “open-file” model, imposing relatively broad discovery
obligations on prosecutors early in the criminal process, others
follow a more restrictive, “closed-file” model and allow the
prosecution to avoid production of critical evidence either entirely
or until very near the time of trial. Though the advantages and
disadvantages of both models are debated, surprisingly little is
known about the models’ real-world operation.
In this Article, we report the results of an original empirical
study in which we surveyed practicing prosecutors and criminal
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defense attorneys about their pre-plea discovery practices. We
surveyed attorneys from Virginia and North Carolina, two
adjacent states, which are demographically and geographically
similar, but have notably different discovery rules. North Carolina
mandates open-file discovery early in the criminal process. By
contrast, Virginia protects certain critical documents, such as
witness statements and police reports, from discovery.
Our findings indicate that, as expected, open-file discovery
can promote more informed guilty pleas. It leads to improved
pre-plea disclosure of most categories of evidence. The practice is
also viewed as more efficient in that it reduces discovery disputes
and speeds up case dispositions. We also found little evidence that
open-file discovery endangers the safety of witnesses, a common
argument against the practice. Open-file discovery does not,
however, appear to enhance the disclosure of certain impeachment
evidence, such as the prior convictions of prosecution witnesses.
Further, practitioners reported that even when the entire case file
is turned over to the defense pre-plea, the file is frequently missing
some information relevant to the case. The Article interprets these
findings and concludes with a general endorsement of the North
Carolina open-file system over the Virginia closed-file system as a
better guarantor of informed decisions and efficient process in
criminal cases.
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I. Introduction
It is commonplace to observe that most criminal cases in the
United States today are resolved by a plea bargain, rather than a
trial. 1 Yet the Supreme Court has never held that the prosecution’s
evidence must be disclosed to the defendant before a guilty plea. 2
1. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (noting that
plea bargaining “is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the
criminal justice system” (citing Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992))). In some
jurisdictions, criminal trials are so rare that many prosecutors practice for years
without appearing before a jury. Don Stemen et al., Plea Bargaining in
Wisconsin: Prosecutor Effects on Charge Reductions and Sentencing Outcomes 9
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
2. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–32 (2002). Ruiz concluded that
the government is not constitutionally required to disclose impeachment
evidence before a guilty plea, but it did not squarely resolve whether the
government must disclose factually exculpatory evidence. Id. at 628. Circuit
courts have split on this question. Compare, e.g., Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616,
617 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a prosecutor need not disclose exculpatory
evidence when a defendant waives a trial and pleads guilty), with, e.g., McCann
v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that, if a
prosecutor fails to disclose factually exculpatory evidence before a defendant
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Instead, it has held only that exculpatory evidence must be disclosed
sometime before trial. 3
As a result, state legislatures and judicial systems have
adopted their own unique regimes and practices regarding
pre-plea discovery. 4 Some jurisdictions follow an “open-file” model
and impose relatively broad discovery obligations on prosecutors
early in the criminal process. 5 Others follow a more restrictive,
“closed-file” model and allow the prosecution to avoid production
of critical information either entirely or until very near the time
of trial. 6 Advocates of each of these approaches have marshaled
theoretical arguments and anecdotal evidence on their behalf, but
no one has tested empirically how the two models operate in
practice. 7 We have taken up this task by surveying prosecutors
and defense attorneys from two states with opposing approaches
to pre-plea discovery. 8 This Article describes the findings of our
enters a guilty plea, this would likely violate the Due Process Clause); see also
Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 216 (W. Va. 2015) (reviewing federal and
state decisions on this question and concluding “that a defendant is
constitutionally entitled to exculpatory evidence during the plea negotiation
stage”).
3. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
4. See infra Part II.B (discussing the criminal discovery rules used by
different jurisdictions).
5. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 (requiring the prosecutor to make
available to the defendant all reports regarding relevant information within the
prosecutor’s control); COLO. CRIM. P. 16 (same); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3 (requiring the
prosecutor to put together a discovery packet or allow defendant to inspect,
copy, and photograph relevant information); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903
(West 2015) (allowing a defendant to make a motion entitling her to receive “the
complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and
prosecutor’s offices involved in the investigation”); OHIO CRIM. R. 16 (allowing a
defendant access to relevant case materials subject to few limitations); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015) (allowing defendants upon
request access to all relevant information).
6. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-4 (2010) (calling for disclosure “no later
than ten days before trial, or at such time as court orders”); VA. SUP. CT. R.
3A:11 (disclosure motion must be made “at least 10 days before the day fixed for
trial”).
7. See infra notes 15–20 and accompanying text (discussing various
arguments for and against open-file models with accompanying scholarship
depending primarily on anecdotal and hypothetical arguments).
8. The survey examines North Carolina, which uses an “open-file” model,
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study and discusses their implications for discovery debates and
reform.
While discovery rules continue to vary significantly from
state to state, a recent trend has been in the direction of earlier
and broader discovery. 9 Several states have reformed their rules
and now require that the prosecutor disclose to the defense—
either soon after indictment or arraignment, or in any event,
before a guilty plea—virtually all evidence relevant to the case. 10
This move toward open-file discovery has been motivated by
several concerns.
One concern prompting states to adopt liberal pre-plea
discovery policies is the troubling number of eventual
exonerations of defendants who originally pleaded guilty. 11
Several researchers have found that a key factor contributing to
such wrongful convictions is the withholding of exculpatory
evidence. 12 Constitutional rules mandating the disclosure of
and Virginia, which follows the “closed-file” model. See infra Part III.B
(explaining the method used for the survey of North Carolina and Virginia).
9. See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015)
(describing this trend); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the
Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1622–23 (2005)
(same).
10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing rules requiring
disclosure).
11. According to the National Registry of Exoneration, 210 of the 1575
wrongful convictions involved a guilty plea. Of the 210 plea-based wrongful
conviction cases, at least twenty-one involved failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence. The failure to disclose exculpatory evidence was a contributing factor
in a much larger number of trial-based convictions. See Basic Patterns, NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Basic-Patterns.aspx (last
visited Apr. 2, 2016) (detailing exonerated individuals including the alleged
crimes, reasons for conviction, and means of exoneration) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). For a recent example, see Naheed Rajwani,
DNA Helps Clear Man’s Name from Rape Charge After 24 Years, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (July 25, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/metro/
20140725-dna-helps-clear-mans-name-from-rape-charge-after-24-years.ece (last
visited Apr. 2, 2016) (describing the case of a man who pleaded guilty to rape
and was later exonerated by DNA evidence) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
12. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 96 (2008) (examining claims brought by exonerated individuals, including
claims of Brady violations); JON B. GOULD ET AL., PREDICTING ERRONEOUS
CONVICTIONS: A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 19
(2012) (“In research on erroneous convictions, the most commonly established
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exculpatory evidence before trial have proven too weak and
ineffective, and these rules have not even been applied to the
period before a guilty plea. 13 Yet, without the benefit of seeing the
weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case, defendants (and their
counsel) may be more readily persuaded that the risk of a
harsher sentence after trial and conviction outweighs the hope of
acquittal, and thus, may be induced to plead guilty despite actual
innocence. 14 Even in cases where guilt is not in question, many
argue that a fully informed guilty plea is essential to fair and
accurate verdicts and sentences. 15
Another justification offered for liberal pre-plea discovery is
greater efficiency. Open-file discovery is said to be more
economical than restrictive discovery because defense attorneys
no longer have to request specific items of evidence, and disputes
over what evidence is discoverable are reduced. 16 As the defense
transgression is the prosecution’s failure to turn over exculpatory evidence.”);
EMILY M. WEST, COURT FINDINGS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMS IN
POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AND CIVIL SUITS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA
EXONERATION CASES 4 (2010) (“More than one-third (38%) of misconduct
allegations involved Brady violations by the prosecutors—withholding
potentially exculpatory evidence such as knowledge of alternative suspects and
forensic science evidence that may have weakened the prosecution’s case.”).
13. Infra Section II.A.
14. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2495 (2004) (“The result of inadequate discovery is that the
parties bargain blindfolded. . . . Prosecutorial bluffing is likely to work
particularly well against innocent defendants, who are on average more risk
averse than guilty defendants.”).
15. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 9, at 1624 (“[B]road discovery partially
compensates for restricted defense counsel; it helps make up for the deficiency
in adversary process of constrained defense advocacy.”); R. Michael Cassidy,
Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment
Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1427, 1466 (2011) (arguing that pre-plea
disclosures enhance accurate and voluntary plea bargaining that “more closely
mirrors trial outcomes”); Daniel S. McConkie, Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal
Discovery, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 13)
(“[D]efendants need expansive information to intelligently plead guilty and
agree to a sentence, or at least the contours of a sentence.”); Janet Moore,
Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and Garcetti, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1372 (2012) (“Providing defendants with information
obtained through the government’s superior investigative resources levels the
playing field.”); Eleanor Ostrow, Comment, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90
YALE L.J. 1581, 1583 (1981) (“[D]isclosure of evidence is critical to the fairness of
the guilty-plea process.”).
16. See Rodney J. Uphoff, Criminal Discovery in Oklahoma: A Call for
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gains a better understanding of the prosecution’s case earlier in
the process, the case is also likely to be resolved more speedily. 17
Advocates of open-file rules also maintain that such rules make
discovery more predictable and consistent across counties and
among individual prosecutors. 18 Under this reasoning, a clear-cut
requirement to disclose all evidence reduces the chances that
prosecutors will use their discretion in illegitimate or unfair
ways. 19
Not everyone, however, is convinced that broad pre-plea
discovery is necessary or is a net benefit to criminal justice
systems. Mandatory disclosure of evidence at an early stage
presents several potential difficulties. Among these is the concern
that early disclosure of certain types of information—chiefly
police reports and witness names, addresses, and statements—
could, in some cases, endanger witness safety and privacy,
discourage witnesses from testifying, or jeopardize the integrity
of ongoing investigations. 20 A second concern is that broad preLegislative Action, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 381, 405 (1993) (“Not only would a
mandatory open file policy increase the adequacy of defense counsel’s
representation, such a policy would substantially limit litigation in the trial and
appellate courts over discovery issues.”).
17. See Alafair Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481,
516 (2009) (“Defendants confronted with the evidence against them may be
quicker to plead guilty if the evidence is strong, or to argue persuasively for
dismissal if the evidence is weak, leading to earlier resolution of cases and the
elimination of unnecessary trials.” (citation omitted)); Daniel S. Medwed,
Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1560 (2010) (“Defendants
who are fully aware of the strength of the case against them might express
greater willingness to accept plea bargains than those who lack such insight.”).
18. See TEX. DEF. SER. & TEX. APPLESEED, IMPROVING DISCOVERY IN
CRIMINAL CASES IN TEXAS: HOW BEST PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER JUSTICE
5 (2013) [hereinafter TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE STUDY] (finding that before
Texas adopted open-file rules, discovery practices varied “between Texas
counties and sometimes within a single district attorney’s office”).
19. See WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND
COMMON PRACTICES 51 (1985) (reporting study finding that “prosecutors will
make the discovery procedures more cumbersome for certain defense attorneys
whom they disliked or distrusted”); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal
Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
541, 600 & n.241 (2006) (explaining that removing prosecutorial discretion will
“equalize the disclosure of information among all defendants”).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631–32 (2002) (discussing
concerns about witness tampering and disruption of investigations if defendants
have access to too much information); Baer, supra note 9, at 55 (“Information
that convinces a defendant to admit his guilt is valuable to society; information
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plea disclosure can be burdensome for prosecutors, who would
have to review evidence earlier in the process and possibly
undertake more time-consuming tasks, such as redacting
sensitive information and applying for protective orders. 21
Prosecutors would also have to ensure that evidence in the
custody of investigative agencies is included in the file in a timely
fashion, even though they generally have no direct supervisory
authority over such agencies. 22
Moreover, many argue that mandatory open-file discovery
simply isn’t necessary. Proponents of this view believe that the
phenomenon of innocent defendants pleading guilty is quite rare
and, in any event, has little to do with what evidence the
prosecutor has disclosed. 23 Opponents of broader discovery rules
generally believe that the constitutional framework established
by Brady v. Maryland 24—under which prosecutors must disclose
that enables him to establish his innocence falsely by lying and threatening
others is not.”); Bennett L. Gershman, Preplea Disclosure of Impeachment
Evidence, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 141, 145 (2012) (“[T]here are considerable
costs involved in broadening preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence—costs
that drain the efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources as well as
threaten the privacy and safety of witnesses.”); Ion Meyn, Discovery and
Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1091, 1127–28 (2014) (discussing the concern that witnesses and their families
will be intimidated through “threats, pressures, and physical harm” by
defendants through pretrial disclosure (citation omitted)); Steven M. Goldstein
et al., Response to the Majority’s Report, NYSBA TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY FINAL REPORT 81 (Dec. 1, 2014) [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT,
Response to Majority] (detailing concerns about witness safety that arise with
increased disclosure).
21. See, e.g., Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632 (discussing the increased time and
resources necessary to prepare documents pre-trial if prosecutors are required
to expand disclosure); see also Baer, supra note 9, at 51 (detailing how open-file
rules often mandate early disclosure, requiring prosecutors to continually
examine incoming information to determine if it’s discoverable).
22. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995) (“[T]he individual
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”); Robert
Farb, Discovery in Criminal Cases, in NORTH CAROLINA SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK (Jessica Smith ed. 2015), available at http://benchbook.sog.unc.edu/
criminal/discovery (discussing the duty of North Carolina prosecutors to
investigate and obtain discoverable information from law enforcement).
23. See Gershman, supra note 20, at 151 (“It is unreasonable to believe that
the disclosure of impeachment information . . . would affect in any meaningful
way the reliability of a defendant’s open acknowledgment of guilt.”).
24. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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exculpatory and impeachment evidence before trial—is adequate
to protect defendants’ rights. 25 Some also point out that
prosecutors often already provide broader discovery than
required by law—and that in cases where prosecutors withhold
evidence, they may have good reasons for doing so. 26
Even as the debates between advocates and opponents of
open-file discovery proceed, little has been written about the
real-world operation of systems that have adopted the practice.
To our knowledge, only one empirical study has examined the
practical effects of open-file pre-plea discovery, and its scope was
limited. 27 This study was conducted less than a year after the
introduction of open-file discovery in Texas, and it focused
primarily on how the system was being implemented, rather than
on its broader costs and benefits. 28 Furthermore, no empirical
research has compared jurisdictions with broad discovery rules to
jurisdictions with more restrictive rules. As a result, the debates
about optimal pre-plea discovery remain driven largely by
speculation and anecdotal evidence, rather than hard data.
This Article aims to take a step toward filling that empirical
gap. We describe below a study we conducted from September
2014 to January 2015, in which we surveyed prosecutors and
defense attorneys in Virginia and North Carolina about their
pre-plea discovery practices. These two adjacent states are
demographically and geographically similar, but have notably
different discovery rules. North Carolina mandates open-file
discovery early in the criminal process. 29 Virginia, by contrast,
25.
26.

Infra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
Cf. BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN
ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING—TECHNICAL REPORT 75 (2012)
(noting broad agreement among prosecutors that discretion is necessary to allow
them to fashion what they perceive as the most effective and fair responses).
27. See TEX. CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS ASS’N & MANAGING TO EXCELLENCE CORP.,
THE COST OF COMPLIANCE: A LOOK AT THE FISCAL IMPACT AND PROCESS CHANGES
OF THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT iv–v (2015) [hereinafter TCDLA REPORT ON
MICHAEL MORTON ACT] (examining the effects of the Michael Morton Act, which
introduced open-file discovery in Texas). For a discussion of four other empirical
studies of discovery practices, none of which focuses on open-file or pre-plea
discovery, see infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
28. See TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL MORTON ACT, supra note 27, at v
(noting that the study examines the fiscal impact of implementing open-file
discovery in Texas).
29. Requests for discovery must be filed within ten days of finding of
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requires much less disclosure and protects police reports and
witness names and statements from discovery (unless they are
exculpatory, in which case they must be disclosed before trial). 30
Through a comparison of survey responses in these two
states, our study first examines whether rules mandating early
open-file discovery result in significantly different pre-plea
disclosure practices. Relatedly, it evaluates whether open-file
rules result in the disclosure of exculpatory evidence more
reliably than traditional closed-file approaches. The survey next
analyzes whether prosecutors in North Carolina attempt to evade
stricter open-file rules by negotiating discovery waivers as part of
plea negotiations. Finally, it solicits the general views of
prosecutors and defense attorneys in both states concerning the
advantages and disadvantages of open-file discovery.
We find that discovery rules do have a significant effect on
discovery practices. 31 As might be expected, the open-file regime
of North Carolina results in more extensive and predictable
disclosure of several key categories of evidence than do the more
restrictive Virginia rules. 32 This is so even though a large
majority of Virginia prosecutors reported that they voluntarily
provide broader discovery than required by law. 33
More surprisingly, we find that open-file rules do not
necessarily produce broader pre-plea disclosure of certain
evidence that can be used to impeach prosecution witnesses. 34
probable cause, or the date the defendant waives probable cause. If the
defendant is unrepresented, the ten days starts when defendant consents to
proceeding on an information, or service of true bill upon defendant, or
appointment of counsel. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-902(d) (West 2015).
30. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11. Brady also requires pre-trial disclosure of witness
statements that may be exculpatory or have impeachment value. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (explaining that any witness statement
that “would tend to exculpate [a defendant] or reduce the penalty” must be
disclosed). But per Ruiz and related Fourth Circuit and Virginia state law,
impeachment, and possibly factually exculpatory, evidence need not be provided
before a guilty plea. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–32 (2002)
(concluding that the government is not required to disclose exculpatory evidence
before a guilty plea is entered); see also infra note 188 and accompanying text
(discussing Fourth Circuit and Virginia state law).
31. Infra Part III.C.1.
32. Id.
33. Infra note 171 and accompanying text.
34. For example, at the pre-plea stage, Virginia prosecutors are more likely
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Our finding likely reflects the fact that this evidence often does
not become part of the file until closer to trial and is thus not
required to be disclosed under open-file rules before a guilty
plea. 35 The interaction of open-file discovery with the “due
diligence” exception to Brady (under which prosecutors are
relieved from the duty to disclose exculpatory and impeachment
evidence when the defense can obtain the evidence through its
own reasonable efforts) 36 also helps explain why the North
Carolina disclosure rate of this evidence is lower than that in
Virginia. Because North Carolina prosecutors consistently
disclose witness names early in the process, they may expect
defense attorneys to research for themselves whether the
witnesses have any prior convictions. Virginia prosecutors, on the
other hand, do not typically turn over witness names at the
pre-plea stage and thus cannot expect defense attorneys to check
witnesses’ criminal records.
Although open-file does not consistently increase
impeachment evidence provided to the defense, we found that it
does enhance the disclosure of factually exculpatory evidence to
some degree. Open-file rules appear to make the most difference
where the exculpatory nature of the evidence is not obvious. 37 In
such cases, prosecutors in Virginia have to make a deliberate
than North Carolina prosecutors to disclose evidence of witness criminal
records. Infra notes 179–181 and accompanying text.
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-902(d) (West 2015) (requiring
disclosure within ten working days of the probable-cause hearing).
36. Compare, e.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 686 (4th Cir. 2002)
(holding that information available to the defendant through diligent
investigation need not be disclosed), and United States v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d
628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that, because the defendant could have
obtained a copy of a transcript himself, the Government’s failure to disclose was
not a Brady violation), with Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1137 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that a prosecutor’s failure to disclose based on a premise that the
defendant could have found the information through due diligence is “contrary
to federal law . . . and unsound public policy”). Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976) (noting in passing that Brady applies to evidence that
“had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense”). For a critique
of the “due diligence” rule, see Thea Johnson, What You Should Have Known
Can Hurt You: Knowledge, Access, and Brady in the Balance, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1 (2015); Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The
Erosion of Brady Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV.
138 (2012).
37. Infra Part III.C.2.
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judgment that the evidence is indeed exculpatory and material to
the case in order to disclose it, whereas North Carolina
prosecutors provide it automatically as long as the evidence is
part of the file. We explain how our findings on this point fit
within the broader literature discussing the causes of
non-compliance with Brady. 38
Our survey results also suggest that neither open-file nor
closed-file rules ensure consistent disclosure of Brady evidence
when the evidence is in the possession of investigating agencies,
rather than prosecutors. It appears that, in some cases, the
evidence is either not recorded or not transmitted by law
enforcement pre-plea, and as a result, it is not included in the file
that is turned over to the defense as part of initial discovery. 39
Our findings on this point are consistent with commentaries
arguing that the success of open-file depends critically on
investigators who are required and trained to document and
convey evidence to the prosecution in a timely fashion. 40
We find further that the parties do not attempt to evade the
open-file rules in North Carolina by negotiating away discovery
rights. Discovery waivers remain exceptional and are limited to
specific types of evidence, such as the identity of confidential
informants or the results of drug testing. 41 This result tends to
contradict arguments that open-file is too onerous and would lead
prosecutors to bargain for discovery waivers. Open-ended
responses by North Carolina prosecutors and defense attorneys
likewise indicate that liberal pre-plea discovery does not impose
undue logistical burdens on prosecutors or undue hardships on
witnesses.
38. Infra notes 58–62, 200–201 and accompanying text.
39. Infra notes 322, 331–340 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games
Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 545 (2007) (observing that
governmental agencies outside of the prosecutor’s control may decide not to
disclose information to the prosecutor, leading defendants to believe, incorrectly,
that they have obtained all relevant information); Meyn, supra note 20, at 1122
(“The term ‘open-file policy’ is misleading. The policy provides only a vague
degree of access to the prosecutorial file and no access to the police department’s
investigatory file.”); Prosser, supra note 19, at 601, 606–07 (explaining issues
that can arise when information is not reduced to writing and is therefore
undiscoverable under some jurisdictions’ rules).
41. Infra Part III.C.3.
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With respect to the subjective views and impressions of
prosecutors and defense attorneys in the two states, we uncover
some similarities and some differences. 42 We find that
prosecutors and defense attorneys tend to provide quite different
accounts of what evidence is actually provided before a guilty
plea. The two groups of legal actors also have distinct views of the
disadvantages of open-file discovery, though they largely agree
with respect to the advantages of open-file. We further uncover
notable differences in the views of prosecutors in North Carolina
and prosecutors in Virginia. The latter tend to view open-file
discovery far more warily than do their North Carolina
counterparts.
We discuss possible reasons for our findings and conclude
with some implications for debates about discovery reform. While
we believe that further empirical work would be helpful in
measuring the direct effects of different discovery rules, our
findings offer the first data-driven endorsement of the North
Carolina open-file system over the closed-file system used in
Virginia. While the open-file system may not always produce
better disclosure of impeachment or all categories of exculpatory
evidence, it does generally enhance disclosure of most types of
evidence. It also appears to reduce discovery disputes and
promote speedier dispositions of cases.
II. Regulating Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases
A. The Constitutional Baseline
Although discovery rules vary significantly across the United
States, constitutional doctrine sets a baseline below which
neither states nor the federal system can fall. In 1963, in Brady v.
Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution requires prosecutors to disclose, before
trial, evidence that may exculpate defendants or mitigate their
sentences. 43 In subsequent cases, the Court affirmed that
42. Infra Part III.C.4.
43. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
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prosecutors must also reveal to the defense impeachment
evidence, i.e., evidence that tends to undermine the credibility of
government witnesses. 44 Critically, the Court also held that
prosecutors are responsible for disclosing not only evidence in
their possession, but also information that is in the custody of law
enforcement officers. 45 A number of state statutes, lower court
decisions, ethical rules, and local court rules have reinforced the
Brady rules for disclosing exculpatory evidence. 46
The Brady framework for discovery aims to ensure fair and
accurate outcomes in criminal cases. 47 It is supposed to achieve
this goal by compelling prosecutors to consider weaknesses in
their case and alerting defense attorneys to evidence in the
defendant’s favor. 48 In practice, Brady has not fully delivered on
this promise, for several reasons.
First, the Brady framework provides a remedy for discovery
violations only where the withheld evidence is material to the
outcome—in other words, where it is reasonably likely that
disclosure would have led to a different outcome. 49 But it is often
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
44. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (holding that if
the reliability of a witness can help determine guilt or innocence, information
regarding the reliability of the witness must be disclosed); United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“Impeachment evidence . . . as well as
exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.”).
45. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995) (“[T]he individual
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”).
46. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1980) (requiring disclosure to the accused “all evidence or information known to
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense”); Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure
Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2165 (2010) (noting that state prosecutors “have to
comply not only with the federal constitutional obligations but with disclosure
obligations established by state constitutional decisions, statutes, procedural
rules, and/or ethics rules”); McConkie, supra note 15, at 11–12 (noting that
federal prosecutors have to comply with DOJ internal discovery guidelines and
with state ethical rules pertaining to discovery).
47. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 693.
48. See McConkie, supra note 15, at 13 (explaining that access to
exculpatory and inculpatory evidence is essential for a defendant to understand
the weaknesses of the prosecutor’s case).
49. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (“The evidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
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difficult for defendants to show, after conviction, that the outcome
would have been different had the disclosure occurred. 50 Indeed,
it is a challenge to even learn that certain evidence was never
disclosed. 51 This helps explain why only a small percentage of
Brady violations are even litigated. 52
Another problem with the Brady framework is that it is
addressed primarily to the prosecution, but it is often police
officers who fail to record and turn over exculpatory evidence. 53
In Kyles v. Whitley, 54 the Supreme Court attempted to address
this problem when it noted that prosecutors have “a duty to learn
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” 55 It
expressed hope that police and prosecutors could devise
procedures that would help them fulfill this constitutional duty. 56
result of the proceeding would have been different.”); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454
(“The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence.”); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999) (explaining that a
Brady violation would be found only where the nondisclosure prejudiced the
accused); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The
Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 647 (2002) (discussing
the Court’s increasingly strict materiality standard). For a sampling of the
scholarly critique of the materiality standard, see, e.g., Medwed, supra note 17,
at 1543–44.
50. See Burke, supra note 17, at 489–90 (explaining that, even where
defendants learn of non-disclosure, the materiality standard sets a high bar
many defendants cannot meet).
51. See Medwed, supra note 17, at 1540 (“[P]roven Brady errors hint at a
larger problem because the vast majority of suspect disclosure choices occur in
the inner sanctuaries of prosecutorial offices and never see the light of day.”).
52. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 17, at 489 (“If [prosecutors] intentionally
suppress evidence that might jeopardize a conviction, they can do so in the
comfort of knowing there is little chance the evidence will ever come to light and
therefore only a remote possibility of a challenge to their decision to withhold
it.”); Medwed, supra note 17, at 1541–42 (“Defense lawyers . . . usually lack the
‘time, resources, or expertise’ to conduct the type of massive pretrial
investigation needed to ferret out this evidence. When a prosecutor chooses not
to disclose evidence, that decision is seldom revealed to outsiders . . . .”).
53. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 40, at 545 (“Prosecutors know that
Brady evidence may be in the files of other government agencies, i.e., the police
and other law enforcement agencies involved in the investigation.”).
54. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
55. Id. at 437.
56. See id. at 438 (“[N]either is there any serious doubt that ‘procedures
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In practice, this requirement has been difficult to meet because
prosecutors have no supervisory authority over law enforcement
and therefore cannot reliably ensure that officers document and
transmit exculpatory evidence. 57
More broadly, Brady does little to address what is perhaps
the most common reason for nondisclosure—prosecutors’ failure
to recognize exculpatory evidence as such. 58 As scholars have
amply documented, such omissions may occur entirely
inadvertently. Prosecutors may fail to disclose as a result of
insufficient training, 59 a lack of time or resources to review the
evidence carefully, 60 or cognitive biases that prevent them (as
well as law enforcement officers) from appreciating that certain
evidence might undermine their case. 61 While Brady sanctions
and regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor’s] burden and to
insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every other
lawyer who deals with it.’” (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972)).
57. As a result, a number of lower federal courts have interpreted Kyles
more narrowly and have found no due process violation where the prosecution
lacks authority over the person with knowledge of the information or where it
would “place an unreasonable burden” on the prosecutor to search unrelated
files for Brady evidence. Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment
Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team,
67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 755–56 (2015).
58. See Medwed, supra note 17, at 1542 (noting how, as a result of cognitive
biases, “prosecutor[s] may process information selectively, undervaluing the
potentially exculpatory evidence and overrating the strength of the rest of the
prosecution case”).
59. See Prosser, supra note 19, at 551, 569 (discussing how inexperienced
prosecutors may have difficulty discerning what must be disclosed).
60. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests:
How Excessive Prosecution Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U.L.
REV. 261, 286 (2011) (“[W]hen prosecutors carry excessive caseloads, they
handle them in a triage fashion. . . . If evidence is lurking in a case file that will
ultimately lead to a defendant’s case being dismissed, it will linger there until
the prosecutor has time to focus on the matter.”).
61. See Burke, supra note 17, at 495 (describing “the well-documented
tendency to favor evidence that confirms one’s working hypothesis”); see also
Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind: Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations, and the
Prosecutorial Organizational Culture, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2013)
(noting how the partisan culture of prosecutors’ offices tends to exacerbate
confirmation biases that prevent adequate disclosure of Brady evidence); Susan
Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49
HOW. L.J. 475, 479 (2006) (discussing prosecutors’ “tendency to develop a fierce
loyalty to a particular version of events: the guilt of a particular suspect or
group of suspects”); Keith R. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
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theoretically apply even where the nondisclosure is inadvertent,
the infrequency of such sanctions provides little incentive for
police departments and prosecutors to institute robust training
and auditing necessary to prevent Brady violations. 62
Finally, an important reason why Brady law has proven
inadequate is that it applies before trial, yet the vast majority of
cases today are resolved through guilty pleas. 63 The Supreme
Court has expressly held that prosecutors need not turn over
impeachment evidence before a guilty plea, 64 and a number of
lower courts have applied this holding to factually exculpatory
evidence as well. 65 The Court explained that pre-plea disclosure
of impeachment evidence is not required because: (1) the duty to
disclose impeachment evidence protects the fairness of the trial,
not the fairness of criminal proceedings more broadly; (2) earlier
disclosure would increase the risks of witness intimidation; and
(3) pre-plea disclosure of impeachment evidence would unduly
burden prosecutors. 66
For
all
these
reasons—application,
timing,
and
enforcement—the Brady doctrine fails to guard adequately
against failures to disclose exculpatory evidence. Some
jurisdictions have attempted to strengthen Brady’s requirements
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292
(2006) (noting how tunnel vision leads prosecutors “to focus on a particular
conclusion and then filter all evidence in a case through the lens provided by
that conclusion”).
62. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1573, 1593 (2003) (noting that “courts and disciplinary authorities do not
sanction prosecutors for failing to disclose evidence as required by the [ethical]
rule but not by other law”); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125, 172–73
(2004) [hereinafter Medwed, The Zeal Deal] (discussing the reticence of courts
and disciplinary authorities to punish prosecutorial misconduct).
63. In state systems, guilty pleas accounted for 94% of felony convictions in
2006. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—
STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2009).
64. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–32 (2002).
65. See, e.g., Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
a prosecutor need not disclose exculpatory evidence when a defendant waives a
trial and pleads guilty). But see, e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782,
787–88 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that if a prosecutor fails to disclose exculpatory
evidence of actual innocence before a defendant enters a guilty plea, this would
likely violate the Due Process Clause).
66. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629, 631–32.
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to some degree by statute or ethical rule. A few have abandoned
the materiality requirement, 67 while others have required that
exculpatory evidence be disclosed “as soon as practicable.” 68 Such
reforms remain the exception rather than rule, however, and they
do not fully overcome Brady’s shortcomings. For example, the
timing requirement is often too flexible and fails to guarantee
that disclosure would occur before a guilty plea. 69 More
problematically, even where rules have expanded Brady
requirements on paper, enforcement of the rules remains weak. 70
As a result, the problem of police and prosecutors failing to
recognize exculpatory evidence remains. 71
B. Beyond the Baseline: Two Models of Discovery in Criminal
Cases
Beyond these requirements for disclosing exculpatory
evidence, states and the federal system have adopted rules that
mandate the disclosure of certain specified types of evidence, such
as documents, expert reports, and statements by the defendant. 72
67. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1(b)(8) (requiring the disclosure of
information that is “material or information which tends to mitigate or negate
the defendant’s guilt as to the offense charged, or which would tend to reduce
the defendant’s punishment therefor” (emphasis added)); MD. R. 4-262(d)(1),
4-263(d)(5)-(6) (requiring disclosure of information that “tends to exculpate the
defendant or negate or mitigate the defendant’s guilt or punishment as to the
offense charged”); see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(a)(vi) (omitting a materiality
requirement for disclosure of certain enumerated types of Brady evidence);
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(ix) (same).
68. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c)–(d); WIS. STAT. § 971.23(1)(h) (2007).
69. Even ethical rules like Model Rule 3.8(d), which have aimed to require
earlier disclosure of exculpatory evidence, remain ambiguous as to the precise
timing of the disclosure. Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 958 (2008).
70. See, e.g., id. at 958 (noting that Rule 3.8(d) has not been enforced
against prosecutors who fail to disclose exculpatory evidence before pleas); John
G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 458 n.86 (2001) (same); Green, supra note 62, at
1593 (explaining that prosecutors are not sanctioned for failure to disclose
under the Model Rules).
71. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text (examining factors
contributing to prosecutorial failures to recognize and disclose exculpatory
evidence).
72. See generally MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL
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The breadth of items required to be disclosed and the timing for
the disclosure vary significantly from one jurisdiction to the
next. 73 One can distinguish two models that fall at each end of
the spectrum. On one end are states such as Virginia and New
York, which largely follow the federal rules of criminal procedure
and require a relatively limited set of items to be disclosed. 74
Critically, such “restrictive” jurisdictions do not mandate pretrial
disclosure of witness names, witness statements, or police
reports. 75 They also frequently tie disclosure to the date of trial
and thus fail to ensure that disclosure occurs before a guilty
plea. 76 We call this the “closed-file” model, and we identify ten
states and the federal system as belonging in this category. 77
On the other side of the spectrum are states such as North
Carolina and Texas, following the “open-file” or “liberal” discovery
model. 78 While states that follow this model differ somewhat in
the scope of information they require to be disclosed, the chief
characteristics of their discovery rules are similar. The
prosecution is generally required to disclose, at some point after
arraignment, either its entire case file (minus work product) or a
broad set of evidentiary materials that encompasses nearly
everything in the file (minus work product). 79 The key feature of
such liberal discovery is that it presumptively requires the
disclosure of witness names, witness statements, and police
reports. 80
PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 282 (2007).
73. Id. at 286–87.
74. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (requiring limited disclosure by the prosecution
upon motion by the defendant).
75. See, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11 (requiring only defendant statements,
criminal records, and certain books, reports, and tests to be disclosed before
trial). For other examples, see rules categorized as “closed-file” in Appendix B.
76. See, e.g., id. (requiring motion for disclosure at least ten days before
trial). For other examples, see rules categorized as “closed-file” in Appendix B.
77. Infra Appendix B.
78. Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., COLO. CRIM. P. 16 (requiring disclosure of a broad set of
evidentiary materials); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (West 2015) (same);
OHIO CRIM. R. 16 (same); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015)
(same). For other examples, see rules categorized as “open-file” in Appendix B.
80. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a) (West 2015) (requiring that
the prosecution disclose its entire file, including witness names and statements,
co-defendant statements, investigating officers’ notes, police reports, and other
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Even when states adopt liberal discovery provisions, they
also enact measures to protect witness safety and the integrity of
investigations. Typically, if prosecutors present particular
concerns that disclosure may endanger the safety of witnesses or
the integrity of the investigation, the court can issue protective
orders allowing non-disclosure. 81 The law may also limit
disclosure to self-represented defendants because of fears that
they might tamper with the evidence or otherwise interfere with
the investigation. 82 Finally, defense attorneys may be restricted
in communicating certain witness information (such as home
address and other personal data) to their clients. 83
We identify seventeen states with rules that follow this
“open-file” model. 84 The list includes states that, while not
directly
requiring
the
prosecution
to
disclose
all
non-work-product items in its file, mandate the disclosure of
critical items such as witness names, witness statements, and
police reports. 85 Although these states remain a minority, the
trend in recent years is in the direction of broader and earlier
discovery. At times, the triggers for reform have been high-profile
exonerations of people who had been wrongfully convicted as a
result of the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence. 86 Concerns about fairness and wrongful convictions
items).
81. See, e.g., COLO. CRIM. P. 16(III)(d) (allowing the court to restrict
discovery on a showing of cause); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15A-903(a)(3) to
908(2) (West 2015) (limiting disclosure of discoverable information upon a
showing of potential harm to a witness or “other particularized, compelling need
not to disclose”); OHIO CRIM. R. 16(D) (listing scenarios in which a prosecutor
may refuse to disclose otherwise discoverable information).
82. See OHIO CRIM. R.16(L)(2) (“The trial court specifically may regulate the
time, place, and manner of a pro se defendant’s access to any discoverable
material not to exceed the scope of this rule.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
39.14 (d) (West 2015) (providing that pro se defendants may review but not copy
materials in the file).
83. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(f) (West 2015)
(requiring defense attorneys to redact such information); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(j)
(restricting disclosure of certain sensitive personal information); OHIO CRIM. R.
16(C) (allowing prosecutors to designate some information for defense counsel
only).
84. See infra Appendix B (listing states that have open-file rules, which
require disclosure of witness names, witness statements, and police reports).
85. See generally, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1.
86. See Phillip Bantz, Death Row Inmate’s Exoneration in North Carolina
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drove North Carolina and Texas to adopt open-file discovery in
2004 and 2014, respectively. 87 In other jurisdictions, reforms
reflected a mix of motivations, but chiefly a belief that broader
discovery is both fairer and more efficient than restrictive
discovery. 88
Another twenty-three states fall somewhere in the middle of
the spectrum of pre-plea discovery. 89 They may require the
prosecution to disclose witness names and statements but not
police reports. 90 Or they may require the disclosure of witness
names, but not statements, 91 or of only portions of a police report
(e.g., those concerning surveillance or identification procedures). 92
Many states falling on the restrictive end of the spectrum, or
in the middle, are in the process of considering a shift toward
broader and earlier discovery. 93 In this process, debates about the
Inspired Change, N.C. LAW. WEEKLY, May 3, 2013, 2013 WLNR 11476236
(discussing how the exoneration of Alan Gell, who had been wrongfully
convicted of murder in part because of withheld exculpatory evidence, led to the
passage of legislation requiring open-file disclosure); Guy Loranger, The Nifong
Effect, N.C. LAW. WEEKLY, June 4, 2007, 2007 WLNR 29556667 (discussing the
Duke University lacrosse team case in which the prosecutor, Mike Nifong,
withheld exculpatory evidence that was ultimately unearthed by the defendants
because of North Carolina’s open-file discovery rules); see also JUDICIARY & CIVIL
JURISPRUDENCE COMM., HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, BILL ANALYSIS, S.B.
1611, at 4 (Tex. 2013) (explaining that the change in discovery rules in Texas
was motivated by the case of Michael Morton, who spent 25 years in prison
before being exonerated).
87. See Bantz, supra note 86 (crediting Gell’s exoneration with sparking
legislative changes); JUDICIARY & CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE COMM., supra note 86, at
4 (discussing cases in North Carolina and Texas that led to an open-file
discovery system).
88. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 (committee comment to 2003
amendment) (“Codification of the common practice of initial disclosure before or
at the arraignment phase of the proceedings is intended to facilitate effective
communication and the efficient resolution of issues.”); OHIO CRIM. R. 16 (staff
notes to July 1, 2010 amendments) (“The purpose of the revisions to Criminal
Rule 16 is to provide for a just determination of criminal proceedings and to
secure the fair, impartial, and speedy administration of justice through the
expanded scope of materials to be exchanged between the parties.”).
89. See generally Appendix B.
90. MISS. UNIF. R. COURT CIR. & CTY. CT. PRACTICE, R. 9.04.
91. ARK. R. CRIM. PROC., R. 17.
92. HAW. R. PEN. PROC., R. 16.
93. See, e.g., N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, DISCOVERY IN NEW YORK CRIMINAL
COURTS: SURVEY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2006) [hereinafter NYCLA
REPORT] (examining criminal discovery practice in New York and recommending
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costs and benefits of open-file discovery have played a prominent
role. 94
C. The Rise of the Open-File Model: Costs and Benefits
States considering discovery reform over the last decade have
heard strong opinions both in favor of and against a shift toward
the open-file model. Advocates of open-file have argued that it is
the best means for ensuring the consistent disclosure of
exculpatory evidence. 95 Open-file discovery largely eliminates the
need for police and prosecutors to evaluate whether specific items
of evidence qualify as Brady material. 96 Instead, it gives the
defense the opportunity to review all recorded evidence and
determine for itself which items might be favorable to the
defendant. 97 Advocates have therefore argued that the practice
resolves one of the key problems of the Brady regime—
prosecutors and police officers failing to identify evidence as
exculpatory. 98
“more open and earlier disclosure”). In 2015, Virginia went through its third
unsuccessful effort to reform its own restrictive discovery rules. See Tom
Jackman, Virginia Decides Not to Change Rules That Withhold Documents from
Defense, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/va-decides-not-to-change-rules-that-withhold-documents-from
-defense/2015/12/12/6f76d982-9dc5-11e5-bce4-708fe33e3288_story.html
(last
visited Apr. 7, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
94. See, e.g., Jackman, supra note 93 (discussing arguments for and against
open-file discovery); TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE STUDY, supra note 18, at 1–3
(same).
95. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 17, at 514 (arguing that open-file discovery
removes prosecutorial discretion, resulting in defendant access to all material
exculpatory evidence); Moore, supra note 15, at 1372 (arguing that open-file
discovery “levels the playing field” and helps ensure public confidence in the
justice system through more reliable verdicts); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 283 n.23 (1999) (recognizing that open-file discovery “may increase the
efficiency and the fairness of the criminal process”).
96. See Burke, supra note 17, at 514 (arguing that open-file discovery
removes the burden from prosecutors to determine what is material exculpatory
evidence).
97. See McConkie, supra note 15, at 13 (explaining that access to
exculpatory and inculpatory evidence is essential for a defendant to understand
the weaknesses of the prosecution’s case).
98. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 17, at 1540 (“In some [wrongful
conviction] cases, prosecutors simply deemed the evidence not to be
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Because open-file discovery must be provided early in the
process (typically at arraignment or soon thereafter), it is also
defended on the grounds that it helps to ensure fair and informed
guilty pleas. 99 Early and broad discovery provides defense
attorneys with critical information that enables them to counsel
their clients more effectively. This is particularly important in
the many cases where—as a result of an underfunded and
overwhelmed indigent defense system—defense attorneys lack
the time or resources to investigate independently. 100 Open-file
offers informational benefits to the prosecution as well. Because
the defense is better educated and prepared early on, it can
provide critical feedback to the prosecution about potential
weaknesses in the case and allow the prosecution to make a more
informed decision about the disposition of the matter. 101
Supporters of open-file discovery further argue that the
practice fosters cooperation between the parties and reduces
discovery disputes. As the parties gain clarity about the facts in a
timely fashion, open-file is also said to promote speedier
resolution of the case, whether through a guilty plea or
dismissal. 102 For all these reasons, many see open-file discovery
as more efficient than more restrictive regimes. Indeed, efficiency
has been a key reason behind discovery reforms in a number of
jurisdictions. 103
important.”); Prosser, supra note 19, at 600–01 (“[Open-file discovery] would
remove much of the uncertainty inherent in the discretionary disclosure
decisions prosecutors now have to make.”).
99. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 15, at 1466 (arguing that pre-plea
disclosure promotes accurate and voluntary guilty pleas that “more closely
mirror[] trial outcomes”); Moore, supra note 15, at 1372 (“Providing defendants
with information obtained through government’s superior investigative
resources levels the playing field.”); Ostrow, supra note 15, at 1583
(“[D]isclosure of evidence is critical to the fairness of the guilty-plea process.”).
100. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1624 (arguing that “broad discovery
partially compensates for restricted defense counsel”).
101. See Burke, supra note 17, at 516 (“Defendants confronted with the
evidence against them may be quicker to plead guilty if the evidence is strong,
or to argue persuasively for dismissal if the evidence is weak, leading to earlier
resolution of cases and the elimination of unnecessary trials.” (citation
omitted)).
102. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 17, at 1560 (“Defendants who are fully
aware of the strength of the case against them might express greater
willingness to accept plea bargains than those who lack such insight.”).
103. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 (committee comment to 2003
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Finally, proponents of mandatory open-file rules contend that
such rules ensure more consistent discovery practices and equal
treatment of similarly situated defendants. In closed-file states,
individual prosecutors or prosecutor’s offices often provide
broader discovery voluntarily, on a case-by-case basis. 104 While
such discretionary discovery may benefit individual defendants, it
creates divergent practices within the same state. 105 It invites
diverse interpretations of “open-file,” some of which result in
significantly narrower disclosures than would be required under
a formal, mandatory open-file policy. 106
More problematically, discretionary discovery invites the
risks of favoritism and discrimination. 107 Studies have found, for
amendment) (“Codification of the common practice of initial disclosure before or
at the arraignment phase of the proceedings is intended to facilitate effective
communication and the efficient resolution of issues.” (emphasis added)); OHIO
CRIM. R. 16 (staff notes to July 1, 2010 Amendments) (“The purpose of the
revisions to Criminal Rule 16 is to provide for a just determination of criminal
proceedings and to secure the fair, impartial, and speedy administration of
justice through the expanded scope of materials to be exchanged between the
parties.” (emphasis added)); see also Allard Ringnalda, Procedural Tradition
and the Convergence of Criminal Procedure Systems: The Case of the
Investigation and Disclosure of Evidence in Scotland, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1133,
1151 (2014) (arguing that a number of common-law countries have recently
expanded discovery in criminal cases primarily with the aim of improving the
efficiency of the process).
104. See, e.g., TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE STUDY, supra note 18, at 5 (finding
that under the previous restrictive Texas discovery rules, some prosecutor’s
offices used a form of open-file policy); NYCLA REPORT, supra note 93, at 1
(finding the same result under restrictive New York discovery rules).
105. See, e.g., NYCLA REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (noting that procedures
for disclosure vary widely in four different boroughs of New York City); TEXAS
DEFENDER SERVICE STUDY, supra note 18, at 5 (finding inconsistent disclosure
practices across Texas under previous restrictive discovery rules).
106. TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE STUDY, supra note 18, at 3 (finding that
discretionary open-file policy in Texas resulted in “significantly fewer
disclosures” than American Bar Association recommendations); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do with It?,
23 CRIM. JUST. 28, 33 (2008) (noting that jurisdictions with voluntary open-file
procedures “do not provide information much beyond that mandated by Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”).
107. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1229 (1975) (“Although most defense attorneys do seem able to
secure relatively broad informal discovery in jurisdictions in which the statutory
right to discovery is extremely limited, some defendants suffer because their
attorneys are not sufficiently trusted by the prosecutor’s office to receive the
usual privileges.”); Prosser, supra note 19, at 600 (explaining that removing
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example, that when prosecutors have discretion over how much
discovery to provide, they make decisions based on factors such as
the relationship between the prosecutor and the defense attorney,
thus potentially punishing clients for the “sins” of their
attorneys. 108 Open-file rules reduce the possibility for such
discriminatory treatment, at least when it comes to the discovery
process. 109 It also reduces the risk that some defense attorneys
will represent their clients less zealously in order to remain in
the prosecutor’s good graces and receive favors such as broader
discovery. 110
Although the popularity of open-file laws is growing,
important concerns about their effects remain. The first and chief
concern is that open-file discovery endangers witness safety and
witness privacy and therefore conflicts with the government’s
duty to protect the public. 111 Relatedly, opponents of open-file
prosecutorial discretion will “equalize the disclosure of information among all
defendants”).
108. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 19, at 51 (finding that “prosecutors
will make the discovery procedures more cumbersome for certain defense
attorneys whom they disliked or distrusted”); Alschuler, supra note 107, at 1225
(“Recent studies indicate, however, that the benefit of informal discovery results
not from an attorney’s position as a public defender but simply from the
attorney’s personal relationship with individual prosecutors.”); see also
Frederick & Stemen, supra note 26, at 102 (reporting prosecutor statements
that a better relationship with a defense attorney would result in “better flow of
information and a more just resolution to a case”).
109. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 104, at 59 (arguing that open-file
disclosure models ensure “accountability and transparency” through equal
disclosure among all prosecutors).
110. See Alschuler, supra note 107, at 1229 (“[T]he absence of a formal right
of discovery seems to impose pressures upon defense attorneys to defend their
clients less vigorously than they could. . . . it makes defense attorneys beholden
to the prosecution and poses an obvious danger to their independence.”).
111. See, e.g., Sara N. Pole, Dep’t of State Police, Minority Comments,
SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY RULES
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE & JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VA. 55 (Dec. 2,
2014) (discussing how open-file discovery “requires prosecutors and judges to
gamble with witness safety”); NYSBA REPORT, Response to Majority, supra note
20, at 81 (noting that, because open-file discovery often occurs early in the trial
process, prosecutors and judges will have trouble “accurately predict[ing] which
defendants are likely to intimidate, threaten, harm, or kill the witnesses against
them”); see also Baer, supra note 9, at 55 (“Information that convinces a
defendant to admit his guilt is valuable to society; information that enables him
to establish his innocence falsely by lying and threatening others is not.”);
Gershman, supra note 20, at 145 (“[T]here are considerable costs involved in
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worry that disclosure of witness information would discourage
some citizens from cooperating with law enforcement and
jeopardize the integrity of investigations. 112
Open-file discovery rules do provide some safeguards against
abuses of the process. Typically, the rules allow prosecutors to
apply for a protective order to keep such sensitive witness-related
information from the defense. 113 But opponents of open-file
discovery see such provisions as insufficiently protective of
witness interests. As one opponent noted, they “require
prosecutors and judges to gamble with witness safety by
attempting to predict the unpredictable.” 114 Opponents further
note that applications for protective orders depend on prosecutors
recognizing that certain information in their files might endanger
a witness. But overworked and harried prosecutors may not have
the time or energy to review the evidence carefully before
disclosing it and may miss signs of potential threats to
witnesses. 115 Some critics of open-file have also argued that
protective orders would be insufficient to ensure witness safety
because:
[T]rial courts are not comfortable with ambiguous proof of
threats. They balk at addressing the kinds of threats more
commonly seen, such as property mysteriously destroyed,
defendants’ friends simply driving by a witness’s home several
times, calls from blocked or unknown numbers, and

broadening preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence—costs that drain the
efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources as well as threaten the
privacy and safety of witnesses.”); Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery
Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 655 (2013) [hereinafter
Federal Criminal Discovery Reform] (citing Deputy Attorney General James M.
Cole’s Senate Judiciary Committee testimony against proposed expansion of
federal discovery).
112. See Pole, supra note 111, at 55 (noting concern about a “chilling effect”
on victims and witnesses and that “[the U.S. Department of Justice] estimates
only 50% of crime is reported and eighty-six (86%) of [Commonwealth Attorneys
in Virginia] polled have had witnesses or victims express concerns about their
information being released”).
113. Supra note 81.
114. Pole, supra note 111, at 55.
115. See id. at 56 (noting that “69% of CAs [Commonwealth Attorneys in
Virginia] polled said they would not have the funds, or would be a burden [sic],
to redact information from criminal investigative files”).
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statements to witnesses using just the right kind of tone or
inflection. 116

A second concern is that an open-file discovery regime would
be unduly burdensome, particularly for prosecutors and law
enforcement officers. 117 For example, prosecutors would need to
maintain a log of documents disclosed to the defense to avoid
claims that certain evidence was not in the file and was not
disclosed. While an electronic discovery system can help with
this, a switch to such a system is quite costly, at least at the
outset. 118 Open-file discovery is also expected to require
additional manpower to redact documents containing sensitive
information and to litigate protective measures. 119
Some critics further worry that open-file discovery will lead
to defense abuses, such as the fabrication of stories to explain the
evidence, and that this will undermine legitimate prosecutions. 120
More broadly, but along the same lines, commentators have

116. C. David Sands III, Deputy Commonwealth’s Attorney, Cty. of Orange,
Va., Comment Letter on Proposed Virginia Criminal Discovery Rules (June 30,
2015) [hereinafter Letter from C. David Sands III] (on file with author).
117. Supra note 115.
118. SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY RULES TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE & JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
VA., 13–14 (Dec. 2, 2014) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC.
COMM. ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY] (noting that the costs that the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts incurred for implementing a Discovery
Automation System between 2006–2011 were just over $4.18 million).
119. Virginia Ass’n of Commonwealth’s Attorneys (VACA), Public Comment
on the Report of the Special Committee on Criminal Discovery Rules, June 29,
2015 [hereinafter 2015 VACA Letter] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) (“The impact of additional personnel and software systems to integrate
police reports into manageable formats to redact sensitive information will come
at a tremendous cost. The additional burdens placed on the judiciary to review
reports, assess good cause, conduct in camera reviews and hold hearings on
discovery disputes will add untold hours to each case . . . .”).
120. See, e.g., Steven Koppell, An Argument Against Increasing Prosecutors’
Disclosure Requirements Beyond Brady, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 643, 652
(2014) (“[O]pen file discovery could cause defendants to fabricate their defense
strategy in reaction to the evidence against them.”); Brian P. Fox, Note, An
Argument Against Open-File Discovery in Criminal Cases, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 425, 432 (2013). (“[I]f a defendant were entitled to a copy of the
prosecution’s playbook, the defendant could more readily tailor his defense to
combat the prosecution . . . .”).
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argued that open-file discovery will tip the balance of advantages
too far in favor of the defense. 121
Finally, supporters of restrictive discovery rules maintain
that Brady violations are rare and that switching to open-file is
not necessary to ensure that prosecutors consistently disclose
exculpatory evidence. 122 Open-file would thus only “inject
confusion, severe logistical impracticalities, and arbitrary
enforcement to an area of the law that is clearly established,
well-understood, and in no apparent need of overhaul.” 123 Some
further point out that broader discovery is least needed pre-plea,
because defendants would not plead guilty unless they in fact
committed a crime, and they are in the best position to know
whether or not they did so. 124
For some, open-file discovery may be acceptable if left to the
discretion of prosecutors, but not as a mandatory, categorical
rule. 125 Discretionary open-file is lauded as more flexible and
121. See Fox, supra note 120, at 432 (“‘Broader discovery tilts the balance of
advantage, which already favors the defendant . . . too far . . . to the benefit of
the defendant.’” (quoting Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and
the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full
Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 272–73 (2008))); VACA Letter,
supra note 119 (“[T]he proposed changes provide enhanced information flow to
the criminal defendant but not to the prosecution. . . . [W]hat is sought is a
favorable environment for the criminal defendant rather than basic fairness and
true reciprocity.”).
122. See, e.g., Federal Criminal Discovery Reform, supra note 111, at 655
(citing Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole’s Senate Judiciary Committee
testimony against proposed expansion of federal discovery); VACA Letter, supra
note 119 (“There is no empirical data or specifically identified problem to
support significant change [of Virginia discovery rules], nor is there any tangible
evidence to suggest that the current Rules are inadequate in the manner in
which discoverable information is shared.”).
123. Joshua A. Boyles, Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney, City of
Richmond, Va., Comment Letter on Proposed Virginia Criminal Discovery Rules
(June 30, 2015).
124. Cf. Gershman, supra note 20, at 147 (“I am not convinced that
significantly broadening the disclosure of impeachment evidence during plea
bargaining is a necessary reform or that it will make much of a difference to
defendants who are contemplating a plea.”).
125. See VACA Letter, supra note 119 (“The prosecutor can and does root
through the files of the government in order to assure the defendant has the
information that he is entitled to have for his defense. The prosecutor does this
as a matter of duty and obligation. This duty should not be replaced by
rule-based, open file discovery on the cynical assumption that the prosecutor
cannot be trusted.”) .
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more effective, because it allows prosecutors, who are among the
first to learn about threats to witnesses or to the investigation, to
withhold evidence in response to developments in the case. 126
Restricting disclosure in this way is also said to be less costly, as
it does not require prosecutors to apply for a protective order from
the court each time they have a piece of evidence that might
endanger a witness. 127 Because prosecutors are likely to know the
defense attorneys with whom they regularly work, they are also
able to assess whether the defense is likely to abuse the
disclosure to fabricate defenses. 128 One Virginia prosecutor
opined in public comments that different rules should apply in
“high-trust” and “low-trust” jurisdictions, depending on the
relationship between the prosecution and the defense bar. 129
III. The Practice of Pre-Plea Discovery: Comparing the Closed-File
and Open-File Models
A. The Empirical Gap
As legislators and scholars debate the pros and cons of
open-file discovery, it is critical to examine how such discovery
has functioned in the states that have adopted it and how it
compares to more traditional, closed-file discovery regimes. Does
126. Cf. Letter from C. David Sands III, supra note 116 (“I can personally
attest after talking to hundreds of witnesses that threats are almost never as
obvious as a face-to-face demand that they not testify. Threats are purposely
surreptitious, ambiguous, and open-ended. . . . Unfortunately, trial courts are
not comfortable with ambiguous proof of threats.”); FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra
note 26, at 72 (noting that most prosecutors believe that formal policies are
generally harmful “given the complexity and uniqueness of cases”).
127. See VACA Letter, supra note 119 (“Why should it be necessary for the
Commonwealth to have to show good cause in order to redact sensitive
information? This will add more work for judges, more in camera reviews, and
the other litany of consequences mentioned previously.”).
128. Cf. FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 26, at 98 (noting that prosecutor’s
relationships with defense attorneys “certainly affect how a case may be
handled or how certain information is evaluated”).
129. See Letter from C. David Sands III, supra note 116 (suggesting that
“the relationship between the prosecution and defense . . . dictates how
necessary the proposal’s reforms are in different jurisdictions” and observing the
different discovery practices that can be seen in “high-trust” and “lower-trust”
jurisdictions).
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it in fact provide the defense with better access to material
evidence than traditional discovery practices? Does it enhance
pre-plea compliance with Brady? How frequently do the parties
negotiate around open-file rules and waive discovery? 130 Does
open-file pre-plea discovery result in undue risks to witnesses,
dangers to the investigation, fabrication of defenses, or other
burdens to prosecutors or the judicial system? Does it speed up or
slow down dispositions? 131 Does it confer an excessive
“advantage” to the defense that should be remedied by broader
reciprocal discovery? Does it have other disadvantages that have
not been fully considered in the debates?
The answers to these questions are critical to an informed
discussion about the desirability and feasibility of open-file,
pre-plea discovery rules. Yet empirical work in this area has been
scant. We have uncovered only five empirical studies of discovery
practices, and while these studies provided important
information on certain aspects of discovery, none aims to address
the questions above in a comprehensive manner. 132 All five
130. See Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An
Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 83–85 (2015)
(examining discovery waivers in federal courts); Erica G. Franklin, Note,
Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the
Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568–70 (1999) (discussing
plea deals that require a defendant to waive discovery of all non-disclosed
information, including Brady evidence).
131. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 15, at 1383 (“Full open file discovery
appears to be increasing the speed and fairness of plea bargaining.”); THE
JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A POLICY REVIEW 20
(2007),
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/expanded
discoveryincriminalcasesapolicyreview.pdf (“[A]utomatic discovery will cut down
on court time and expense in that motions will not need to be filed for the
appropriate pre-trial discovery to occur.”).
132. See generally LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES (2011) (reporting results of survey of federal
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys about disclosure of Brady evidence in
federal court); NYCLA REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (2006) (reporting results of
survey of New York defense attorneys about discovery practices in different
boroughs of New York City); William Bradford Middlekauff, What Practitioners
Say About Broad Criminal Discovery Practice: More Just—Or Just More
Dangerous?, 9 CRIM. JUST. 14 (1994) (reporting on a study that the New York
State Assembly Codes Committee commissioned about discovery practices in
select cities); TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL MORTON ACT, supra note 27
(discussing findings of survey of Texas attorneys and prosecutors about the
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studies focus on a single jurisdiction and do not compare the
effect of different formal rules on discovery practices. Four of the
studies examine pretrial discovery more broadly and do not
examine what evidence is provided at the pre-plea stage. 133 The
same four studies analyze practices in states with restrictive
rules and therefore have little to say about the operation of
open-file rules. 134 Only one of the studies, conducted in Texas at
the end of 2014 and early 2015, examines open-file discovery
practices. 135 Yet this study was conducted less than a year after
open-file discovery rules were adopted in Texas, so it focuses
mostly on issues related to implementation of the law. 136 It does
not aim to compare open-file practices in Texas to more
restrictive discovery practices, and it does not examine the
reported advantages and disadvantages of open-file discovery
more broadly.
To analyze the effects of different rules on pre-plea discovery
practices, we chose to survey prosecutors and defense attorneys
in North Carolina and Virginia about their experiences with
pre-plea discovery. Our survey focuses on the perceptions of those
involved in discovery and therefore does not directly test the
effects of open-file discovery against those of more restrictive
discovery. However, defense attorneys and prosecutors are the
key actors in discovery and have first-hand experience with most
of its effects. Their views and perceptions therefore offer an
indicator of what really happens at this critical stage of the
criminal process.
implementation of open-file discovery rules); TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE STUDY,
supra note 18 (discussing study of Texas discovery practices before the adoption
of open-file discovery).
133. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 132 (discussing pretrial disclosure of
Brady evidence, but not addressing discovery before guilty pleas); Middlekauff,
supra note 132 (discussing pretrial disclosure, but not pre-plea disclosure);
NYCLA REPORT, supra note 132 (same); TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE STUDY, supra
note 104 (same).
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (surveying practices of the
federal system, New York, and Texas (before the adoption of open-file
discovery)).
135. See TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL MORTON ACT, supra note 27, at 12–15
(discussing the implementation of open-file rules in Texas).
136. See id. at 14–25 (discussing the planning for and consequences of
implementation of the Michael Morton Act).
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We chose Virginia and North Carolina because they are
geographically close and have populations of similar size, 137 yet
have starkly different discovery rules. Virginia’s rules are
restrictive, providing no witness statements, witness names, or
police reports to defendants before trial, unless some of these
documents are deemed exculpatory by the prosecutor. 138 North
Carolina, on the other hand, has some of the most liberal
discovery rules in the country, which have been in place for more
than a decade. 139 In felony cases, prosecutors must generally
make their complete files available to the defense upon request,
unless they can show that specific information may jeopardize the
safety of a witness or is protected work product. 140 By selecting
the two demographically and geographically similar, but legally
distinct jurisdictions, we were able to better isolate the effects of
different legal frameworks on discovery practices.
B. Survey Method
Our survey was designed to be brief to encourage
participation and completion. We asked approximately twenty
main survey questions, although some had subpart questions. We
estimated that completion would take, on average, between five
and ten minutes. The prosecutor survey is reproduced in the
Appendix. 141
The survey was confidential and voluntary, and we provided
no financial incentive for participation. To recruit survey
participants, we relied on two primary methods. The first
137. See
State
&
County
QuickFacts,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51000.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2015)
(last visited Oct. 13, 2015) (listing the Virginia Population at 8,326,289 and the
North Carolina population at 9,943,964) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
138. See SUP. CT. VA. R. 3A:11 (requiring the disclosure of select items upon
motion of the accused, but not including witness names, witness statements, or
police reports).
139. See supra note 79–87 and accompanying text (discussing the history
and provisions of North Carolina’s open-file discovery rules).
140. Supra note 79–87 and accompanying text.
141. The defense attorney survey (not reproduced here) was largely the
same, although the questions were rephrased to ask about what defense
attorneys believed to be prosecutors’ practices of disclosure in their jurisdiction.
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method, for prosecutors only, was to approach chief prosecutors
asking them for help in distributing the survey to attorneys in
their offices. The second method, for both prosecutors and
defenders, was to reach out to state legal organizations for their
support. Below we describe these methods in greater detail.
Initially, we approached chief prosecutors individually,
primarily via email. 142 We invited them to take the survey and to
distribute to staff attorneys in their office. In Virginia, there are
120 commonwealth’s attorneys and approximately 645 assistant
attorneys (total = 765). 143 From these 120 individual invitations,
thirty-seven offices agreed to participate, four actively declined,
and the remainder did not respond. The majority of the
thirty-seven cooperating offices were small, however, with
twenty-six of them having five or fewer attorneys total in the
office. Because we were not getting sufficient participation
through our contacts with individual commonwealth’s attorneys,
we approached the Virginia Association of Commonwealth’s
Attorneys (VACA) with a request for its support. The President
agreed to send out the survey invitation and link on our behalf to
all Virginia commonwealth attorneys; she also posted a link to
the survey on a website used by staff and chief prosecutors.
In response to these solicitations, 185 prosecutors (24% of all
Virginia prosecutors) began the survey and 122 of these
completed the survey (16% of all Virginia prosecutors). However,
three of the 122 completers did not handle felony cases in the
past year and were considered ineligible to participate in the full
survey.
In North Carolina, we first emailed or faxed the forty-four
district attorneys, asking them to take the survey and distribute
to others in their office. 144 Out of these forty-four invitations, only
five agreed to participate, one declined, and the remainder did
not respond. We then approached the North Carolina Conference
142. We sent an invitation letter by fax when we could not locate an email
for the chief prosecutors.
143. See Purposes and Function, COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEYS’ SERVICES
COUNCIL, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, http://www.cas.state.va.us/agency.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. About the Conference, N.C. CONFERENCE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS,
http://www.ncdistrictattorney.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2016) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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of District Attorneys with a request for its support, and the
Director sent out the survey invitation and link on our behalf to
all 637 North Carolina prosecutors.
Overall, 119 prosecutors (19% of all North Carolina
prosecutors) began the survey and of these, seventy-six completed
the survey (12% of all North Carolina prosecutors). Of the
seventy-six, six had not handled felony cases in the past year and
were not included in our analyses.
To recruit public and private defense attorneys, we solicited
assistance from statewide legal organizations. The Virginia
Indigent Defense Commission provided us with a spreadsheet of
Virginia public defenders and private defense attorneys certified
to practice criminal law in the state. We sent 283 valid emails to
Virginia public defenders. 145 Overall, 208 (73.5%) began the
survey and of these, 153 (54.1%) completed the survey. We also
sent valid emails to 1713 private defense attorneys in Virginia. 146
Three hundred forty-seven responded (20.3%) and began the
survey, and 243 private defenders in Virginia completed the
survey, for a 14.2% completion rate.
In North Carolina, we sent email invitations to 284 public
defenders whose emails were available online. Overall, sixty-four
(22.5%) North Carolina public defenders began the survey and
forty-three completed it (15.1%). In addition, the North Carolina
Office of Indigent Defense Services sent a survey invitation and
link on our behalf to 810 valid email addresses of private defense
attorneys who had been appointed to represent indigent
defendants over the previous year. 147 Of North Carolina private
defenders, ninety-five (11.7%) began the survey and sixty-one
(7.5%) completed it.
Overall, we received responses from 1018 prosecutors and
defense attorneys from Virginia and North Carolina. However, of
these, eighty-three participants (8.2%) handled misdemeanors or
145. We sent a total of 320 email invitations to Virginia public defenders.
However, thirty-seven bounced back as undeliverable.
146. We sent a total of 1918 emails, but 205 were undeliverable or the
recipients were ineligible to participate in the survey as they did not practice
criminal law at the trial level.
147. The North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services sent emails to
891 court-appointed private defense attorneys, but eighty-one of these emails
were undeliverable.
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juvenile cases exclusively in the past year and were considered
ineligible to answer questions about felony discovery practices. As
indicated above, 263 more participants (25.8%) did not complete
the survey, dropping out after completing initial questions about
the number and types of cases they typically handled (e.g.,
assault, domestic violence). Of the eligible participants (i.e., n =
935), 75% completed all (or most) of the survey. For analytic
purposes, our sample consists of 637 participants, which included
192 prosecutors and 445 defense attorneys.
Table 1 presents demographic characteristics (race, gender,
and practical experience) of our sample by legal role and state. 148
As can be seen, the majority of the sample was white, which did
not differ by role or state. 149 With regard to gender,
approximately half of the Virginia prosecutors were men; in
contrast, about two-thirds of the other samples (i.e., Virginia
defenders, North Carolina prosecutors, and North Carolina
defenders) were men. 150 This was not a statistically significant
difference, however. Finally, on average, prosecutors and
defenders (for both North Carolina and Virginia) had practiced
five to fifteen years in their respective roles. 151 However,
defenders had slightly more experience than prosecutors. 152
The demographic and career-related characteristics of our
sample tend to approximate the population of North Carolina
prosecutors and defenders. 153 (We were unable to obtain similar
demographic characteristics for Virginia prosecutors and
defenders, as this information is not systematically collected.)
148. See infra Table 1 (showing four groupings of Virginia and North
Carolina survey participants by “prosecutor” and “defender” cross-referenced
with their demographic characteristics).
149. See infra Table 1 (showing between 83 and 92.4% of participants as
“White”).
150. See infra Table 1 (showing Virginia prosecutors at 51.7%, while all
other categories ranged from 61.4 to 65.2%).
151. Infra Table 1.
152. Infra Table 1. We note here that although gender and practical
experience differed by legal role, these two characteristics (as well as race) did
not influence one of our main dependent variables, number of documents turned
over as part of initial discovery package, r’s < -.05. Thus, we do not consider
gender, practical experience, or race further in our analyses.
153. Telephone Interview with Marie Jankowski, Deputy Dir., Va. Indigent
Def. Comm’n (June 17, 2015).
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More specifically, according to information supplied from the
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, 154 among
Public Defenders and Assistant Public Defenders, 74.5% are
non-minorities and 50.7% are men. In their current roles as
(Assistant) Public Defenders, the average number of years of
experience is 8.83 years. 155 Among North Carolina District
Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys, 83.5% are
non-minorities, and 55.4% are men; in their roles only as
prosecutors, the average number of years of experience was 9.67
years. 156
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics

Gender: %
Male
Race: %
White
Mean
Career
Experience
(SD)

NC
Prosecutors
N = 73
61.4%

VA
Prosecutors
N = 119
51.7%

NC
Defenders
N = 94
62.8%

VA
Defenders
N = 351
65.2%

83.6%

92.4%

83.0%

86.9%

3.74a
(1.60)

3.89a
(1.64)

4.32ab
(2.02)

4.36b
(2.20)

Statistic
χ2 (3) = 6.88
Ф = .11
χ2 (3) = 5.21
Ф = .09
F(3, 631) =
3.06*
partial η2 =
.01

Notes. *p<.05. Career experience: 1 = 0–2 years, 3 = 5–10 years, 4 = 10–15
years, 8 = More than 30 years. SD = Standard deviation.

Of the 445 defense attorneys who completed our survey, 60%
were private (n = 265), and 40% were public defenders (n =
180). 157 Within and across state, public and private defenders had
approximately the same proportion of whites 158 and men, 159 and
154. E-mail from John W. King, Research Associate, N.C. Office of Indigent
Def. Serv., to Jenia I. Turner, Professor, Southern Methodist Univ. Dedman
School of Law (June 23, 2015).
155. The North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts does not
maintain information about the number of years that an attorney has been
licensed, but rather only the number of years in practice as a public defender or
a district attorney. Id.
156. E-mail from Margaret B. Wiggins, Hum. Resources Assoc., N.C. Office
of Indigent Def. Serv., to Allison D. Redlich, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. at
Albany (June 15, 2015).
157. In Virginia, there were 141 public and 210 private criminal defenders.
In North Carolina, there were thirty-nine public and fifty-five private criminal
defenders.
158. (χ2s(1) < 3.51, p’s > .06).
159. (χ2s(1) < 3.65, p’s > .06).
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similar average number of years of practical experience. 160
Finally, we also asked defenders if they had ever practiced as a
prosecutor. The majority of defenders (72%) had not. 161
In sum, our overall response rate varied by state and to some
degree, by legal actor type. In both Virginia and North Carolina,
16% of the state’s prosecutors completed the survey. For
defenders, rates were more variable ranging from a low of 7% to a
high of 36%, depending on the state and public or private status.
Like most surveys of this nature, our sample is
non-representative, as we did not randomly select individuals to
participate, and persons self-selected to examine and complete
the survey. 162 Although we attempted to reach out broadly to the
populations of attorneys in Virginia and North Carolina, our
results may not generalize to all attorneys in these states because
of the non-representativeness of our sample. 163 Nonetheless, our
response rates and our completion rate of 75% are quite
comparable to, or exceed, rates from similar surveys. 164
In addition, as noted earlier, the demographic composition of
our respondents was similar to the demographic composition of
prosecutors and defense attorneys in North Carolina (we were not
able to obtain comparable data on Virginia). Our analysis of the
data also indicates that responses concerning our main topic—
frequency of discovery provided in six key categories—were not
affected by race, gender, or years of experience as attorney, which

160. (F(1, 439) < 2.55, p’s > .11).
161. In Virginia, 72% of defenders never worked as prosecutors. In North
Carolina, 75% had not.
162. See Bias in Survey Sampling, STAT TREK, http://stattrek.com/surveyresearch/survey-bias.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2015) (explaining the difference
between representative and non-representative samples in a survey, and
discussing how bias may arise from non-representative sampling and what
effects such bias may have) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
163. See id. (explaining that non-representative samples may not be
generally applicable because of this potential bias).
164. See TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL MORTON ACT, supra note 27, at 4
(displaying results from a recent Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association
study on Texas discovery practices and showing participation at around 8%);
N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, supra note 93, at 1 (noting that 750 surveys were
mailed, and 131 responses were used to write the report, resulting in a 17.5%
response rate, although it is unclear whether this percentage included only
completed surveys, or partially-completed surveys as well).
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may help to allay concerns about the non-representativeness of
our samples. 165
C. Survey Findings
1. Breadth and Frequency of Pre-Plea Discovery
We first aimed to determine whether statutorily prescribed
open-file discovery results in significantly broader discovery to
defendants. To do so, we surveyed the frequency with which
prosecutors turn over fourteen types of evidence to the defense
before a guilty plea by the defendant. 166 We examined frequency
by state and by legal actor role. 167 Prosecutors reported on their
own behaviors, whereas defenders reported on their experiences
with prosecutors.
The table below covers eleven of the fourteen categories of
evidence we inquired about. Tables 3a and 3b (discussed in Part
III.C.2) present findings on the three categories concerning
exculpatory and impeachment evidence.

165. Supra note 152 and accompanying text. We tested whether any
relationship existed between these demographic characteristics and the
frequency of the following categories of discovery provided: witness names,
witness statements, police reports, factually exculpatory evidence in the
prosecutor’s possession, impeachment evidence in the prosecutor’s possession,
and exculpatory or impeachment information that is not in the prosecutor’s
possession but which may be requested. We found no such relationship.
166. See infra Table 2a (showing eleven of the fourteen categories of
evidence surveyed); infra Table 3a (showing the remaining three categories).
167. Infra Table 2a; infra Table 3a.
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Table 2a: In felony cases, what types of documents do you turn
over either as part of an initial discovery package or later, but
before a defendant pleads guilty? Please indicate how often you
disclose such documents, assuming they are present.

Defendant’s
statements
Codefendant’s
statements
Names of
witnesses

X2(2); Ф

Always

Sometimes

North Carolina
Prosecutors (%)

Never

Always

Sometimes

Never

Virginia
Prosecutors (%)

0

1.7

98.3

0

1.4

98.6

0.28; .01

2.6

37.6

59.8

0

1.4

98.6

35.85***;
.43

13.6

59.3

27.1

0

15.5

84.5

58.43***;
.56

Witness
statements

6.8

58.5

34.7

0

1.4

98.6

76.18***;
.63

Witnesses’
criminal
records
Statements of
potential
testifying
experts
Statements of
non-testifying
experts
Search
warrant
affidavits
Defendant’s
criminal
record
Police report

4.2

52.9

42.9

17.1

57.1

25.7

11.90**;
.25

1.7

16.4

81.9

0

13.7

86.3

0.63; .06

8.0

42.9

49.1

0

20.3

79.7

16.77***;
.30

12.0

34.2

53.8

2.7

5.5

91.8

29.93***;
.40

1.7

1.7

96.6

0

2.8

97.2

1.47; .09

19.7

35.9

44.4

0

1.4

98.6

1.7

22.2

76.1

1.4

4.1

94.5

58.22***;
.55
11.54**;
.25

Materials
related to
identification
procedures

*p < .05; 168 **p < .01; ***p < .001
168. The p value, which we set at the threshold of .05 or lower for statistical
significance, can be thought of as the chance that we are incorrectly rejecting
the null hypothesis. That is, for each “significant” difference, there is a 5% or
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Table 2b: In felony cases, what types of documents does the
prosecutor turn over either as part of an initial discovery package
or later, but before a defendant pleads guilty? Please indicate
how often such documents are disclosed, assuming they are
present.

Defendant’s
statements
Codefendant’s
statements
Names of
witnesses
Witness
statements
Witnesses’
criminal
records
Statements
of potential
testifying
experts
Statements
of nontestifying
experts
Search
warrant
affidavits
Defendant’s
criminal
record
Police report
Materials
related to
identification
procedures

X2(2); Ф

Always

Sometim
es

North Carolina
Defense Attorneys (%)

Never

Always

Sometim
es

Never

Virginia Defense
Attorneys (%)

0.9

8.9

90.2

1.1

11.7

87.2

0.72; .04

16.9

68.6

14.5

2.1

27.7

70.2

117.55***;
.52

32.3

56.4

11.3

7.4

39.4

53.2

32.0

57.3

10.8

1.1

37.2

61.7

39.2

50.0

10.8

53.2

38.3

8.5

79.88***;
.43
112.82***;
.51
5.89*; .12

17.5

44.1

38.5

12.0

43.5

44.6

1.12; .05

52.2

39.2

8.6

26.1

50.0

23.9

16.17***;
.19

41.4

32.1

26.5

5.3

35.1

59.6

36.09***;
.29

3.7

13.2

83.0

3.2

5.3

91.5

4.69; .10

20.8

51.2

28.0

1.1

9.6

89.4

23.8

58.4

17.7

5.3

39.4

55.3

114.81***;
.51
58.11***;
.36

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

lower chance that the difference we observed is not meaningful and is instead
due to pure chance (i.e., random variation).
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We find that statutorily mandated open-file discovery results
in broader disclosure of almost all types of evidence and that the
difference in levels of disclosure reported in North Carolina and
Virginia is statistically significant for all but three types of
evidence. 169 This is true with respect to co-defendants’
statements, witness names, witness statements, statements of
non-testifying experts, search warrant affidavits, materials
related to identification procedures, and police reports. 170 The
difference is statistically significant when we compare the
responses of Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors as well as
the responses of defense attorneys from each state. In short,
while many of our Virginia prosecutor respondents maintained
that they voluntarily provided broader discovery than they were
required by law, 171 such practices are not widespread or
consistent enough to produce levels of discovery similar to those
of North Carolina open-file. 172
The three types of evidence for which open-file rules did not
produce significantly broader discovery were the defendant’s
statements, the defendant’s criminal record, and statements of
testifying experts. 173 We believe that several factors explain why
respondents reported similar rates of disclosure for these three
categories of evidence in North Carolina and in Virginia. First,
rules in both states require the disclosure of this evidence, albeit
at a different stage of the proceeding. 174 Second, none of these
169. Supra Table 2a.
170. Supra Table 2a.
171. In a response to Question 10 in our survey, reproduced in Appendix A,
a large majority of Virginia prosecutors asserted that, in a large majority or all
of their cases, they disclose a broader set of documents than they are required to
under the law pre-plea.
172. This pattern of results comports with preliminary data collected in an
ongoing study by Professors Jenny Roberts and Ronald Wright, who asked
defenders from multiple states, including North Carolina and Virginia, how
often they received discovery from prosecutors before plea negotiations. Jenny
Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016). The average response of nine felony-practicing defenders in
North Carolina was “often,” whereas the average response of twenty-four
Virginia defenders was “sometimes.” Id. The data were supplied to the authors
on July 31, 2015.
173. Supra Table 2a.
174. Virginia rules require prosecutors to disclose all three of these types of
evidence upon motion of the defendant, which must be made “at least 10 days
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items raises concerns with respect to the safety of witnesses or
the integrity of the investigation. 175 Third, two of the items—the
defendant’s statements and criminal record—tend to be available
to the prosecution pre-plea. Accordingly, a large majority of
defense attorneys and prosecutors in both jurisdictions noted that
these items are “always” provided before a guilty plea. 176 By
contrast, because statements of testifying experts may not always
be available pre-plea, they are disclosed with lesser frequency. 177
However, because they must be provided at some point in the
process in both Virginia and North Carolina, the frequency of
disclosure is similar by state. 178
With respect to witness criminal records, North Carolina
prosecutors and defense attorneys reported a lower rate of
disclosure than their Virginia counterparts. 179 Although the
difference by state was statistically significant (at p < .05), it was
quite small, particularly for defenders. 180 The interesting
question here is why North Carolina prosecutors are frequently
failing to disclose the witness criminal records before a guilty
plea, despite the open-file rules. A combination of factors may
help explain this result. First, it is likely that prosecutors do not
obtain these records until later in the process, so this evidence is
before the day fixed for trial.” VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11. North Carolina Rules allow
requests for open-file discovery to be filed within ten days of finding of probable
cause, or the date the defendant waives probable cause. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15A-902(d) (West 2015).
175. This concern can be seen in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (describing in comments to amendments that the
limitations on disclosure include considerations of the safety of witnesses and
the integrity of the investigation).
176. Note, however, that defense attorneys suggested that these were
provided much less frequently than prosecutors stated they were being
provided. See infra Table 2c (showing that Virginia defense attorneys responded
that defendant criminal records were “always provided” at 83%, compared to a
96.6% “always provided” response from Virginia prosecutors).
177. See infra Table 2c (showing an 81.9% “always provided” figure for
Virginia Prosecutors and a 38.5% “always provided” figure for Virginia defense
attorneys).
178. Infra Table 2c.
179. See infra Table 2c (showing higher “never disclosed” percentages for
witness criminal records in both North Carolina categories as opposed to
Virginian counterpart categories).
180. See infra Table 2c (comparing Virginia disclosure at 10.8% to North
Carolina disclosure at 8.5%).
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simply not part of the prosecutor’s file that is required to be
disclosed to the defense pre-plea in North Carolina. Second, as
some respondents pointed out, defense attorneys can obtain the
witnesses’ records on their own; the early disclosure of the
prosecutor’s file provides them with the names of the witnesses,
so they simply need to run a background check. Accordingly, as
we learned from some of the open-ended comments on our survey,
at least some North Carolina prosecutors believe that researching
witness criminal records is a responsibility of the defense, not
their own. This belief is consistent with the defense due diligence
exception to Brady, which exempts prosecutors from disclosing
exculpatory or impeachment evidence that the defense could
reasonably obtain on its own. 181
Responses to the question about frequency of pre-plea
discovery differed not only by state, but also by legal actor as
shown in Table 2c; for almost all categories, defense attorneys
from both North Carolina and Virginia stated that they received
evidence much less frequently than prosecutors from the
respective jurisdiction indicated that they provided such
evidence. 182
It is possible that some of the difference in responses can be
explained by selection biases. 183 Perhaps the prosecutors who
took our survey tend to be disproportionately openhanded
disclosers. Conversely, defense attorneys who took the survey
might disproportionately deal with less generous prosecutors
(and were thus potentially using the survey to express frustration
with the system). As with other voluntary surveys, it is
impossible to completely rule out selection bias as a cause of the
181. As noted earlier, under this doctrine, prosecutors are relieved from the
duty to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence when the defense can
obtain the evidence through its own reasonable efforts. Supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
182. Infra Table 2c. The only two exceptions came from North Carolina, with
respect to the defendant’s criminal record and police reports. Although defense
attorneys stated that they received these items pre-plea somewhat less
frequently than prosecutors stated that they provided them, the difference was
not statistically significant. Infra Table 2c.
183. See Statistics and Probability Dictionary: Selection Bias, STAT TREK,
http://stattrek.com/statistics/dictionary.aspx?definition=selection_bias
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2015) (defining selection bias in survey sampling as “the bias
that results from an unrepresentative sample”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).

328

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016)

observed differences. 184 However, it appears that at least to some
degree, perceptions of how frequently evidence is disclosed are
colored by the professional role of the survey participants. 185
Table 2c: Percentage frequency of pre-plea disclosure by legal
actor and state

Materials
related to
identification
procedures

1.7

X2(2); Ф

Always

Never

Always

Virginia Defenders
(%)
Sometimes

Defendant’s
0.0
statements
Co-defendant’s
2.6
statements
Names of
13.6
witnesses
Witness
6.8
Statements
Witness
4.2
criminal
records
Statements of
1.7
potential
testifying
experts
Statements of
8.0
non-testifying
experts
Search warrant 12.0
affidavits
Defendant’s
1.7
criminal record
Police report
19.7

Sometimes

Never

Virginia Prosecutors
(%)

1.7

98.3

0.9

8.9

90.2

8.21**; .13

37.6

59.8

16.9

68.6

14.5

93.02***; .45

59.3

27.1

32.3

56.4

11.3

16.82***; .19

58.5

34.7

32.0

57.3

10.8

36.03***; .28

52.9

42.9

39.2

50.0

10.8

83.99***; .43

16.4

81.9

17.5

44.1

38.5

65.18***; .38

42.9

49.1

52.2

39.2

8.6

90.67***; .55

34.2

53.8

41.4

32.1

26.5

29.23***; .25

1.7

96.6

3.7

13.2

83.0

14.04***; .17

35.9

44.4

20.8

51.2

28.0

10.79**; .15

22.2

76.1

23.8

58.4

17.7

138.02***; .55

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
184. See id. (discussing the practical impossibility of removing “voluntary
response” selection bias due to the natural tendency to over-represent
individuals with strong opinions or a more accessible means of response).
185. Infra Table 2c.
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X2(2); Ф

Always

Sometimes

Defendant’s
0
1.4
98.6
statements
Co0
1.4
98.6
defendant’s
statements
Names of
0
15.5 84.5
witnesses
Witness
0
1.4
98.6
statements
Witnesses’
17.1 57.1 25.7
criminal
records
Statements of
0
13.7 86.3
potential
testifying
experts
Statements of
0
20.3 79.7
non-testifying
experts
Search
2.7
5.5
91.8
warrant
affidavits
Defendant’s
0
2.8
97.2
criminal
record
Police report
0
1.4
98.6
Materials
1.4
4.1
94.5
related to
identification
procedures
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

North Carolina
Defenders (%)
Never

Always

Sometimes

Never

North Carolina
Prosecutors (%)

1.1

11.7

87.2

7.46**; .21

2.1

27.7

70.2

23.12***; .37

7.4

39.4

53.2

17.85***; .33

1.1

37.2

61.7

32.49***; .44

53.2

38.3

8.5

24.36***; .39

12.0

43.5

44.6

30.43***; .43

26.1

50.0

23.9

49.19***; .55

5.3

35.1

59.6

21.96***; .36

3.2

5.3

91.5

3.07; .14

1.1
5.3

9.6
39.4

89.4
55.3

2.37; .12
31.82***; .44

2. Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
Our survey asked several questions concerning the disclosure
of Brady evidence. First, we asked participants directly whether
they disclose, before a guilty plea, three types of exculpatory and
impeachment evidence: (1) factually exculpatory evidence that is
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in the prosecutor’s possession; (2) information in the prosecutor’s
possession that might be used to impeach the credibility of a
prosecution witness; and (3) exculpatory or impeachment
evidence that is in the possession of another government agency,
but which prosecutors are able to request. 186
Constitutional law does not mandate the disclosure of
impeachment evidence before a guilty plea. 187 The question of
whether factually exculpatory evidence must be provided pre-plea
remains unsettled. 188 Because constitutional law does not set a
firm requirement in this area, one may expect to see better
disclosure of Brady evidence in an open-file state like North
Carolina, where prosecutors must turn over everything in their
files shortly after arraignment, than in Virginia, where procedure
rules allow more limited disclosure delayed until closer to trial.
Our findings do not unequivocally confirm this hypothesis.
To begin, North Carolina and Virginia prosecutors reported
186. Infra Appendix A.
187. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
188. The Fourth Circuit, which covers Virginia and North Carolina, does not
require the disclosure of factually exculpatory information before a guilty plea.
See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 285 (4th Cir. 2010) (“When a
defendant pleads guilty, those concerns [supporting Brady disclosures] are
almost completely eliminated because his guilt is admitted.”). State courts in
both Virginia and North Carolina have also not required this evidence. For
North Carolina, see State v. Allen, 731 S.E.2d 510, 521 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(determining that the Ruiz holding should apply in similarly postured North
Carolina cases). But cf. State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 637 (2008) (disagreeing
with state’s contention that Brady only required the State to turn over evidence
“at trial”). Virginia state law does not seem to provide broader protection than
federal law. Our research found a single appeals court case from 1998 stating
that a defendant can withdraw a guilty plea if the prosecution had failed to
disclose impeachment evidence before the plea and if this materially affected
the defendant’s decision whether to plead guilty. See Jefferson v.
Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 219, 224 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing withdrawal
of the plea where the record established “any defense at all” to the indictments,
and it was “reasonably probable that nondisclosure of the exculpatory
impeachment evidence had the ‘least . . . influence’ on the plea”). However,
Jefferson was decided before Ruiz, and a more recent Virginia Supreme Court
case held that disclosure of Brady evidence mid-trial is permissible as long as
“the defendant has sufficient opportunity to make use of . . . [it] at trial.”
Commonwealth v. Tuma, 740 S.E.2d 14, 18 (Va. 2013). Likewise, a recent
Virginia State Bar Legal Ethics Opinion suggested that state law does not
require pre-plea disclosure of Brady evidence. VA. STATE BAR, LEGAL ETHICS OP.
1862, “TIMELY DISCLOSURE” OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND DUTIES TO DISCLOSE
INFORMATION IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS, http://www.vsb.org/docs/LEO/1862.pdf.
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roughly similar rates of pre-plea disclosure of factually
exculpatory evidence. 189 More strikingly, North Carolina
prosecutors reported a lower rate of disclosing impeachment
evidence before a guilty plea than did their Virginia
counterparts. 190 Likewise, the percentage of North Carolina
prosecutors who stated they “always” disclose, pre-plea,
exculpatory and impeachment evidence that is in the possession
of another government agency was significantly lower than the
percent of Virginia prosecutors who responded the same. 191
While these responses by prosecutors do not appear to
confirm the hypothesis that open-file produces better disclosure of
exculpatory evidence, responses by defense attorneys point in the
opposite direction. North Carolina defenders stated that they
received all three categories of exculpatory and impeachment
evidence more frequently than did their Virginia counterparts. 192
In one category—that of factually exculpatory evidence in the
prosecutor’s possession, the difference between the rates reported
by North Carolina defenders and their Virginia counterparts was
statistically significant. 193 In short, defense attorneys’ responses
may be read to support the hypothesis that open-file discovery
produces more consistent disclosure of Brady material.

189. Supra Table 3a.
190. See supra Table 3a (showing that 89% of North Carolina prosecutors
reported “always” disclosing impeachment evidence pre-plea as compared to
96.6% of Virginia prosecutors).
191. See supra Table 3a (showing 59.7% “always” disclosures from North
Carolina prosecutors in comparison to 83.9% “always” disclosures from Virginia
prosecutors).
192. Supra Table 3a.
193. See supra Table 3a (reflecting a 46.2% “always” response from North
Carolina defenders compared to a 35% “always” response from Virginia
defenders).

332

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016)

Table 3a: In felony cases, what types of documents do you [the
prosecutor] turn over either as part of an initial discovery package
or later, but before a defendant pleads guilty? Please indicate how
often you [the prosecutor] disclose such documents, assuming they
are present.
X2(2); Ф

Always

Sometimes

North Carolina
Prosecutors (%)

Never

Always

Sometimes

Never

Virginia
Prosecutors (%)

Factually
exculpatory evidence
in DA possession

0

0.8

99.2

0

2.7

97.3

1.06; .07

Impeachment
evidence in DA
possession
Exculpatory or
impeachment
evidence not in DA
possession (but
requestable)

0

3.4

96.6

0

11.0

89.0

4.39*; .15

0.8

15.3

83.9

2.8

37.5

59.7

13.90***;
.27

Factually
5.2
exculpatory evidence
in DA possession
Impeachment
23.6
evidence in DA
possession
Exculpatory or
47.5
impeachment
evidence not in DA
possession (but
requestable)
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

X2(2); Ф

Always

Sometimes

North Carolina
Defense Attorneys
(%)

Never

Always

Sometimes

Never

Virginia Defense
Attorneys (%)

59.8

35.0

10.8

43.0

46.2

9.71**; .15

62.4

14.0

19.6

62.0

18.5

1.15; .05

46.9

5.6

33.3

60.2

6.5

5.97*; .12
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Table 3b: Differences by legal actor regarding reported disclosure
of Brady material.
Differences between
Virginia Prosecutors
and Defense
Attorneys
X2(2); Ф
146.04***; .56

Factually exculpatory
evidence in DA
possession
Impeachment evidence in 262.92***; .76
DA possession
Exculpatory or
278.67***; .78
impeachment evidence
not in DA possession (but
requestable)
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Differences between
North Carolina
Prosecutors and
Defense Attorneys
X2(2); Ф
49.49***; .55
81.07***; .70
55.16***; .58

What explains the different patterns of responses between
prosecutors and defense attorneys? To answer this question, we
must examine each category of Brady material separately. We
begin with factually exculpatory evidence. Prosecutors from both
states say that they disclose at about the same very high rate,
more than 97%. 194 Defense attorneys, however, report
dramatically lower rates of disclosure by prosecutors in both
states. 195 Defense attorneys’ answers also suggest that, pre-plea,
factually exculpatory evidence is being provided significantly less
frequently in Virginia than in North Carolina. 196
We believe that the difference in these responses occurs
because of a different interpretation by each side of what is
meant by “exculpatory” evidence. Prosecutors respond based on
what they would do once they have determined that certain
evidence is in fact exculpatory. Almost all say they would turn it
over 197—perhaps because of a belief that this is the fair thing to
do—even though, as a formal legal matter, they may be able to

194. Supra Table 3a.
195. See supra Table 3a (showing 35% “always” disclosure in Virginia and
46.2% “always” disclosure in North Carolina).
196. Supra Table 3a.
197. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (showing responses
indicating over 97% disclosure from prosecutors in both states).
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argue that such evidence need not be disclosed until later in the
process. 198
Defense attorneys respond with reference to what evidence
they believe is exculpatory, but in their view, prosecutors do not
always share this assessment of the evidence. 199 As the
scholarship on Brady violations has shown, the defense
perspective on this question is likely correct; prosecutors
frequently fail to recognize that certain evidence is exculpatory,
whether because of cognitive biases or because of a lack of time
and resources to investigate the evidence more thoroughly,
particularly before a guilty plea. 200 These different perspectives
can explain the divergent reports by prosecutors and defense
attorneys as to how often factually exculpatory evidence is
disclosed. They also help explain why North Carolina defense
attorneys report a significantly higher disclosure rate than do
Virginia attorneys—because open-file disclosure automatically
produces evidence in the prosecutor’s file, cognitive biases and
the lack of time and resources are less likely to stand in the way
of adequate Brady disclosure. 201
With respect to impeachment evidence, we obtained a
different pattern of results. North Carolina defense attorneys
report only slightly higher rates of prosecutorial disclosure
compared to Virginia defense attorneys, while North Carolina
prosecutors report significantly lower rates of disclosure than do
198. Supra note 188 and accompanying text.
199. Infra note 240 and accompanying text.
200. Supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
201. Even in North Carolina, prosecutors may be able to withhold certain
evidence if a confidential informant is involved or if the safety of a witness is in
jeopardy. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-904(1a) (West 2015). This may explain
why only 46% of North Carolina defense attorneys responded that prosecutors
“always” disclosed factually exculpatory evidence pre-plea, while 43% believed
prosecutors did so “sometimes.” Supra Table 3a. In addition, although the
question specifically stated that the factually exculpatory evidence was in the
prosecutor’s possession, respondents may have easily overlooked this qualifier,
particularly because the question came at the end of a long table. Infra
Appendix A. Therefore, defense attorneys may also have been thinking of cases
where exculpatory evidence in North Carolina was not disclosed before a guilty
plea as part of open-file simply because it had not yet been transmitted to the
prosecution. Subsequent responses indicate that delayed transmission of Brady
evidence is a notable problem in North Carolina and in Virginia. Infra notes
322, 335–340 and accompanying text.
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their Virginia counterparts. 202 These responses are consistent
with our findings on criminal records of prosecution witnesses,
where North Carolina respondents again reported less frequent
pre-plea disclosure than did their Virginia counterparts. 203 Prior
records of prosecution witnesses are one type of impeachment
evidence that respondents to our survey may have considered. In
North Carolina, defense attorneys have independent access to
such evidence so they could research these on their own. 204
Accordingly, under the “due diligence” exception to Brady,
prosecutors would not have a duty to disclose this information. 205
In Virginia, defense attorneys could also run background
checks on witnesses, but they are unlikely to know who the
witnesses are, because the law does not require prosecutors to
turn over witness names. 206 Accordingly, prosecutors cannot rely
on the “due diligence” exception to Brady. Instead, Virginia
prosecutors must determine on their own whether any
information
about
witnesses,
including
impeachment
information, must be disclosed pursuant to Brady. This may help
explain why North Carolina prosecutors reported lower rates of
disclosure of impeachment evidence compared to Virginia
prosecutors.
This is just one possible explanation of the results in this
category. It is not entirely satisfactory, as it leaves open the
question why defense attorneys in North Carolina reported
slightly higher levels of disclosure of impeachment evidence than
did Virginia defense attorneys. We offer another possible
explanation later in this section.
With respect to the third category of evidence—Brady
evidence that is not in the prosecutor’s possession—the
significantly lower reported rate of disclosure by North Carolina
202. Supra Table 3a.
203. See supra Tables 2a & 2b (showing that Virginia prosecutors are more
likely to turn over witness criminal records than North Carolina prosecutors).
204. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 132-1.4 (West 2015) (classifying basic
witness information, such as name, address, and violations of the law, as public
records).
205. See Weisburd, supra note 36, at 147–53 (discussing the “due diligence”
exception to Brady when facts are readily available to the defendant).
206. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11(b) (requiring only defendant statements,
criminal records, and certain books, reports, and tests to be disclosed before
trial).
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prosecutors may reflect their increased awareness that a number
of items are not in their files when they make their initial
disclosure to the defense. This is consistent with subsequent
comments, by some prosecutors and many defense attorneys in
North Carolina, that a major disadvantage of open-file discovery
is that it does not guarantee completeness of the files that are
being disclosed, particularly pre-plea, because much of the
information is not transmitted to the prosecution until later in
the process. 207 Open-ended comments by respondents suggest
that in Virginia, too, law enforcement frequently fails to transmit
evidence to prosecution until later in the process. 208 But this
failure is likely not as glaring as in North Carolina, where the
prosecution turns over its entire file to the defense and then has
to supplement its disclosure each time law enforcement sends
over more evidence.
Alternatively, responses to this question may corroborate the
criticism (shared by some defense attorneys and prosecutors in
subsequent comments) that open-file can make some prosecutors
too complacent about their disclosure obligations. Because they
are turning over their entire files, North Carolina prosecutors
may tend to think that they have met their duties under Brady.
As a result, they may not be as proactive as their Virginia
counterparts in following up with investigating agencies to
determine if additional Brady material might exist.
Yet both of these explanations of why North Carolina
prosecutors are reporting similar or lower rates of disclosure of
Brady evidence than Virginia prosecutors are at odds with
responses by defense attorneys from the two states. North
Carolina defense attorneys reported significantly higher rates of

207. Infra notes 322, 340 and accompanying text; see also infra Table 9
(showing that roughly one-third of North Carolina prosecutors responded that
one reason for refraining from broader discovery before a guilty plea is the lack
of time to check with all agencies). For a discussion of the duty of North
Carolina prosecutors to investigate and obtain discoverable information, see
Farb, supra note 22.
208. See infra notes 322–323 and accompanying text (discussing the
strategies currently employed in the existing system and potential drawbacks to
an open-file system); see also infra Table 9 (showing that 35% of Virginia
prosecutors responded that one reason for refraining from broader discovery
before a guilty plea is the lack of time to check with all agencies).
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prosecutorial disclosure of Brady evidence than did their Virginia
counterparts. 209
One alternative explanation of the results is that Virginia
prosecutors are overestimating the frequency with which they
disclose Brady evidence. Discovery has been the subject of intense
debate and proposals for reform in Virginia over the last several
years. 210 In December 2014 (while we were conducting our
survey), a special committee appointed by the Virginia Supreme
Court proposed that the Virginia criminal procedure rules be
amended to provide for broader and earlier discovery. 211 The
proposal was open for public comments until August 2015, and it
generated significant opposition from a number of Virginia
prosecutors. 212 Because the issue was so politically sensitive at
the time we administered the survey, consciously or
unconsciously, some Virginia prosecutors may have been eager to
show that they are disclosing Brady material at high rates and
that there is no pressing need for reforming the rules. Finally,
because our sample was not random, but instead relied on the
willingness of respondents to take the survey, our survey may
have been especially likely to attract responses from those
prosecutors in Virginia who provide broader discovery than
required.
The over-reporting hypothesis is consistent with responses
from defense attorneys. As noted earlier, defense attorneys from
North Carolina reported a higher rate of pre-plea disclosure of
Brady material than did their Virginia counterparts. 213 Moreover,
defense attorneys in both states reported a significantly lower
rate of disclosure of Brady material than did prosecutors. 214 Also
consistent with the over-reporting hypothesis, the gap between
209. See supra Table 2b (reflecting the higher turnover rates of North
Carolina prosecutors for every type of discovery material except witness
criminal records).
210. SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY, supra note 118, at 22, 37–38 .
211. See id. (comparing current text of rules with proposed amendments).
212. See id. at xv (describing the timeline for the report, including the public
comment); see also Public Comments to Virginia Discovery Committee Report
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
213. Supra Table 3a.
214. Supra Tables 3a & 3b.
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the reported disclosure rates by prosecutors and reported rates by
defenders is broader in Virginia than it is North Carolina. 215
We also asked participants whether prosecutorial decisions
to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence depended
upon whether the information was material to the outcome.
Under constitutional law, materiality remains a valid limit on
disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence. 216 Among
Virginia prosecutors, 5% answered “yes,” 87% answered “no,” and
8% answered “sometimes.” North Carolina prosecutors’ responses
did not significantly differ from those of Virginia prosecutors, as
6.8%, 84%, and 10% answered “yes,” “no,” and “sometimes,”
respectively.
But the answers to this question differed significantly by
legal actor role. Roughly 34% of North Carolina defense attorneys
and 40% of their Virginia counterparts stated that prosecutorial
decisions to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence
depend upon whether the information was material to the
outcome. 217 As our analysis of responses to a series of
215. Supra Tables 3a & 3b.
216. For North Carolina, see State v. Allen, 731 S.E.2d 510, 520 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2012) (“The defendant bears the burden of proving that undisclosed
evidence was material.”). For Virginia, see Workman v. Commonwealth, 636
S.E.2d 368, 374 (Va. 2006) (describing material Brady evidence as evidence that,
if suppressed, “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial” (citing United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985))). In North Carolina, ethical rules do
not eliminate the materiality requirement. See N.C. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.8(d)
(mandating disclosure of “all evidence or information required to be disclosed by
applicable law, rules of procedure, or court opinion”). But in Virginia,
prosecutors are ethically required to disclose exculpatory evidence without
regard to its materiality—as long as the prosecutor knows that the evidence
“tends to negate the guilt of the accused.” VA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.8(d). On the
other hand, the same ethical rule simply requires “timely disclosure” and does
do not necessarily apply pre-plea. See id. (requiring “timely disclosure . . . of the
existence of evidence which the prosecutor knows tends to negate the guilt of the
accused”). For clarification that “timely” does not necessarily mean pre-plea, see
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 1862, “TIMELY DISCLOSURE” OF
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND DUTIES TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION IN PLEA
NEGOTIATIONS 2–3 (2012) (discussing the use and meaning of “timely” in terms
of sharing information in an efficient manner).
217. Virginia Prosecutors versus Virginia Defenders: x2(2) = 101.20, p <
.0001, Ф = .47; North Carolina Prosecutors versus North Carolina Defenders:
x2(2) = 29.54, p < .0001, Ф = .42; Virginia Prosecutors versus North Carolina
Prosecutors: x2(2) = 0.32, p = .85, Ф = .04; Virginia Defenders versus North
Carolina Defenders: x2(2) = 4.27, p = .12, Ф = .10.
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hypothetical scenarios in the following paragraphs suggests,
materiality may indeed play a more important role in disclosure
decisions than prosecutorial responses to this question might
indicate.
To test the likelihood of disclosure of Brady material, we also
asked participants to respond to three hypotheticals in Part II of
our survey. The hypotheticals were at the end of the survey and
were optional, so only a portion of the respondents chose to
answer them. Because only a self-selected group answered the
hypothetical questions, the results may be subject to some
response bias.
The hypotheticals concerned impeachment or factually
exculpatory evidence and are reproduced in full in Appendix A.
They tested the likelihood of disclosing different types of Brady
evidence, both impeachment and potentially factually
exculpatory. All three were intentionally structured so as to allow
respondents to validly conclude that the evidence is likely not
material to the outcome of the case. Strong independent
evidence—a video-recording that clearly showed the assailant’s
face, as well as the victim’s identification of the defendant—
corroborated the less reliable account of another eyewitness. The
hypotheticals thus aimed to test, at least in part, the extent to
which materiality affects prosecutors’ decisions to disclose. We
were interested to find out whether “close” cases—i.e., cases in
which the duty to disclose under Brady was ambiguous—would
be resolved differently by prosecutors in North Carolina and
Virginia.
The first hypothetical involved the disclosure of a prior fraud
conviction of one of the two eyewitnesses to the crime and aimed
to test whether prosecutors disclosed such potential impeachment
evidence before a guilty plea. 218 The impeachment evidence was
not likely to affect the outcome of the case, as strong independent
evidence pointed to the defendant’s guilt. Our findings are laid
out in Table 4 below.

218.

Infra Appendix A.
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Table 4, Hypothetical Scenario 1: %YES
North Carolina
Prosecutors (N = 36)

Virginia Prosecutors
(N = 78)

Statistic

55.6%
North Carolina
Defenders (N = 38)
21.1%
χ2 (1) = 9.36**; Ф = .36

79.5%
Virginia Defenders
(N = 167)
34.7%
χ2 (1) = 6.99**; Ф = .25

χ2 (1)=42.62***; Ф=.42
χ2 (1)=2.65; Ф=.11

As the table shows, a significantly lower percentage of North
Carolina prosecutors stated that they would disclose this type of
information before a guilty plea than would prosecutors in
Virginia. 219 This result is consistent with our earlier findings on
witness criminal records and on impeachment evidence, where
North Carolina prosecutors similarly reported significantly lower
rates of pre-plea disclosure than did Virginia prosecutors. 220
Participants were given the option to explain their answers,
and several North Carolina respondents (on both the defense and
prosecution side) explained that prosecutors would not disclose
this information before a guilty plea because the information
would be accessible to the defense so prosecutors need not
disclose it. 221 Another explanation given was that prosecutors
would not typically look up witnesses’ prior records until just
before trial, so it would not be part of the file before a guilty
plea. 222
Some Virginia respondents (mostly on the defense side) also
noted that defense attorneys there could look at the prior records
of witnesses themselves, which might explain some of the nondisclosure in that state. 223 But this presumes that Virginia
219. See supra Table 4 (showing that 79.5% of Virginia prosecutors
responded that they would disclose the information, compared to 55.6% of North
Carolina prosecutors).
220. Supra Tables 2a, 3a.
221. See Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Pre-Plea Discovery Practices:
A Survey of North Carolina Prosecutors, Question No. 27, Respondent No. 36
(2014) [hereinafter Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors] (“We are not required to disclose
witnesses [sic] criminal records. They are public record and can be found by
defense counsel.”).
222. See id. at Question No. 27, Respondent No. 21 (“As a general practice,
though, I do not take the time to look up criminal histories of witnesses in every
case—at least pre-trial.”).
223. See, e.g., Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Pre-Plea Discovery
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prosecutors would disclose the names of their prospective
witnesses, which they are not required to do. 224
Among Virginia prosecutors who said they would not disclose
the prior fraud conviction, a more common explanation for nondisclosure was that the evidence was relevant to trial, but not to
a guilty plea. As one explained: “In plea negotiations, there is the
issue that the defendant, who knows whether he is guilty or not,
can make decisions on whether to plea[d] or not, independently of
the strength of the case against him or her. The prior conviction
goes to credibility and issues raised at trial[,] not plea
negotiations.” 225 Another reason given to support non-disclosure
in Virginia was that the prior fraud conviction of the prosecution
witness would not be material to the outcome—thus confirming
our hypothesis that materiality would influence the disclosure
decisions of at least some prosecutors. 226 Yet another response
conditioned disclosure of this evidence on a specific request by a
defense attorney. 227 Formally, the duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence applies even in the absence of a specific request by the
defense, so this factor ought not be relevant. 228 But courts have
Practices: A Survey of Virginia Defense Attorneys, Question No. 27, Respondent
No. 92 (“No one will give you witnesses criminal history in advance because it’s
not required. It’s up to defense counsel to do the due diligence necessary to
protect the client and counsel.”) [hereinafter Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors]; see also
id., Respondent No. 69 (“They give me witness lists and I can run their CCRE if
I want their history.”).
224. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11(b) (requiring only defendant statements,
criminal records, and certain books, reports, and tests to be disclosed before
trial).
225. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 27,
Respondent No. 24; see also id. at Question No. 27, Respondent No. 28 (“The
Virginia rule on witness criminal history is that it must be provided in time for
it to be useful. This has been determined to be at the time the witness is being
called. The fraud conviction would be for impeachment only and could easily be
asked about at trial.”).
226. See id. at Question No. 27, Respondent No. 21 (“No, [I would not
disclose the witness’s prior fraud conviction] because I believe that I could prove
the case without that witness.”).
227. See id. at Question No. 27, Respondent No. 102 (“[No, I would not
disclose the witness’s prior fraud conviction] [u]nless the defense attorney
specifically asks, in which case I would disclose it.”).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (“[T]here are
situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the
defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a
specific request.”).
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considered the existence of a specific defense request in
determining whether non-disclosure was material to the outcome,
so this might explain why such a request would influence some
prosecutors’ decisions. 229
With respect to the other two hypotheticals concerning
potentially exculpatory, but arguably immaterial, evidence, we
obtained responses pointing to higher rates of disclosure in North
Carolina than in Virginia. Specifically, a significantly higher
percentage of North Carolina defense attorneys than Virginia
defense attorneys believe that prosecutors in their jurisdiction
would disclose this evidence pre-plea. 230 In addition, a higher
percentage of North Carolina prosecutors stated that they would
disclose this type of evidence than did Virginia prosecutors
(although the difference was not statistically significant). 231
The table below shows the percentage of “yes” responses to
Hypothetical Scenario 2, which asked whether prosecutors would
disclose, pre-plea, the failure of a key eyewitness to initially pick
out the defendant from a photo array. 232 The eyewitness did pick
out the defendant from a subsequent lineup, and independent
evidence, including a video clearly showing the defendant’s face,
supported conviction.

229. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1985) (“[T]he
more specifically the defense requests certain evidence, thus putting the
prosecutor on notice of its value, the more reasonable it is for the defense to
assume from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to make
pretrial and trial decisions on the basis of this assumption.”); see also WAYNE
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(b) (5th ed. 2013) (discussing relevant
cases).
230. Infra Table 5.
231. Id.
232. Infra Appendix A.
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Table 5, Hypothetical Scenario 2: %YES
North Carolina
Prosecutors (N = 36)
97.3%
North Carolina
Defenders (N = 41)
75.6%
χ2 (1) = 7.55**; Ф = .31

Virginia Prosecutors
(N = 76)
89.6%
Virginia Defenders
(N = 167)
50.9%
χ2 (1) = 33.93***; Ф = .37

Statistic
χ2 (1) = 2.03; Ф = .13
χ2 (1) = 8.15**; Ф = .20

From the optional explanations that accompanied some of
the “Yes” or “No” responses, we can conclude that three factors
tended to motivate decisions of Virginia prosecutors not to
disclose this information before a guilty plea: (1) a belief that the
evidence was not material to the outcome; (2) a belief that this
evidence must be disclosed before trial, but not before plea; and
(3) a belief that such evidence should be disclosed only if the
defense requests it. None of these factors seems specific to
Virginia, however, so they are unlikely to explain the difference
in responses by state.
In North Carolina, no respondents gave a reason for failing to
disclose. Among those who explained their motivations for
disclosing, a few noted that information concerning identification
procedures is statutorily required to be included in the
investigative report. 233 The report itself is included in the
prosecutor’s file that must be disclosed to the defense. This may
help explain the higher rate of reported disclosure in North
Carolina than in Virginia, where no statute requires the
reporting of identification procedures.
The third hypothetical concerns the disclosure by the
prosecutor of a statement by a jailhouse informant, who was
described as a friend of the defendant. 234 The statement suggests
that another jail inmate—not the defendant—committed the
crime, but it is potentially unreliable because the informant is a
friend of the defendant. It is also likely not material to the
outcome because of the strong independent evidence supporting
conviction.

233. See Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, at Question No. 28,
Respondent No. 56 (“If this information was not in the law enforcement report,
it would be a violation of our state’s eyewitness identification statute.”).
234. Infra Appendix A.
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Once again, a significantly greater percentage of respondents
in North Carolina stated that prosecutors would disclose this
evidence before a guilty plea than did respondents in Virginia. 235
Table 6, Hypothetical Scenario 3: %YES
North Carolina
Prosecutors (N = 37)
97.2%
North Carolina
Defenders (N = 39)
59.0%
χ2 (1) = 15.62***; Ф = .46

Virginia Prosecutors
(N=77)
84.2%
Virginia Defenders
(N = 160)
35.0%
χ2 (1) = 49.93***; Ф = .46

Statistic
χ2 (1) = 4.03*; Ф = .19
χ2 (1) = 7.53**; Ф = .19

A few of the Virginia prosecutors who stated that they would
not disclose this type of evidence offered explanations for their
decision. A couple focused on the unreliability of the informant. 236
Two others pointed out that this evidence would be known by the
defendant because he was friends with the informant—therefore,
the prosecutor would not have to turn it over because the defense
would have independent means of obtaining the information. 237
Most of the open-ended explanations by prosecutors, in both
Virginia and North Carolina, noted that while the information
was unreliable (and may therefore require further investigation),
they would nonetheless disclose it as it is potentially exculpatory
and covered by Brady. 238
While a large majority of prosecutors in both states claimed
that they would disclose the informant’s statement, a much lower
percentage of defense attorneys agreed. 239 In the open-ended
explanations of Virginia defense attorneys, many noted that
prosecutors would not consider this evidence exculpatory. 240 In
235. Supra Table 6.
236. See Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 29,
Respondent No. 22 (“The informant is unreliable.”).
237. See id. at Question No. 29, Respondent No. 20 (remarking that, if the
defendant knows the informant, there would be no need for the prosecution to
turn any information over to the defense).
238. Id. at Question No. 29; Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, at
Question No. 28.
239. Supra Table 6.
240. See, e.g., Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Pre-Plea Discovery
Practices: A Survey of Virginia Defense Attorneys, Question No. 34, Respondent
No. 50 (2014) [hereinafter Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys] (“Prosecutors in my
jurisdiction would not consider this exculpatory.”).
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North Carolina, few explanations were provided, but most of
these focused on whether the prosecutor would have the
information in the file. 241 A number worried that law enforcement
may not provide the information to the prosecutor, which would
naturally result in non-disclosure. 242
The responses to the hypotheticals suggest that Brady
evidence is generally more likely to be provided in North Carolina
than in Virginia, except if it concerns the prior record of a
prosecution witness. As discussed earlier in this Section, we
obtained a somewhat different pattern of responses when we
asked prosecutors directly whether they would disclose
impeachment or exculpatory evidence before a guilty plea. 243
What explains the seemingly conflicting answers? We believe
several explanations are plausible, and further research into this
question would be helpful to clarify what drives the results.
One possibility is that when the question expressly presents
the evidence as exculpatory, prosecutors from both states are
likely to respond in similar ways as to whether they would
disclose it. But when a hypothetical presents facts with evidence
that is of debatable exculpatory or impeachment value, open-file
is more likely to make a difference with respect to disclosure.
Because North Carolina prosecutors do not have to make a
judgment on the exculpatory nature of the evidence before
disclosing—if it is in the file, they are required to disclose it 244—
they disclose at higher rates. By contrast, Virginia prosecutors

241. See, e.g., Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Pre-Plea Discovery
Practices: A Survey of North Carolina Defense Attorneys, Question No. 34,
Respondent No. 3 (2014) [hereinafter Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys] (“[T]he
DA would turn this over if LE [law enforcement] advised them of this—the
danger is always whether the LE has informed the DA before Court.”).
242. Id.; see also id., at Respondent No. 7 (“Jailhouse informants are usually
not found by the DA until the DA and defense attorney go through the law
enforcement investigative file with the detective at the pretrial readiness
conference. Although there is a continuing duty to disclose, the police generally
do not give the information to the DA about informants until the readiness
conference.”).
243. Supra Part III.C.2; Table 3a.
244. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (West 2015) (requiring the state to
disclose the “complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies
involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the
defendant”).
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are not required to disclose such evidence before a guilty plea, 245
so doubts about the materiality and reliability of the evidence
reduce the frequency with which they provide it to the defense.
With respect to evidence concerning one particular type of
impeachment evidence—a witness’s prior fraud conviction—both
the hypotheticals and the category responses suggest that such
evidence is less likely to be provided pre-plea in North Carolina
than in Virginia. As discussed earlier, this likely occurs because
witness criminal records do not become part of a North Carolina
prosecutor’s file until later in the process and because the records
are available to defense attorneys to look up independently and
are therefore not seen as the responsibility of prosecutors to
provide.
Finally, consistent with our previous findings, responses on
the disclosure rates of exculpatory evidence differ dramatically by
actor role. Defense attorneys believe that prosecutors in their
jurisdiction would disclose the hypothetical evidence much less
frequently than prosecutors stated that they would. 246 We believe
that at least in part, this likely reflects different perspectives on
what evidence counts as “exculpatory.” It may also reflect how
legal roles shape perceptions of what occurs in the criminal
justice system—a finding that is consistent with previous surveys
of defense attorney and prosecutor experiences. 247
3. Discovery Waivers
A common concern about open-file discovery is that it is more
costly for prosecutors—specifically, that early disclosures are
more time-consuming and burdensome to prepare and that
broader disclosure is more likely to uncover holes in the
prosecution’s case. 248 If that is indeed the case, we may expect
245. Supra note 188 and accompanying text.
246. Supra Table 6.
247. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 19, at 67, 77–78, 87 (finding that
prosecutors and defense attorneys have different perspectives on the strength of
a case and on the choice between plea bargaining and trial); Middlekauff, supra
note 132, at 17–18, 54 (reporting different perceptions of discovery between
prosecutors and defense attorneys); Aviram, supra note 61, at 35 (discussing
how “[c]onfirmation bias influences prosecutors and defense attorneys”).
248. See Brian P. Fox, An Argument Against Open-File Discovery in
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requests for waivers of discovery rights to be more common in
open-file jurisdictions. To the extent that prosecutors find
open-file discovery burdensome, they could simply negotiate to
bypass such discovery in exchange for sentencing or other
concessions to defendants. While open-file discovery typically
occurs before negotiations, the timing of plea bargaining is not
regulated, so negotiations can occur earlier in the process if
prosecutors desire a waiver.
Studies of plea bargaining and discovery at the federal level,
in New York, and in Texas have found that parties do indeed
negotiate waivers of discovery. 249 Yet two of these jurisdictions—
the federal and New York—have relatively restrictive discovery
rules, which ought not impose any significant burdens on the
prosecution. The existence of waivers in jurisdictions like New
York and the federal system may mean that prosecutors in fact
find restrictive discovery more costly because of the higher
administrative burden in responding to discovery motions.
Alternatively, because prosecutors are not providing open-file
discovery in these two jurisdictions, they may be more worried
about the risk that an unintentional Brady violation might pose
to the finality of a conviction. 250 Both of these factors might help
explain the use of negotiated discovery waivers in restrictive
discovery jurisdictions. It is also possible that prosecutors in
those jurisdictions have such overwhelming leverage in
negotiations that discovery waivers are simply a bonus
addendum to a take-it-or-leave it offer to the defense. Prosecutors
Criminal Cases, Note, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 437 (2013) (contending that
the burdens placed on the prosecutors and public defenders by open-file
discovery are significant).
249. See Klein et al., supra note 83, at 83–85 (discussing waivers in federal
courts); N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY, FINAL REPORT 66
(2014) [hereinafter NYSBA TASK FORCE] (noting the use of discovery waivers in
some counties in New York); TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL MORTON ACT, supra
note 27, at 24 (reporting that waivers were a “very prominent topic of the
defense attorney and prosecutor focus group sessions” conducted as part of the
study).
250. For a suggestion that this concern encourages waivers in the federal
system, see Cassidy, supra note 15, at 1431 (describing prosecutorial concerns
about liability for information held by other government entities but unknown
to the prosecutor and about the challenges of identifying evidence as “material”
before the trial).
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may therefore use discovery waivers because they cost little in
terms of sentencing or charging concessions to the defendant. 251
The use of discovery waivers in Texas, however, raises
different questions. To begin, the law that introduced open-file
discovery in Texas, the Michael Morton Act, appears to prohibit
discovery waivers. 252 One would therefore expect some reticence
on part of prosecutors to negotiate waivers. The new law also
requires open-file discovery, which would generally insulate
convictions from Brady challenges, 253 so this would not be a
strong reason for prosecutors to seek waivers. Yet because
open-file discovery is so recent in Texas, administrative burdens
are still relatively high as counties transition to the new
system. 254 These administrative burdens, as well as the
remaining uncertainty surrounding the operation of the law
(including uncertainty about its protection against Brady
challenges), likely explain the use of discovery waivers in Texas.
Finally, it may be too soon to know whether waivers will in fact
become commonplace in Texas. As one defense attorney quoted in
the study of the Michael Morton Act explained, some defense
attorneys are actively challenging these waivers:

251. See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea
Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 608
(2014) (discussing scenarios in which plea-bargaining appears less like a
negotiation and more like an ultimatum); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining
and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004)
(noting considerable prosecutorial leverage in plea negotiations).
252. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 39.14(n) (West 2014) (“This article
does not prohibit the parties from agreeing to discovery and documentation
requirements equal to or greater than those required under this article.”
(emphasis added)).
253. Brady challenges may still occur and succeed where investigating
agencies fail to transmit exculpatory evidence to the prosecution and such
evidence was therefore not included in the open-file disclosure. Under Kyles v.
Whitley, the prosecution is responsible for disclosing exculpatory evidence even
when the evidence is not in its custody, but is in the custody of investigating
agencies working on the case. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995).
254. See Terri Langford, Costs and Questions as TX Implements New
Discovery Law, TEXAS TRIB. (May 29, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/
2014/05/29/michael-morton-act-driving-evidence-costs-das/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2015) (discussing the increasing costs associated with producing copies of
documents under the new law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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There are some attorneys in town that are opposed to signing
those waivers. For a few of them, they’ll choose to go on the
record and acknowledge. They’ll refuse to sign those forms.
The DAs and the County Attorneys absolutely hate it. They
usually call their supervisors or whatever. But they have
successfully, the attorneys that are opposed to signing, have
successfully done it, the alternative method prescribed in the
Morton Act, which is to do it on the record. But I think that
the vast majority of cases, you’re signing forms. I guess we’ll
wait to find out if that’s a mistake or not. 255

It is possible that in the future more defense attorneys will
refuse to sign the waivers or that courts will in fact enforce the
provision banning discovery waivers. 256 It is also possible that
over time, Texas prosecutors will simply find that they do not
need to negotiate waivers, as they become more used to the new
discovery regime and find that it is not unduly burdensome.
Because discovery waivers have been documented in both
restrictive and open-file jurisdictions, we expected to find that
such waivers are also used in both North Carolina and Virginia.
Our survey, however, did not find evidence of regular
negotiations of discovery waivers in either state.
In Virginia, only 4.7% (6 of 127) of prosecutors responded
that they had obtained a waiver of discovery rights as part of plea
negotiations. All six of the respondents stated that they had
obtained such waivers in 10% or less of their felony cases in the
past year. Virginia defense attorneys did not disagree
substantially with this assessment: 88% (330 out of 377) stated
that the prosecution had not requested a waiver of discovery
rights as part of plea negotiations in felony cases over the past
year; and 6% (22 out of 377) stated that the prosecution requested
such waivers only very rarely (in 1–10% of cases). The remaining
6% had experienced waivers in more than 10% of their cases.
Defense attorneys who responded that the prosecution had
requested discovery waivers at some point over the past year also
had the option of describing the types of evidence for which
waivers were requested. While a few Virginia defense attorneys
255. TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL MORTON ACT, supra note 27, at 24.
256. A Texas State Bar opinion from November 2014 suggests that such
waivers may be unethical. See State Bar of Texas, Opinion No. 646, 78 TEX. B.J.
78, 78 (2015) (finding that certain types of discovery waivers may violate ethical
rules following the passage of the Michael Morton Act).
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mentioned exculpatory or impeachment evidence as the subject of
waivers, more common were waivers for non-exculpatory
evidence and “other” types of evidence, such as the identity of
confidential informants. 257 Under “other” waivers, defense
attorneys identified a practice of informal waivers, whereby
prosecutors offer a favorable plea, which is conditioned on
defendants foregoing discovery. As one explained: “Although no
formal waiver is ever requested, it seems implied that if the offer
is accepted without disclosure then the disclosure will not be
made. If disclosure is demanded then the plea bargain offer is
withdrawn.” 258 Another explained that the motivation behind this
practice is to conserve prosecutorial resources: “The prosecutor
claimed it was because of the economy of his time; could devote
time to other cases if he didn’t have to answer discovery.” 259
While Virginia prosecutors did not acknowledge that such
informal waivers are negotiated, it is possible that they did not
mention them because they interpreted the question to focus on
257. Among defense attorneys who reported the use of discovery waivers,
48% reported that prosecutors requested waivers for non-exculpatory evidence
discovery while 25% reported that prosecutors requested waivers for
impeachment or factually exculpatory evidence. We asked respondents to
identify the reasons that motivated prosecutors to negotiate discovery waivers.
In Virginia, the top three reasons selected by defense attorneys were:
(1) concern about harm to ongoing investigations (31 out of 39 defender
respondents selected this one); (2) concern that pre-plea discovery would stand
in the way of an expeditious resolution of the case (25 out of 42 defender
respondents selected this one); and (3) concern about witness safety (25 out of 41
defender respondents selected this option). Of the four Virginia prosecutors who
responded to this question, two selected as their motivation for requesting
waivers the concern about harm to ongoing investigations and three selected the
concern about witness safety.
258. Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question No. 16,
Respondent No. 33; see also id. at Question No. 16, Respondent No. 105
(“Prosecutors never request formal written discovery waiver. Rather, there
might for instance be an offer to reduce to misdemeanor, or agree on a sentence
below the guidelines, in exchange for foregoing disclosure of the identity of an
informant.”); id. at Question No. 16, Respondent No. 261
If counsel requests discovery prosecutors will view it as a rejection of any
plea offer in most cases. It is implied in any case where a plea has been
accepted. If you wish to ask for discovery before the plea you can and the
court will order it, but there is a fair chance the prosecution will try to
withdraw any plea offers.
259. Id. at Question No. 16, Respondent No. 250; see also id. at Question No.
16, Respondent No. 252 (“[I]f you make us investigate and work for to provide
you with more detailed facts, the offer is off the table.”).
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formal waivers. But even among defense attorneys, only a small
minority noted this practice, so it is likely that discovery
waivers—whether formal or informal—are indeed rare.
In North Carolina, only 4.9% (4 out of 81) prosecutors stated
that they had negotiated discovery waivers in felony cases in the
past year, and all four of them had rarely done so (in 10% or less
of their felony cases). North Carolina defense attorneys confirmed
that discovery waivers are uncommon: 91% (93 out of 102) stated
that, in the past year, prosecutors had never requested discovery
waivers as part of plea negotiations in felony cases, and 6%
stated that such waivers occurred in only 10% or less of felony
cases. In North Carolina, the few respondents who did mention
negotiated waivers stated that such waivers typically concerned
specific types of evidence, such as the identity of confidential
informants or the (future) testing of drugs. 260
Neither prosecutors nor defense attorneys in North Carolina
selected “exculpatory evidence” as a type of evidence for which
discovery waivers were requested. 261 Moreover, unlike in
Virginia, North Carolina respondents did not report waivers to
avoid burdensome motions. This makes sense, as open-file
discovery does not require formal motions. Moreover, to the
extent that waivers are driven by fears of Brady challenges, they
are also less needed in an open-file jurisdiction like North
Carolina because prosecutors are generally turning over
everything in their file. 262 This may help explain the relative
scarcity of discovery waivers in North Carolina.
260. See Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No. 16,
Respondent No. 10 (“If you make me get this video ([o]r test these drugs), then
the misdemeanor plea will go away.”); id. at Question No. 16, Respondent No. 20
(“Generally they seek a waiver to disclose undercover informant’s information in
drug cases.”).
261. A few did, however, select impeachment as a reason for requesting
waivers. One out of two prosecutor respondents and two out of seven defense
attorney respondents did so. These responses may reflect waivers pertaining to
the identity of confidential informants.
262. However, the occasional waivers of confidential informant identity were
likely driven by concerns about Brady challenges. North Carolina prosecutors
can legitimately withhold the identity of confidential informants under the
discovery rules, so the waivers appear primarily to serve the purpose of
protecting against Brady claims. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-904 (a1) (West
2015) (“The State is not required to disclose the identity of a confidential
informant unless the disclosure is otherwise required by law.”).

352

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016)

In brief, our survey found no evidence that a shift to open-file
leads to more frequent negotiations of discovery waivers—if
anything, waivers appear to be slightly more common in Virginia,
where discovery is more restrictive, than in North Carolina. This
suggests that waivers may frequently be driven by administrative
burdens associated with discovery motions and by concerns about
protecting against Brady challenges. While the study of the new
Texas discovery statute suggests that waiver requests may be
common in some open-file jurisdictions as well, the Texas law is
too recent to allow a clear conclusion to this effect.
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Open-File Discovery
At the end of the survey, we included several open-ended
questions, which asked participants to comment on their
perceptions of discovery practices in their jurisdiction. We asked
participants whether they were satisfied with existing discovery
practices and what they believed the advantages and
disadvantages of open-file discovery were. Two to three coders
independently reviewed responses to these open-ended questions.
The rate of agreement on coding categories was 78% or higher.
When discrepancies between coders occurred, we deferred to the
senior scholar’s rating.
a. Satisfaction with Pre-Plea Discovery Practices
Our first open-ended question asked participants whether
they believe that pre-plea discovery in their jurisdiction (either by
law or office policy) works well. Participants were also asked to
elaborate on why, in their view, it did or did not. On this
question, responses varied significantly by state.
In Virginia, views of prosecutors and defense attorneys were
starkly opposed. Prosecutors, by and large, believed that
discovery works well. Out of 101 Virginia prosecutors who
responded to this question, only four expressed any misgivings
about their jurisdiction’s discovery policy. 263 A majority explained
263. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 17,
Respondent No. 33 (“Not really. It worked better when we had open
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that either they or their office as a whole provide open-file
discovery or at least broader discovery than is required by law. 264
Yet even those who said they provide only as much as required by
law opined that the practice works well. 265 Some of these
respondents stated that even the more limited discovery practice
adequately ensures the disclosure of exculpatory information,
while others noted that it is satisfactory because it protects
witnesses. 266
By contrast, a majority of Virginia defense attorneys stated
that discovery in Virginia does not work well. 267 Common
concerns mentioned were: (1) that discovery is too limited; 268
(2) that it is left to the discretion of prosecutors and is therefore
inconsistent; 269 (3) that it is overly burdensome on the defense
because defense attorneys are often told they have to go in person
to the prosecutor’s office to make copies or take handwritten
notes summarizing the evidence; 270 and (4) that prosecutors do
not always get all the evidence from police. 271 These complaints
discovery. . . .”).
264. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 17, Respondent No .4 (“Yes. We practice
open-file discovery. It ensures an even playing field and promotes efficiency in
the litigation process.”).
265. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 17, Respondent No. 53 (“It works well here
because it is required by law.”).
266. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 17, Respondent No. 62 (“Yes, because it
protects witnesses.”).
267. Out of ninety-nine respondents, only twenty-seven stated that it works
well, while fifty stated that it does not work well, and twenty-two stated that it
sometimes works well. Id.
268. See Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, Question No. 21,
Respondent No. 74 (“No. There are very few rights to discovery under [Virginia]
law.”).
269. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 21, Respondent No. 20 (“NO! It impedes
justice, leaves too much discretion with the prosecutors who are more concerned
with winning than with facts and justice being served.”); id., at Respondent No.
101 (“Inconsistent, and different across the jurisdictions.”).
270. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 21, Respondent No. 308 (“No. The
jurisdiction I work in has a ‘fig-leaf’ ‘open file’ discovery policy. That means I can
make an appointment to go in and LOOK at the prosecutor’s file. But I am
ABSOLUTELY FORBIDDEN to have copies. So I’m supposed to make
hand-written copies of lengthy witness statements and any other documents in
the file.”).
271. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 21, Respondent No. 53 (“Discovery is
generally provided in an untimely manner and is incomplete. This is due
primarily to law enforcements [sic] providing reports late and the reports are
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were similar to concerns expressed by defense attorneys who
commented publicly on the proposed discovery reform in
Virginia. 272
In North Carolina, both prosecutors and defense attorneys
were generally satisfied with the operation of open-file discovery.
Only two out of sixty-four prosecutors stated that open-file
discovery does not work well. In one case, the respondent noted
that “[e]ven providing everything, frivolous discovery motions
abound.” 273 In another case, the respondent thought that openfile discovery should be provided even earlier if low-level felony
were expected to plead out at the probable cause hearing. 274
Another four respondents stated that the policy works well
“sometimes” or “somewhat.” 275 In all, 90.6% (58 out of 64) of
North Carolina prosecutors were satisfied with open-file
discovery, and many defended the policy in strong and
unequivocal terms. 276
incomplete.”).
272. See, e.g., Virginia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Letter
Comment on Proposed Virginia Criminal Discovery Rules (June 26, 2015)
(noting that “current discovery rules are inadequate for due process and fair
trials” and that the expansion of discovery by prosecutors in some Virginia
counties leads to rules that “are inconsistent and malleable”).
273. Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, Question No. 17, Respondent
No. 18.
274. See id. at Question No. 17, Respondent No. 23 (“No, I think it is
unrealistic that we expect low level felony pleas in a PC setting without
providing discovery.”).
275. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 17, Respondent No. 27 (“It can cut both
ways. Many prosecutors have to weigh the balancing act of keeping the victims
and witness safe while providing all the information. Generally pre-plea
discovery helps both sides evaluate the case.”).
276. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 17, Respondent No. 15 (“The thought of a
defense attorney advising his or her client to enter into a plea knowingly and
voluntarily, without knowing the evidence in a case, sounds preposterous. As a
prosecutor our job is to search for the truth.”); id. at Question No. 17,
Respondent No. 26 (“Yes because if a defendant’s attorney is provided all of the
discovery materials they can better advise their clients and the cases move
through the system more efficiently.”); id. at Question No. 17, Respondent No.
38
Yes. It facilitates a dialogue focused on resolution of the case and
reduces greatly any accusations of hiding or keeping evidence or
exculpatory statements or items from the defendant. In codefendant
cases it facilitates cooperation in resolving cases. It also builds trust
and a good working relationship between the defense and
prosecution.
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While defense attorneys were somewhat less positive about
pre-plea discovery in North Carolina, a large majority—69.5% (57
out of 85), stated that the practice works well in their
jurisdiction. 277 Only thirteen stated that it does not work well,
and another eleven stated that it works well “sometimes” or
“somewhat.” 278 Among those defense attorneys who had
misgivings about the way discovery operates in North Carolina, a
common concern was that prosecutors are reluctant to press law
enforcement for information relevant to the case, but missing
from the file. 279
In summary, while more restrictive discovery—as practiced
in Virginia—seems to polarize the views of prosecutors and
defense attorneys, open-file discovery—as practiced in North
Carolina—appears to be well-received by both.
b. Advantages of Open-File Discovery
We next asked respondents what they thought were the
major advantages of “open-file” discovery. Once again, we found
some differences between North Carolina and Virginia
prosecutors, as well as between prosecutors and defense
attorneys.
Whereas twenty out of 101 Virginia prosecutors (20%)
believed there were no advantages to open-file discovery, none of
the sixty-six North Carolina respondents (0%) believed the same.
We therefore see a much more negative view of open-file among
Virginia prosecutors—for whom open-file is a choice but not a
mandate—than among their North Carolina counterparts, who
are required to provide open-file discovery by law. A similar
contrast emerges in responses about the disadvantages of
open-file, which are discussed in the next section. 280
277. Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, Question No. 21.
278. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 21, Respondent No. 18 (“Depends on the
DA. Some DAs seem to provide everything they have, and others provide almost
nothing.”); id. at Question No. 21, Respondent No. 64 (“Unfortunately it varies
by county.”).
279. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 21, Respondent No. 80 (“[T]he local DA
attempts to comply [with] the law, but does not seem to work at getting local
law enforcement to comply.”).
280. Infra Part III.C.4.c.
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Among prosecutors who did identify benefits of open-file,
there was broad agreement on what those benefits were. In both
Virginia and North Carolina, the most commonly mentioned
advantage by prosecutors was efficiency. Roughly 35% of Virginia
prosecutors and 41% of North Carolina prosecutors who answered
this question believed efficiency to be a major advantage of
open-file discovery. While some used the word efficiency, others
gave examples, such as spending less time trying to figure out
what to disclose, not having to respond to discovery motions, and
resolving the case more quickly. 281
The second most commonly mentioned advantage was
protection against inadvertent nondisclosure of exculpatory
evidence and against claims of such nondisclosure. 282 Roughly
36% of North Carolina prosecutors and 30% of Virginia
prosecutors identified this as an advantage of open-file. 283
Virginia prosecutors also tended to note that open-file has the
advantage of facilitating guilty pleas (21%), ensuring that the
parties are better informed (21%), promoting fairness (18%), and
fostering trust and cooperation among the parties and the court
(12%). The same advantages were also mentioned by some North
Carolina prosecutors: ensuring that the parties are better
informed (26%), promoting fairness (21%), facilitating guilty
pleas (20%), and fostering trust and cooperation among the
parties and the court (11%).
Defense attorneys agreed with prosecutors about these
advantages of open-file discovery, though their ranking was
somewhat different. One of the two most frequently noted
advantages of open-file discovery was that the practice
ensures better informed decisions and more effective
assistance of the client. 284 The other was that open-file
281. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, Question No. 18,
Respondent No. 54 (“[It p]uts all the cards on the table, and you can arrive at
the strengths and weaknesses of a case in a timely manner between opposing
counsel.”); id. at Question No. 18, Respondent No. 69 (“It saves time on pretrial
motions.”).
282. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 18, Respondent No. 53 (“It [is] a procedural
safeguard to act as a stop-gap to prevent inadvertent non-[disclosure].”).
283. Respondents often identified more than one advantage of open-file
discovery. That is why the percentages add up to more than 100%.
284. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question
No. 22, Respondent No. 89 (“[It a]llows the defendant access to make a quick
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discovery promotes fairness and transparency. 285 A high
number of respondents also noted that speedier guilty pleas, 286
efficiency, 287 and better relationships between the parties 288
informed decision as to whether to plead guilty. It is the most reliable means to
assure that the defendant has access to all discovery that he is entitled to.”).
Twenty-nine out of seventy-two North Carolina defense attorneys and 105 out of
307 Virginia defense attorneys mentioned this as a major advantage. See
generally id. at Question No. 22; Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240,
at Question No. 22. Nine North Carolina defense respondents and sixty-four
Virginia defense respondents also mentioned that open-file discovery promotes
the truth, a related advantage. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra
note 241, at Question No. 22, Respondent No. 20 (“I believe that open-file
discovery allows clients and attorneys to make educated and rational decisions
based on the evidence available. It helps stop gamesmanship and focuses the
resolution of cases on the facts and law of the case.”); id. at Question No. 22,
Respondent No. 22
The Defendant does not feel that the Defense Counsel and Prosecutor
are collaborating to force a plea. As a Public Defender, I have limited
resources and may not have the opportunity to explore certain avenues
of investigation that law enforcement has already pursued. If, with
broad pre-trial discovery, I can speak intelligently to those issues that
are of concern to my client, it goes a long way in fostering a good client
attorney relationship. It also assists in making the client more
receptive to any legal advice I may give.
285. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question
No. 22, Respondent No. 11 (“It creates a transparent process, and there is less
chance of trial by ambush.”). Thirty-three out of seventy-two North Carolina
defense attorneys, and 123 out of 307 Virginia defense attorneys noted this as a
major advantage. Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question
No. 22; Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question No. 22.
286. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question
No. 22, Respondent No. 93 (“Expedited resolution of the majority of cases by
negotiated guilty plea.”). Twelve North Carolina defense respondents and
seventy-seven Virginia defense respondents stated this as a major advantage.
See generally Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question No.
22; Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No. 22.
287. See Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No. 22,
Respondent No. 9 (“I believe it actually expedites the case.”). Six North Carolina
defense respondents and fifty-one Virginia defense respondents stated this as a
major advantage; see generally, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note
240, at Question No. 22; Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at
Question No. 22.
288. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question
No. 22, Respondent No. 28 (“I think it enhances the relationship between
defense and prosecution attorneys and prevents suspicion.”). Seven North
Carolina defense respondents and twenty-seven Virginia defense respondents
mentioned this as a major advantage. See generally id. at Question No. 22;
Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question No. 22.
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and with the client 289 were important advantages of open-file
discovery. Four out of seventy-two North Carolina defense
attorneys and eleven out of 307 Virginia defense attorneys stated
that open-file has no advantages. 290 Most of these respondents
did not believe that the practice called “open-file” truly provided
them with the entire evidence in the case. 291 On the whole,
however, both Virginia and North Carolina defense attorneys
related very positive views of open-file discovery.
c. Disadvantages of Open-File Discovery
We asked participants what they believed were the major
disadvantages of “open-file” pre-plea discovery. The responses
differed significantly between North Carolina and Virginia
prosecutors, as well as between prosecutors and defense
attorneys in each state.
As in the previous question, answers from Virginia
prosecutors revealed a much more negative view of open-file
policy than answers from their North Carolina counterparts.
289. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question
No. 22, Respondent No. 161 (“Fosters a better relationship between defendants
and their attorneys.”). Six North Carolina defense respondents and thirty-five
Virginia defense respondents mentioned this as a major advantage. See
generally id.; Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No.
22.
290. See generally Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at
Question No. 22; Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question
No. 22.
291. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question
No. 21, Respondent No. 85
There are no advantages to it. A defense lawyer should file a
discovery motion in every case after he or she sees what is in the
prosecutor’s open file. . . . Overall open file discovery is a fraud. In
state and federal courts it allows the prosecution to simply say “I
have given you everything in the file” and they are protected. Such
prosecutors on both levels routinely prevent exculpatory evidence
from ever making it into their file and thereby they thwart the
purpose of the open file. I have had numerous federal and state
judges indicate that they will not compel the production of evidence
not in the prosecutors “open file” and so that prevents its pre-plea or
pretrial production to defense counsel. . . . If prosecutors placed
individual defendant rights ahead of their conviction record it would
be a great tool, but as it has been applied, it is a joke.
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Whereas 43.1% (25 out of 58) North Carolina prosecutors
responded that they believed open-file discovery has no major
disadvantages, only 7.3% (7 out of 96) Virginia prosecutors
believed the practice has no major disadvantages.
The most common disadvantage mentioned by Virginia
prosecutors was the risk of witness intimidation or
manipulation. 292 Roughly 47% (45 out of 96) Virginia prosecutors
identified this as a major disadvantage. 293 By contrast, only
10.3% (6 out of 58) of North Carolina prosecutors believed that
witness intimidation was a significant disadvantage of open-file
discovery. 294
Most Virginia prosecutors mentioned witness safety or
witness intimidation as a problem in general terms. 295 A couple of
respondents, however, offered concrete examples:
I used to follow “open file” discovery by handing my file to
defense counsel and letting them look through it and make
copies. However, several bad experiences involving defense
attorneys’ use of private witness information to confront
citizen witnesses caused me to change that policy. . . . Most
troubling, was a drug buy tape given to defense in discovery
was copied by a defendant and then played for other potential
defendants in order to burn the informant. Three individuals
heard the tape and were so enraged by learning the
informant’s identity that they tracked down the informant,
shot and killed the informant, and shot the informant’s wife in
the head. Based on these and other experiences, I no longer
allow unfettered access to my files under an “open file”
policy. 296
Some attorneys are not trustworthy and almost all of their
clients will obstruct the quest for the truth for their personal
advantage. Witnesses are in jeopardy and have been
threatened, injured, and killed in my jurisdiction. 297
292. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 19,
Respondent No. 61 (“The only disadvantage I see is that it potentially endangers
witnesses and victims, or subjects them to harassment. This can be
reduced/prevented by redacting their names and/or information.”).
293. Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 19,
294. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, at Question No. 19,
Respondent No. 45 (“[It] sometimes affects safety of witnesses.”).
295. Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 19.
296. Id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 27.
297. Id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 12.
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In North Carolina, of the six prosecutors who identified
witness intimidation as a major disadvantage of open-file, only
three gave more specific responses. The first prosecutor to discuss
an example of witness intimidation was not certain that open-file
was in fact a contributing factor to the intimidation:
I have had one case where retaliation occurred. A “snitch” was
able to be identified by the information in the file and he was
later beaten up. I don’t know if that outcome would have been
any different if I had waited to give discovery out, but I doubt
it. 298

Another North Carolina prosecutor noted that “the major
disadvantage is that defendants take the information given and
place it on social media” and that “[t]his tends to scare
witnesses.” 299 The respondent did not point to a concrete example
from his or her experience. Finally, a third North Carolina
prosecutor noted,
Although I have yet to see this come up, I’ve been concerned
that we may disclose the location of a witness, namely a
woman staying at a battered women’s shelter, for example,
through a note somebody made in the file. This could, in turn,
be passed to the defendant, resulting in an attack. Again, I’ve
yet to see it come up, but since the files aren’t filtered and
everything is just turned over, the possibility is there.” 300

These isolated cases apart, prosecutors in North Carolina
tend not to see witness safety as a significant problem with
open-file discovery. By contrast, witness intimidation is perceived
as a much more serious problem in Virginia, where prosecutors
are not required to disclose witness information unless it is
exculpatory or impeachment evidence (in which case it must be
disclosed before trial). This finding is consistent with most of the
anecdotal evidence from other jurisdictions with liberal discovery
practices, which suggests that open-file discovery does not
increase the risk of witness intimidation. 301
298. Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, at Question No. 19,
Respondent No. 62.
299. Id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 102.
300. Id. at Question No.19, Respondent No.21.
301. See e.g., Avis E. Buchanan, Fairer Trials and Better Justice in D.C.,
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2011, at A1 (“Those opposed to open-file discovery argue
that it can lead to additional witness-safety concerns or witness intimidation,
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The most common disadvantage that North Carolina
prosecutors mentioned was the resource and logistical burden of
open-file discovery. Still, only 13.8% (8 out of 58) of North
Carolina respondents identified this as a major disadvantage. By
contrast, 25% (24 out of 96) of Virginia prosecutors believed
logistical and resource burdens to be a significant disadvantage of
open-file discovery. One Virginia prosecutor worried about the
“time
spent
redacting
personal
identifying
info
of
victims/witnesses.” Another described the logistical challenges as
follows:
Documenting what was in the file when counsel actually
viewed the file is nearly impossible unless we hire additional
staff to organize and numerically stamp each page. There are
no resources for that. Similarly, most interviews with
witnesses and defendants are being recorded. Even were we to
redact reports and statements, the videos will have the
identifying information as part of the interview process and
therefore be available to the defense. Unless we were to hire a
technology expert to copy and redact the interviews, this will
remain a problem. There are no resources for that and it would
lead to complaints of tampering. 302

In North Carolina, a few prosecutors also commented that
open-file discovery can be “time consuming” and onerous. 303 As
one elaborated, it imposes a “[m]assive burden on prosecutors
office to copy and provide documents that have nothing to do with
but that hasn’t happened in the jurisdictions that use it. In studies by some of
the states and cities with open-file discovery (Florida, San Diego, Philadelphia,
Detroit and Newark), no causal link between the practice and witness
intimidation has been found.”); N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY CODES COMM., CRIM.
DISCOVERY IN N.Y. STATE: CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 13
(1991) (noting the same study). But see NYSBA REPORT, Response to Majority,
supra note 20, at 92 (citing statements from Philadelphia prosecutor’s office that
open-file rules have contributed to widespread problems of witness
intimidation).
302. Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 19,
Respondent No. 12; see also id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 36
(“Documenting what has been provided to defense counsel in the file. If
additional information is provided to prosecutors, how to document that defense
had an opportunity to review the information. Issues with defense alleging
certain items were not in the file. Protecting/redacting confidential information
about witnesses.”).
303. Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, at Question No. 19,
Respondents Nos. 20, 23, 35, 39, 52, 55, 74.
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case but because law enforcement looked at or has in their
possession we make sure to provide to defense.” 304 Another
pointed out that it takes a “[g]reat deal of man power to copy all
of the discovery and provide it in every case as well as making
the paper trail to prove it has been done if there is alter a claim
that open file discovery has not been complied with.” 305 While
some of these remarks from North Carolina prosecutors echo
those of Virginia prosecutors, it is notable that a much smaller
percent of the North Carolina respondents voiced such concerns.
These statements should also be read alongside the responses of
Virginia prosecutors and North Carolina prosecutors who cited
efficiency as one of the main advantages of open-file discovery. 306
Another misgiving among prosecutors about open-file
discovery had to do with the potential abuse of the disclosed
information by the defense. Prosecutors expressed concerns about
the fabrication of defenses based on the information disclosed and
about false allegations by defense attorneys that certain evidence
was not properly disclosed. One Virginia prosecutor lamented
that open-file discovery leads to
[m]isuse by defense attorneys who twist the information they
receive, and misrepresent the law to the court, and use the
information in a way that is not supported by statute or case
law to impeach witnesses. I have seen this done and the
mistrust of the prosecutor’s office it creates in the police
department. It makes the officers more likely to not include
exculpatory information in their report. 307

This concern was much more common among Virginia
prosecutors (26% identified it as a major disadvantage) than
among their North Carolina counterparts (10.3% identified it as
such). 308 Moreover, North Carolina prosecutors tend to worry
primarily about unfounded allegations that discovery was not
produced than about fabricated defenses. 309 By contrast, Virginia
304. Id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 52.
305. Id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 74.
306. Supra note 281 and accompanying text.
307. Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 19,
Respondent No. 26.
308. Compare Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 19,
with Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, at Question No. 19.
309. Only two out of the six North Carolina prosecutors who saw defense

TWO MODELS OF PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY

363

prosecutors frequently express a concern about the defense
“twisting” the evidence and “distorting” the truth. 310 The mistrust
of what defense attorneys might do with the evidence in an
open-file system appears to be higher in Virginia than in North
Carolina.
The last concern by prosecutors has to do with the shift that
open-file discovery creates in the balance of advantages between
the parties. A number of prosecutors lamented that open-file
discovery asks them to reveal their cards, while the defense does
not have to reciprocate fully. 311 A few prosecutors further noted
that a major disadvantage of open-file is that the “[d]efense might
see weaknesses in my case that I might not want them to be
aware of (not exculpatory material, of course, which I always turn
over.).” This concern was shared by 14.6% (14 out of 96) of
Virginia prosecutors and 10.3% (6 out of 58) of their North
Carolina counterparts.
Perhaps not surprisingly, many prosecutors in both states
would like to see the balance of advantages adjusted in some
ways. In a question concerning discovery from the defense, a
large majority of prosecutors in North Carolina (72.3%) and
Virginia (70.5%) stated that the defense should be required to
provide broader reciprocal discovery. 312 This is so even though, in
North Carolina, the defense is already required to disclose (after
receiving open-file from the prosecution) a variety of items,
including reports of testifying experts, test reports, notice of
misuse as a major disadvantage worried about the defense “twisting” the
evidence. One worried about the defense “shoring up” his case based on
disclosures and hampering ongoing investigations. Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors,
supra note 221, at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 27. The other worried about
the defense contacting witnesses who can be encouraged to amend their
statements. Id. at Question No. 18, Respondent No. 28.
310. Seventeen out of the twenty-five Virginia prosecutors who stated that
defense abuse was a major disadvantage of open-file expressed concerns of this
nature. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 19,
Respondent No. 26 (discussing “[m]isuse by defense attorneys who twist the
information they receive, and misrepresent the law to the court”).
311. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 5 (noting as a major
disadvantage that “[d]efense is not required to provide us any discovery”).
312. Roughly 17% of North Carolina Prosecutors and 18% of Virginia
Prosecutors stated that the defense should not be required to disclose more. The
remaining 10–12% of the respondents either had no opinion or did not express
an unequivocal opinion on this question.
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intent to introduce at trial certain defenses, 313 names and
background of testifying experts, 314 and a list of witnesses. 315
These items must only be disclosed later in the process—and in
the case of witness lists, not until the beginning of jury
selection. 316 For that reason, many North Carolina prosecutors
believe that defense witness names should be disclosed earlier,
and some noted that defense witness statements should also be
provided. Finally, some stated that the scope of defense disclosure
was sufficiently broad, but they lamented that courts do not
enforce discovery rules against the defense. 317
In Virginia, disclosure by the defense is much more limited
than in North Carolina and covers only certain tests and reports,
notice of alibi, and, if the defendant intends to rely on an insanity
313. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-905(c)(1) (West 2015) (requiring the
disclosure of intent to introduce defenses including alibi, duress, entrapment,
insanity, mental infirmity, diminished capacity, self-defense, accident,
automatism, involuntary intoxication, or voluntary intoxication).
314. See id. § 15A-905(c)(2) (requiring notice to the state of any expert
witnesses that the defendant reasonably expects to call as a witness at trial).
315. See id. § 15A-905(c)(3) (requiring disclosure, at the beginning of jury
selection, of a list of witnesses the defendant reasonably expects to call during
trial).
316. Id.
317. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note 221, at Question No. 19,
Respondent No. 46
The defense gets away with not handing over a lot of information.
They are never reprimanded or sanctioned for behavior that would
not be allowed in civil litigation. There is nothing preventing a
defense attorney from never disclosing information that they are
required to hand over. It only benefits the defendant to withhold
information as defense attorneys know that there is no way a judge
will not allow something that benefits the defendant for fear that the
case will be overturned if there was a conviction without it. I have
been prosecuting felony cases for 3 years and have handled thousands
of felonies and I can count on one hand the number of times I have
received reciprocal discover[y] from the defendant. We get absolutely
zero.
Id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 17
Yes, but mostly, because most of the time, even when reciprocal
discovery motions are filed, they are often not complied with or judges
don’t enforce them with the same rigor as defense motions. It is not so
much that the state should have broader discovery, but the defense
should be required to give what the statutes require them to. While
perhaps not equal in scope, it should be equal in obligation.
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defense, reports related to that defense. 318 This disclosure is
conditional on disclosure of specified items by the prosecution and
must be provided “within a reasonable time but not less than ten
days before trial or sentencing, as the case may be.” 319 It is
therefore perhaps not surprising that a large majority of Virginia
prosecutor respondents stated that the defense should provide
broader disclosure. Most of those who specified the type of
evidence to be disclosed thought that prior records or other
impeachment information about defense witnesses should be
provided. 320 Some respondents asking for broader disclosure by
the defense in Virginia recognized that rules currently require
only limited disclosure by the prosecution as well. So statements
in favor of broader defense disclosure were at times accompanied
by an acknowledgement that the prosecution may have to provide
more as well. 321
Finally, a few prosecutors worried that open-file discovery
might lull prosecutors and defense attorneys into a false sense of
security about the information that must be uncovered, as one
Virginia prosecutor explained:
Sometimes law enforcement doesn’t provide us with copies of
everything. For example, they may show up for court and have
photos that we didn’t know existed. This wouldn’t be any
better if we followed the statutory discovery rules but it looks
bad for us because we’ve indicated we’ve made everything
available and then there’s something we didn’t know about. In
these cases we’ve just continued the case if the information is
something that the defense needs time to investigate. 322
318. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11(c) (applying to any prosecution for a felony in
a circuit court and to any misdemeanor brought on direct indictment).
319. Id.
320. Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 20.
321. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 20, Respondent No. 49
[C]ertainly if the prosecution were required to provide everything, then
a reciprocal burden should be placed on the defense. If the motivation is
to seek the truth in the criminal justice system, then defense counsel
shouldn’t object to that philosophy. However, I have found that the
defense bar and defense organizations are simply using political
avenues to try and advance their strategic position, not provide fair
trials for their clients.
322. Id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 28; see also id. at Question No.
19, Respondent No. 30 (“Far too many prosecutors rely on open file to provide
exculpatory information. Oftentimes, situations present themselves where a file
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A few worried that open-file discovery might have perverse
effects, leading law enforcement to omit information from the file,
to protect it from disclosure to the defense, as one Virginia
prosecutor asserted:
Mandating an open-file policy will lead to files with less
information. We do not generate our own information—it is
provided to us by other agencies (police, etc.). They are not
fans of their work-product becoming accessible to the public
(which is always a risk under an open-file discovery
scheme). 323

Another question also tested what features of broad
discovery prosecutors find problematic. This question asked
prosecutors to select reasons for which they might refrain from
providing broader discovery than required by law. In Virginia,
91% of prosecutors listed concerns about witness safety as a
reason for refraining from broader discovery. 324 By contrast, only
52% of North Carolina respondents did so. 325 Additionally,
whereas 84% of Virginia prosecutors listed concerns about harm
to an ongoing investigation as a reason for refraining from
providing broader discovery, only 46% of their North Carolina
counterparts did so. 326 And while roughly a quarter of Virginia
prosecutors responded that a lack of good relations with the
defense or a concern that a defendant might manipulate the
evidence would be a reason for them to refrain from providing
broader discovery, just over 1% of North Carolina respondents
shared this view. 327 In both jurisdictions, however, the lack of
time to check with investigating agencies was a reason for
roughly a third of the respondents to refrain from broader
discovery. 328

not only needs to be opened . . . counsel’s attention must be directed to the
exculpatory information to make sure it’s seen.”).
323. Id. at Question No. 19, Respondent No. 87.
324. Infra Table 9.
325. Infra Table 9.
326. Infra Table 9.
327. Infra Table 9.
328. Infra Table 9.
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Table 9: Reasons for Refraining from Broader Pre-Plea Discovery
Than Required by Law: % Yes, Prosecutors
Virginia
North Carolina
Prosecutors; n=107 Prosecutors; n=62
35.5
32.3

No time to check
with all agencies
Concern about
witness safety
Concern about
witness willingness
to testify
Concern about harm
to ongoing case
Lack of
time/resources to
review for privilege
Concern about
impeding timely
resolution
Evidence was
overwhelming
Concern about
financial cost
Lack of good
relations with
defense
Concern defendant
would manipulate
evidence
Concern about the
strength of evidence
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

X2(1); Ф
0.18; 0.03

91.3

52.3

35.34***;
0.46
25.34***;
0.39

47.7

10.0

84.1

46.0

19.8

23.7

26.27***;
0.39
0.49; 0.05

3.7

5.1

0.12; 0.03

29.6

16.4

3.99*; 0.15

4.7

3.4

0.21; 0.04

26.2

1.7

16.65***;
0.31

25.2

1.7

15.84***;
0.31

10.3

1.7

4.47*; 0.16

Responses to this question suggest that Virginia prosecutors
are more sensitive to the risks that disclosure might pose to
witness safety and ongoing investigations and are more
concerned about defense misuse of disclosed evidence. While
North Carolina prosecutors share the preoccupation about
witness safety and the integrity of investigation, the number of
prosecutors who selected these concerns as reasons for refraining
from broader discovery is dramatically lower than the
corresponding number for Virginia. 329

329.

Supra Table 9.
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As may be expected, defense attorneys had a different
perspective from that of prosecutors about the disadvantages of
open-file discovery. In North Carolina, 46.4% of respondents (32
out of 69) believed that open-file discovery has no major
disadvantages. 330 In Virginia, the percentage of defense attorneys
who believed the same was lower—33.3% (101 out of 303). 331 It is
important to note, however, that many Virginia defense attorneys
described the disadvantages of discretionary, not mandatory,
open-file practice, because this is the only type of open-file
discovery they had experienced first-hand.
A common complaint about discretionary open-file was that
it was “open-file” in name, but in reality frequently incomplete. A
third of Virginia defense respondents (102 out of 303) believed
this was a major disadvantage of open-file policy. 332 Some further
complained about police officers and other investigative agencies
not including relevant information in the file sent to the
prosecutor. 333 As one stated, the main disadvantage of open-file
discovery is
[c]rappy, incomplete police reports. In many cases, after
reviewing the prosecution file, I have more questions than
answers. If the police officer leaves important details out of the
report or does a poor investigation, there may be a ton of
exculpatory evidence that neither the prosecutor, nor I, have
any idea about. 334

Others noted that open-file policy made prosecutors “lazier”
and gave them an excuse not to seek out exculpatory evidence
from law enforcement. 335 A number observed that prosecutors
failed to inform them of evidence that was received after the
defense attorneys had reviewed the file. 336 Many pointed out that
330. Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No. 23.
331. Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question No. 23.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 88.
335. See e.g., id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 91 (“It develops lazy
prosecutors who do not know their case, because they have not been forced to
actually comb through their file.”); id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 153
(“They don’t think they ever have to do anything except open their file. I don't
get information that isn't written and given to the prosecution.”).
336. See e.g., id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 156 (“Prosecutors rely
on the file, don’t search for more, and if things are added later they do not alert
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there were frequent disagreements about whether certain
evidence was in the file when the defense reviewed it, because
there was no requirement to document the evidence provided to
the defense. The following statements by Virginia prosecutors
sum up these concerns:
Some jurisdictions that say they use it don’t always put
everything in the file—I have a case with a co-defendant
where a lot of the pertinent information was in the other file.
In that same case the prosecutor didn’t obtain additional
exculpatory information as required and relied upon the open
file discovery to say that what was provided was sufficient. A
final problem is that sometimes they will update the file and
not tell the defense attorney that more information has been
received, so the defense attorney is left guessing as to when to
look for more evidence in the CA file. I think discovery just
needs to be sent to the defense attorney and supplemented as
it comes in. 337
There is little regulation about what is included or not—often
times prosecutors will provide a book or box of documents, but
there is no way to know what is being held back; there needs
to be an effective process for notification when new documents,
info, etc. is added to the file and a way to document what is
viewed and to have actual copies of items (as opposed to being
able to look at and hand copy items). 338
Defense counsel only sees what the prosecutor chooses to put
in his file—I had a case in [omitted] where the prosecutor
added documents to his file several times before trial—and
although we stopped by to inspect the file several times—he
still offered new evidence at trial that we had never seen—and
of course the judge let it in—he said he had provided it; we
said he had not—the defense always loses that one. 339

Similar concerns about the incompleteness of the file also
emerged in the North Carolina responses, but a somewhat
smaller percentage of defense respondents—26.1%, believed this
was a major disadvantage of open-file discovery. 340 These findings
defense counsel.”).
337. Id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 12.
338. Id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 175.
339. Id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 107.
340. The following statement by a North Carolina defense attorney was
representative:
The only disadvantage is that the DAs rely on the police to turn over
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are consistent with existing anecdotal evidence and commentary
noting that even open-file disclosure fails to produce certain
material evidence (including Brady evidence) that remains in the
custody of investigative agencies. 341
In a related concern, 7.9% (24 out of 303) of Virginia defense
respondents and 7.2% (5 out of 69) of their North Carolina
counterparts expressly noted that open-file discovery can make
prosecutors and defense attorneys complacent and passive. 342
Thus prosecutors may fail to seek out exculpatory evidence from
investigative agencies, as is their duty under Brady, and defense
attorneys may wrongly assume that the file is complete and fail
to investigate further.
In Virginia, 24.1% of defense attorneys also complained that
open-file discovery, as practiced by prosecutors in their state,
unduly burdened them. 343 The most common complaint was that
attorneys were not permitted to copy materials, but had to go to
the office in person to view the materials and take notes. 344 By
contrast, only 11.6% of North Carolina defense attorneys believed
open-file discovery to be burdensome. 345 Moreover, only half of
these North Carolina respondents believed that open-file was
their entire file. There may be an occasion where the entire police file
is not turned over, and the DAs office may not be motivated to
follow-up. The prosecutor takes on faith that the police have turned
everything over, and may not be aware that something is missing. We
as Defense Lawyers also might not be aware, and thus might not
think to challenge the DAs if something may be missing.
Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No. 23, Respondent
No. 13.
341. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 40, at 545 (acknowledging that even
under the most liberal open-file policies, prosecutorial files may not contain all
relevant documents, including Brady evidence); Meyn, supra note 20, at 1122
(stating that the term “open-file” is potentially misleading, as prosecutorial files
may not include all information available to law enforcement); Prosser, supra
note 19, at 596, 601, 606–07 (discussing limitations on the open-file discovery
policy, including the failure by prosecutors to record all the information they
receive).
342. This concern was also implicit in a number of the comments about the
file being incomplete, so this percentage likely underestimates the number of
defense respondents who would agree with this proposition.
343. Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question No. 23.
344. Id.
345. Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No. 23.
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burdensome to defense attorneys; the rest were talking about
burdens on prosecutors or on the justice system. 346
A few defense attorney respondents in Virginia and North
Carolina also brought up concerns about abuse of the evidence by
clients or dangers to witnesses (including confidential
informants). 347 Just over 7% of North Carolina respondents (5 out
of 69) noted as a major disadvantage of open-file that a client
might manufacture defenses based on the disclosed evidence, that
witnesses might be intimidated, or that ongoing investigations
might be jeopardized. 348 Just over 4% (13 out of 303) of Virginia
defense attorneys noted similar concerns. Some of these
respondents, however, presented this as a preoccupation of
prosecutors, not one that they necessarily shared. 349
Finally, a concern that some Virginia respondents mentioned
reflected the discretionary nature of open-file discovery there:
No consistency across jurisdictions, and even across
prosecutors in the same office. Allows favoritism toward some
attorneys too. It also puts defense attorneys in an
uncomfortable position, as they have to ask nicely for the
discovery, usually agreeing not to file a motion for pre-trial
discovery, which then means that the prosecutors cannot be
held accountable for failure to provide discovery. 350

346. Id.
347. Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question No. 23;
Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No. 23.
348. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question
No. 23, Respondent No. 45 (“Occasionally I will have clients lie to me to fit the
facts of the discovery. For instance, they will see what the discovery says and
then fabricate a story to around the prosecutor’s theory of the case.”); id. at
Question No. 23, Respondent No. 22 (“Defendants will seize upon ANY
discrepancy in hopes that she or she could be found not guilty. Rarely have I had
an experience with a client contacting a witness. Less than 5 times in 12 years
of felony trial work.”); Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at
Question No. 23, Respondent No. 82 (“I’m sure there are some clients who would
arrange to have alibi witnesses to refute vague eyewitness testimony if given
enough information.”).
349. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240, at Question
No. 23, Respondent No. 32 (“Prosecutors here believe it would help defendants
construct defenses.”); id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 64 (“I can see
none, but I know our local prosecutors are always concerned about witness
security.”).
350. Id. at Question No. 23, Respondent No. 101.
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While only two people mentioned this type of concern as a
major disadvantage of open-file discovery in Virginia, it came up
more frequently as a reason for dissatisfaction with the Virginia
discovery policy (an earlier question in the survey), and it was
also mentioned in a number of public comments to the proposed
discovery rule reform in that state. 351
In short, while a sizable percentage of defense attorneys see
no major disadvantages in open-file discovery, many are still
concerned about the lack of completeness of the file that is being
disclosed and the sense of complacency and passivity that
open-file might encourage among defense attorneys and
prosecutors. In Virginia, defense attorneys were also concerned
about the burdens that the current discretionary open-file policy
imposes on them, as they have to go to the prosecutor’s office in
person to view the file and are then not permitted to make any
copies, but must take handwritten notes.
IV. Pre-Plea Discovery: Implications
Debates about the merits of broader pre-plea discovery
continue as jurisdictions from Virginia to New York to the federal
system consider discovery reform. 352 Advocates of open-file
discovery argue that it produces more informed decisions by
defendants about whether to plead guilty. 353 The practice is also
said to speed up the resolution of cases and reduce discovery
disputes. 354 Finally, open-file is seen by its advocates as fairer
and more consistent, as it reduces, or even eliminates,
351. See, e.g., id. at Question No. 21, Respondent No. 36 (“In some counties
where we receive ‘open file’ discovery, it works very well because we see
everything including police reports (with the exception of some witness
statements). In some counties it does not work well because discovery is
provided orally about 30 minutes before preliminary hearing, as a general
rule.”); id. at Question No. 21, Respondent No. 64 (“It varies by local
jurisdiction.”).
352. See NYSBA TASK FORCE, supra note 249 (suggesting that changes in
discovery rules are needed); see also SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC.
COMM. ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY, supra note 118 (recommending reform of
Virginia discovery rules); Federal Criminal Discovery Reform, supra note 111
(discussing federal reform proposals).
353. Supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
354. Supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
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prosecutorial discretion about what evidence is exculpatory. 355 In
response, supporters of the closed-file model argue that open-file
is neither necessary nor desirable. Specifically, they contend that
open-file does not necessarily produce better disclosure of
exculpatory evidence, 356 that it imposes significant logistical
burdens on the prosecution, 357 and that it increases the risk of
witness intimidation. 358 Our study attempts to assess the validity
of these competing claims by comparing the experiences of
prosecutors and defense attorneys in an open-file jurisdiction to
those in a closed-file jurisdiction. Our findings lead us to endorse
the arguments in favor of open-file pre-plea discovery, albeit with
some caveats and qualifications.
A. Methodological Caveats
Before laying out the implications of our survey, we address
several potential critiques of our method. The first has to do with
our low response rates, ranging from roughly 10%–20% for each
of the four categories of respondents. 359 These rates may raise a
concern about selection bias and lack of representativeness of our
responses. As noted earlier, we addressed this critique in part by
analyzing whether relationships exist between demographic
characteristics of our respondents (race, gender, practical
experience) and frequency of discovery provided. We found
none. 360 Likewise, we found no significant correlation between
caseload handled by respondents and frequency of discovery
provided, and none between the type of crime handled by
respondents and the frequency of discovery.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, our response rate is
consistent with or higher than the response rates of other surveys
355. Supra notes 95–98, 104–108 and accompanying text.
356. Supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text.
357. Supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
358. Supra notes 111–116 and accompanying text.
359. The four categories are: North Carolina prosecutors (11.1%), North
Carolina defense attorneys (9.5%), Virginia prosecutors (16%), and Virginia
defense attorneys (19.84%). See generally Pre-Plea: NC Prosecutors, supra note
221; Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241; Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors,
supra note 223; Pre-Plea: VA Defense Attorneys, supra note 240.
360. Supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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of prosecutors and defense attorneys. 361 To some degree, low
response rates are an inherent practical limitation of the survey
method, particularly when busy professionals are being polled.
Beyond running the data analyses we discussed earlier, another
remedy for low response rates would be to supplement our survey
with other types of empirical studies—interviews of practitioners,
observational studies of discovery practices, and simulated
discovery studies, both in North Carolina and Virginia and in
jurisdictions beyond them. 362 We hope to be able to do some of
this research in the future, and we would welcome efforts by
other scholars to supplement our study along these lines.
Another limitation of our survey—and of surveys generally—
is that it tests perceptions of discovery practices rather than
directly monitoring the practices themselves. Particularly when it
comes to defense attorneys, perceptions of what is disclosed may,
in many situations, be educated guesses. Defense attorneys
would typically not know that certain evidence was withheld from
them unless their clients had independent knowledge of the
evidence existing or the attorneys deduced from their own
investigations and analysis of the case that evidence was missing.
In some cases, the evidence may only be uncovered after plea
negotiations fall apart and the case goes to trial, or after the case
is on appeal, or at the post-conviction stage. But in some cases,
the evidence would not surface at all. 363 Defense attorneys may
therefore not have a fully accurate picture of the evidence that is
being withheld from them. In addition, the stark differences in
the disclosure rates reported by prosecutors and those reported
by defense attorneys suggest that professional roles may color
perspectives on this issue. For all those reasons, perceptions of
discovery practices must be treated with caution.
361. See supra Part III.C. (stating that our response rates and our
completion rate of 75% are quite comparable to, or exceed, rates from similar
surveys).
362. See generally Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Evaluating Empirical Research
Methods: Using Empirical Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777
(2002) (arguing that each type of empirical method has its own shortcomings,
and to remedy this, researchers should study the same question using a variety
of quantitative and qualitative methods).
363. See Medwed, supra note 17, at 1540 (“[P]roven Brady errors hint at a
larger problem because the vast majority of suspect disclosure choices occur in
the inner sanctuaries of prosecutorial offices and never see the light of day.”).
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Yet whatever effects professional role has on perceptions of
Virginia prosecutors and defense attorneys would also seem to
affect the perceptions of their counterparts in North Carolina.
Because our survey focuses on comparing the two jurisdictions,
and not simply on the absolute numbers of disclosure within each
jurisdiction, we can distill effects and trends that are not
influenced solely by professional affiliation.
Another potential critique of our approach is that we have
neglected one or more variables that influence discovery
practices. In other words, perhaps it is not the different discovery
rules, but rather a factor we have failed to take into account that
best explains the different discovery practices in North Carolina
and Virginia. We have, however, considered several alternative
explanations and have found none that adequately accounts for
the findings of our survey.
For example, we have examined whether different rates of
violent crime may explain the more serious concerns that
Virginia prosecutors have about open-file disclosure. We found
that violent crime rate is higher in North Carolina than in
Virginia, which cuts against the theory that the more generous
discovery provided in North Carolina can be explained by lower
levels of violent crime. 364 Moreover, Virginia ranks 34th in the
country in terms of violent crime, so the unusually restrictive
discovery practices there cannot be explained by reference to an
exceptionally high violent crime rate. 365
The absence of a significant correlation between violent
crime rates and frequency of discovery is further confirmed by
our data analysis. Our survey asked prosecutors to indicate the
types of crimes they had handled over the past year. 366 We
analyzed whether the type of crime handled influenced the
discovery that prosecutors provided in key categories (we focused
on witness statements, witness names, and police reports, where
the concern about witness safety is likely to be the greatest and
therefore most likely to lead to restricted disclosure). We found no
364. See
2014
Crime
in
the
United
States,
FBI
(2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.2014/tables/table-5 (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) (listing violent crime statistics for
all fifty states) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
365. Id.
366. Infra Appendix A, Questions No. 2, 3.
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significant relationship between the handling of violent crimes
and the amount of information provided to the defense.
We also examined whether caseload or guilty plea rates
might explain different rates of discovery. We had asked
respondents about the number of felonies they had handled over
the past year and about the percentage of felony cases resolved
through a guilty plea. After reviewing the data, we found no
significant relationship between the reported number of cases
handled per year and discovery provided, nor between the
reported percentage of cases disposed via guilty pleas and
discovery provided. In addition, according to data collected by the
Department of Justice (Bureau of Justice Statistics) in 2007, in
North Carolina, the average felony caseload per prosecutor is
113.48 closed cases per year (SD = 56.68). 367 In Virginia, the
average felony caseload per prosecutor is significantly lower, at
77.09 (SD = 59.17) closed cases per year. 368 Therefore, restrictive
discovery in Virginia cannot be justified on the grounds of a
heavier caseload. As a matter of statewide practice, whereas
North Carolina has a higher rate of plea dispositions (97%) than
Virginia (89.8%), both states adjudicate a large majority of their
felony cases via guilty pleas. 369 Therefore, neither caseload nor
guilty plea rates would seem to affect disclosure practices.
One feature we did not consider is the size of offices (and
related to this, whether offices were in rural or urban areas). It is
possible that office size influenced attitudes toward discovery. 370
Virginia’s prosecutor’s offices are, on average, two to three times
smaller than North Carolina offices. 371 Moreover, some anecdotal
367. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL
PROSECUTORS
SURVEY
[CENSUS]
(2007),
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/33202 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In North Carolina, data were available for 40
offices. In Virginia, data were available for 115 offices.
368. Id. This difference is statistically significant, p = .007.
369. VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 33
(2014); NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL BRANCH, TRIAL COURTS: STATISTICAL AND
OPERATIONAL REPORT, JULY 1, 2013–JUNE 30, 2014, at 5 (2014).
370. Cf. Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutorial Services
of North Carolina, 41 CRIME & JUST.: A REV. OF RES. 211 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2012) (discussing the urban versus rural divide within North Carolina’s
prosecutor offices).
371. While Virginia and North Carolina have roughly similar sized
populations and Virginia has a somewhat lower crime rate, Virginia has 120
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evidence points to a correlation between office size and level of
discovery. In open-ended responses, several Virginia prosecutors
indicated that because they practiced in a very small, rural
jurisdiction, defense attorneys and prosecutors knew each other
well, so discovery proceeded informally and without much
dispute. 372 At the same time, in public comments on the proposed
discovery reform, the Virginia Association of Commonwealth’s
Attorneys opined that some less affluent offices (typically
smaller, rural offices) would have fewer resources to handle the
logistical burdens associated with switching to open-file
discovery. 373
Although we did not inquire about the size of office in which
respondents practiced, we did compute correlations between
respondents’ caseload and frequency of discovery reported, as
well as between prosecutor specialization and discovery reported,
and we found no significant correlations. Caseload and
specialization are not perfect proxies for office size, however, so it
is still possible that office capacity has some influence on the
results of our survey. 374 This is an open question for future
research.
prosecutor’s offices, whereas North Carolina has 44. Supra notes 137, 143–144
and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., Pre-Plea: VA Prosecutors, supra note 223, at Question No. 17,
Respondent No. 25 (“Yes [our discovery practice works well]—we are a small
rural county. The vast majority of our cases are handles by the public defenders
office. There is no way that they could do their job without the ability to just
come in and read our file. The cases that are handled by private attorneys, the
vast majority are local folks that respect our position and appreciate that we do
open file.”); id. at Question No. 17, Respondent No. 119 (“Yes, [our discovery
practice works] very well. As prosecutors, we should have nothing to hide. The
only time we deny open file is in child sexual abuse cases or cases where witness
safety is an issue. We are also a rural jurisdiction, and what we do may not
work as well in a large jurisdiction.”).
373. See VACA Letter, supra note 119 (“The fiscal impact of this [proposed
new discovery] rule would be disparate throughout the Commonwealth with
more affluent localities affected less while many other localities would be
affected greatly.”).
374. It is difficult to predict how office size might affect the level of discovery
provided. On the one hand, prosecutors and defense attorneys in smaller
counties are more likely to know and trust one another. Moreover, problems of
witness intimidation are more likely to arise in urban areas, where organized
crime is more prevalent. At the same time, rural areas are likely to have fewer
resources to handle the switch to open-file discovery and that might be a reason
to oppose it.
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There may also be intangible differences—such as how
adversarial the criminal justice culture within each state is—that
could help explain why North Carolina prosecutors tend to
provide broader discovery than their Virginia counterparts. This
is difficult to test. While our results seemed to indicate greater
levels of mistrust between Virginia prosecutors and defense
attorneys than between their North Carolina counterparts, it is
unclear whether this mistrust is the result of more adversarial
rules or a cause of the more adversarial rules in Virginia.
In reviewing the history of the North Carolina open-file
discovery law, we saw no evidence that congeniality among
prosecutor and defense attorneys contributed to the passage of
the legislation. To the contrary, it appears that a driving factor
was public outcry against egregious prosecutorial failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence and the resulting wrongful
convictions. 375 While Virginia has also uncovered wrongful
convictions that were at least in part the product of prosecutorial
misconduct, the failures do not appear to have been as serious
and headline-grabbing as those in North Carolina. 376
We also uncovered some evidence that tends to confirm the
significance of formal legal rules rather than culture in
explaining the difference we observed in North Carolina and
Virginia discovery practices. Open-file discovery rules do not
apply in district courts in North Carolina, which handle mostly
misdemeanor cases. 377 If culture, rather than rules, drove
375. See, e.g., Bantz, supra note 86 (describing the story of Alan Gell, who
was wrongfully convicted in part as a result of withheld exculpatory evidence,
and explaining that his exoneration provided the impetus for discovery reform);
Loranger, supra note 86 (arguing that the withholding of exculpatory evidence
in the Duke lacrosse case was a reminder of the importance of open-file
discovery); Joseph Neff, ‘Open File’ Law Gives Defense a Tool to Force Out
NEWS
&
OBSERVER
(Apr.
12,
2007),
Evidence,
RALEIGH
http://www.newsobserver.com/2007/04/12/82840/open-file-law-gives-defensea.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2015) (detailing how prosecutors withheld
information in the case of Alan Gell, which led to the open-file discovery law in
North Carolina) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
376. See generally INNOCENCE COMM’N FOR VA., A VISION FOR THE JUSTICE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VA. (2005) (discussing wrongful convictions, including some
caused by withheld exculpatory evidence, in Virginia).
377. See State v. Fuller, 176 N.C. App. 104, 108 (2006) (“Article 48 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, Discovery in the Superior Court, applies only
to cases within the Superior Court’s original jurisdiction.”); see also Dean P.
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discovery practices, we might expect discovery in district court to
be as open and generous as in superior court, which handles
felony cases in North Carolina. 378 Yet that is not what our
responses suggested. In open-ended answers, several of our North
Carolina participants suggested that discovery continues to be
more limited in misdemeanor than in felony cases. 379 These
statements offer another indication that formal discovery rules
make a difference.

Loven, Discovery in District Court, NCIDS (2008), http://www.ncids.org/
Defender%20Training/2008%20Spring%20Conference/DiscoveryDistrictCourt.p
df (stating that North Carolina’s discovery statutes only apply to cases having
original jurisdiction in superior court, and therefore do not apply to
misdemeanor cases with original jurisdiction in the district court).
378. Open-file discovery might be more burdensome for prosecutors in
misdemeanor cases because of the significantly higher number of cases that
each prosecutor handles and the frequent lack of a “file” to disclose. This might
help explain the different practices between misdemeanor and felony discovery
even within the same state. Yet apparently some prosecutors in North Carolina
provide such discovery even in misdemeanor cases as a matter of grace.
Moreover, misdemeanor cases are less likely to raise issues of witness safety
than felony cases, so from that perspective, open-file should be more feasible in
misdemeanor cases.
379. See Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at Question No. 21,
Respondent No. 23 (“In NC there is a two tiered system so my client may be
willing to take a plea in District Court, pre-indictment, where there is no right
whatsoever to discovery.”); id. at Question No. 25, Respondent No. 83 (“We need
it [open-file discovery] in District Court.”); id. at Question No. 11, Respondent
No. 29 (“In our jurisdiction, we are not entitled to discovery until the
Defendant’s case is brought to Superior Court, and many times cases linger or
pleas are offered in District Court where there is no right to discovery.”); id. at
Question No. 21, Respondent No. 94 (“Physical discovery is never provided in
felony cases that are reduced to a misdemeanor. We are often allowed to read
the report, but not allowed to copy it.”); id. at Question No. 11, Respondent No.
98 (“[I]f they offer a misdemeanor early in the process, the defendant is not
provided with full discovery.”); see also Loven, supra note 377 (noting the
restriction of open-file discovery rules to cases having original jurisdiction in
superior court). But cf. Pre-Plea: NC Defense Attorneys, supra note 241, at
Question No. 13, Respondent No. 10 (noting that defense is “entitled [to] disc. in
to open file Superior Court. Often given in district court for felony pleas anyway
to resolve cases quickly”); id. at Question No. 11, Respondent No. 13 (“Local DAs
office practice is to provide open file at preliminary stage in District Court
also.”).
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B. Legal and Policy Implications

While we recognize the methodological limitations of our
survey, we believe that we can draw certain implications for
discovery law from the comparative data we collected from North
Carolina and Virginia. Specifically, our findings suggest that
open-file pre-plea discovery can promote better informed case
outcomes, including better informed guilty pleas. Prosecutors and
defense attorneys in North Carolina report more frequent preplea disclosure of most types of evidence than do their
counterparts in Virginia. 380 These differences are statistically
significant and at times quite dramatic. 381 Moreover, a high
number of respondents from both states—especially on the
defense side—identify the ability of the defendant to make more
informed decisions about pleading guilty as a key advantage of
the open-file model. 382 These results suggest that open-file can
help improve the fairness and accuracy of plea bargaining by
giving defendants the information necessary to make an
intelligent decision whether and to what charges to plead guilty.
With respect to whether open-file enhances the disclosure of
exculpatory and impeachment evidence, our conclusions are more
tentative. On the whole, the North Carolina discovery regime
seems to produce better pre-plea disclosure of factually
exculpatory evidence. 383 Compared to their Virginia counterparts,
North Carolina defense attorneys report significantly higher
prosecutorial disclosure rates of factually exculpatory evidence in
the prosecutor’s possession and Brady evidence that is in the
possession of investigating agencies. 384 Moreover, in response to
hypothetical scenarios, a greater percentage of prosecutors and
defense attorneys in North Carolina than those in Virginia
respond that exculpatory and impeachment evidence (other than
witness criminal records) is provided pre-plea. 385 Open-file may
therefore enhance disclosure of Brady evidence in “close” cases,
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Supra Tables 2a & 2b.
Supra Tables 2a & 2b.
Supra Section III.C.4.b.
Supra Section III.C.2.
Supra Table 3a.
Supra Tables 4–6.
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where the exculpatory nature of the evidence or its materiality to
the outcome of the case is debatable. It removes the need for
prosecutors to evaluate whether certain documents qualify as
Brady material and thus eliminates the risk that prosecutors
would fail to disclose as a result of cognitive biases or lack of time
to review the evidence carefully. 386
Yet our survey also uncovers areas in which open-file
discovery does not appear to produce broader pre-plea discovery
of Brady material. The first area concerns certain types of
impeachment evidence, such as the prior records of prosecution
witnesses. In North Carolina, prior records are not commonly
part of the prosecution’s file pre-plea so they are not
automatically disclosed at that stage. 387 Instead, under open-file
rules, prosecutors disclose witness names early in the process,
but then leave it to defense attorneys to research the prior
records of the witnesses. This shift of responsibilities is permitted
under the “due diligence” exception to Brady and does not appear
controversial among North Carolina practitioners. 388 It reveals,
however, that even after the adoption of open-file discovery,
independent defense investigation remains a key component of
adequate representation. 389
Our results also indicate that some evidence, including
Brady material, is not being adequately recorded or promptly
transmitted to the prosecution by investigating agents in Virginia
and North Carolina. As a result, even when the prosecution turns
over its entire file to the defense before a guilty plea, that file is
frequently lacking information material to the case. 390 The
prosecution has a duty to supplement disclosure as it receives
new evidence, so the information may ultimately be provided to
the defense before trial. Given the high rate of guilty pleas in our
386. Supra notes 61, 95–98 and accompanying text.
387. Supra notes 180–181, 202–204 and accompanying text.
388. Supra notes 202–204 and accompanying text.
389. Therefore, broader discovery should not be used as an excuse to further
reduce spending on indigent criminal defense, under the pretext that defense
investigations are no longer vital, as has occurred to some degree in England
and Scotland. See Ringnalda, supra note 103, at 1153–54 (stating that the
traditional assumption has been that after fair notice of the case, the defense
has the responsibility to investigate and look for exculpatory evidence).
390. Supra notes 322–341 and accompanying text.
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criminal justice system, however, the unavailability of some
Brady evidence pre-plea is a cause for concern.
The incompleteness of the prosecution’s file highlights an
important area where open-file fails to deliver on its promise, and
closed-file discovery fares no better. 391 To ensure adequate
disclosure of Brady evidence that is not in the prosecutor’s
custody, reforms would have to extend beyond mandating
open-file discovery. One possibility would be to strengthen
requirements and training for police officers to record and convey
exculpatory evidence to prosecutors in a timely fashion. 392 Some
commentators have also proposed requiring prosecutors to certify
that they have inquired with law enforcement about the existence
of any additional evidence that is not (yet) in the file, but is
relevant to the case. 393 Our results suggest that such reforms
may be necessary for open-file discovery to fulfill its goals.
Responses to the survey also indicate that defense attorneys
and prosecutors tend to regard open-file discovery as more
efficient than restrictive discovery. While both North Carolina
and Virginia respondents expressed some concerns about certain
logistical burdens of open-file discovery, on the whole,
respondents viewed efficiency as a key advantage of open-file
discovery. 394 A large number of prosecutors and defense attorneys
in both states noted that open-file reduces discovery disputes and
speeds up case dispositions. 395
Our respondents, on both the defense and prosecution side,
also maintained that negotiated discovery waivers in North
Carolina are quite rare. 396 This further suggests that prosecutors
391. See id. (finding that in both Virginia and North Carolina, defense
attorneys express concern about the prosecutor’s file being incomplete).
392. See NYSBA TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 68–74 (encouraging
reforms to improve the flow of information between police and prosecutors).
393. See Prosser, supra note 19, at 596 (arguing that prosecutors should be
required to go on record that they exercised due diligence in complying with
discovery obligations); NYSBA TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 40
(recommending that the prosecution and defense should be required to file a
“certificate of compliance” when they have completed their discovery
obligations); see also MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(3) (2015) (stating that all parties
must file a Certificate of Compliance after all discovery has been provided).
394. Supra notes 281, 287 and accompanying text.
395. Supra notes 281, 287 and accompanying text.
396. Supra Part III.C.3.
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do not view open-file discovery as burdensome enough to bargain
away. We recognize that our survey reflects perceptions of
participants, rather than hard data on efficiency. Further study
of the actual economic costs and benefits of open-file discovery
would therefore be helpful to inform reform efforts. But at least
the perceptions of prosecutors and defense attorneys tend to
support efficiency-based arguments in favor of open-file
discovery. 397
Our survey also found little evidence to suggest that open-file
discovery increases risks to the safety of witnesses. Although a
number of Virginia prosecutors feared this consequence of
open-file and had even experienced it, neither North Carolina
prosecutors nor North Carolina defense attorneys identified
witness safety as a significant concern. 398 While a few North
Carolina respondents mentioned risks to witnesses, some also
noted that these risks were mitigated by the available protective
measures. 399 This is particularly notable given that North
Carolina has a higher violent crime rate per capita than does
Virginia. 400
One possible interpretation of our finding is that prosecutors
who have experienced only restrictive discovery magnify fears
about the dangers of open-file discovery. A similar dynamic has
been reported with respect to other criminal justice reforms.
When various jurisdictions first considered mandating the
videotaping of interrogations, for example, law enforcement
officers had serious concerns about logistical burdens and about
the effects of recording on conviction rates. 401 Once videotaping
was introduced, however, these concerns generally subsided. 402
397. Cf. Federal Criminal Discovery Reform, supra note 111, at 673–74
(noting that the need “to seek court orders [to protect witness safety] with
somewhat greater frequency hardly seems burdensome”).
398. Supra notes 292–301 and accompanying text.
399. Supra notes 292–301 and accompanying text.
400. See 2014 Crime in the United States, supra note 364 (listing violent
crime statistics for all fifty states).
401. See, e.g., THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 13–16 (2004) (describing the concerns law
enforcement had regarding recording and how experience tended to change
those attitudes).
402. See id. (showing that once videotaping was introduced, despite initial
concerns, law enforcement became accepting of the new technology).
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The responses from North Carolina may likewise be read to mean
that once a jurisdiction adopts open-file discovery, prosecutors
become more accepting of the system after observing first-hand
that risks to witness safety can be adequately managed through
protective measures.
It is important to emphasize again, however, that our study
measured perceptions of practitioners, rather than the actual
effects of open-file discovery. While practitioners’ perceptions are
unlikely to be entirely mistaken, witness intimidation is one area
where such perceptions should be treated with greater caution.
Neither defense attorneys nor prosecutors have direct knowledge
about witness intimidation—they rely on witnesses to report such
offenses, and studies have found that witnesses frequently
underreport threats and even attacks. 403 Accordingly, further
empirical study, surveying witnesses themselves, would be the
optimal means of assessing the actual effects of open-file on
witness intimidation.
Likewise, while our survey cannot directly measure the
fairness and consistency of discovery provided under open-file
and closed-file models, practitioners’ responses suggest that these
are key advantages of open-file discovery. A very high number of
Virginia prosecutors stated that, in most or all of their cases, they
provide broader discovery than required by law. 404 While
commendable as an effort to encourage more informed and
credible dispositions, in a closed-file state, these actions end up
introducing variation and unpredictability in the way defendants
are treated in different counties or by different prosecutors. It
was also clear that Virginia (as well as North Carolina) defense
attorneys did not believe that prosecutors were turning over
discovery items as frequently as prosecutors reported. 405
Open-file discovery was also described by many of our
respondents—in both Virginia and North Carolina—as promoting
trust between defense and prosecution. 406 Given the dramatic
403. See, e.g., Elizabeth Connick & Robert C. Davis, Examining the Problem
of Witness Intimidation, 66 JUDICATURE 439, 443 (1983) (reporting that only 63%
of the witnesses who had reported intimidation to the researchers had also
reported the threats to criminal justice officials).
404. Supra note 264 and accompanying text.
405. Supra Tables 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3b, 4, 5, 6.
406. Supra notes 283–288 and accompanying text.
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differences in the perceptions of defense attorneys and
prosecutors about what occurs during discovery, this may be a
welcome additional benefit of the practice. It is notable that the
gap in perceptions of what was being disclosed was narrower in
North Carolina than in Virginia. 407 Although these differences
were statistically significant for only a few categories, it is
possible that open-file discovery helps reduce the polarization of
defense and prosecution views.
Relatedly, as a group, North Carolina prosecutors displayed
more positive views of open-file discovery than did their Virginia
counterparts. When describing both the advantages and the
disadvantages of open-file discovery, a greater number of North
Carolina prosecutors showed broad acceptance of the fairness and
efficiency of the practice, and very few had concerns about its
logistical burdens or effects on witness safety. 408 Again, this
suggests that, while open-file discovery may attract initial
opposition from the law enforcement community, the practice can
gain acceptance among prosecutors once it is adopted. Over time,
open-file rules may be able to bridge some differences between
prosecutors and defense attorneys and reduce some
(discovery-related) conflicts between the two.
Our study focuses on perceptions of defense attorneys and
prosecutors and at times yields results subject to multiple
interpretations. More empirical studies of the open-file discovery,
particularly on the disclosure of Brady material and on the effects
of open-file on witness intimidation, would help us better
understand the true operation of different discovery rules.
Despite these limitations, our findings offer the first data-driven
endorsement of the idea that open-file discovery could facilitate
more informed and more efficient case dispositions.

407.
408.

Supra Tables 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3b, 4, 5, 6.
Supra Part III.C.4.
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Appendix A: Pre-Plea Discovery Practices: A Survey of Prosecutors
and Defense Attorneys
Q1
This survey aims to determine pre-plea discovery
practices in your jurisdiction. In particular, we are interested in
finding out whether and under what circumstances prosecutors
provide defendants with broader pre-plea discovery than either
the law or office policy requires. In addition, we are interested in
learning whether and under what circumstances prosecutors
request waivers of discovery as part of plea negotiations.
Thank you for willingness to participate. Your answers and
your time are extremely important to us and will help inform our
academic study of discovery practices. Your participation in this
survey is completely voluntary and confidential. No individual
attorney or office will be identified in any of the analyses or
papers we produce.
This survey is brief and will take 5–10 minutes to complete.
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Q2 Which of the following category best describes your individual
practice over the last year?
(Please check all that apply to your
practice.)
 Misdemeanor
 Felony
 Intake/ Charging/Grand Jury/ Probable Cause Rotation
 Appeals
 Arson
 Assault
 Capital Murder
 Child Abuse
 Drug Crimes
 Domestic Violence
 Gang Violence
 Homicide
 Immigration Offenses
 Juvenile Prosecution
 Organized Crime
 Property Crimes
 Sexual Assault
 Traffic Offenses
 White-Collar Crime
 Other (Please explain) ____________________
Q3 Some of the survey questions are directed solely to
prosecutors who have handled felony cases at least some of the
time over the last year. If you handled misdemeanors or juvenile
prosecutions exclusively in the last year, you will skip those
questions.
Did you handle misdemeanors or juvenile prosecutions
exclusively in the last year?
 Yes
 No
Q4 Over the last year, approximately how many felony cases did
you handle (please estimate the number of felony cases
completed)?
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Q5 Of these completed felony cases, what percentage of cases
would you estimate resulted in guilty pleas (please include “no
contest” pleas in the percentage)?
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Q6 Does your office have an articulated policy concerning
discovery to be provided to defendants before they plead guilty?
Please note: Throughout this survey, questions regarding guilty
pleas are intended to include “no contest” pleas.
 Yes
 No
 Not Sure
Q7 In felony cases, what types of documents do you turn over
either as part of an initial discovery package or later, but before a
defendant pleads guilty? Please indicate how often you disclose
such documents, assuming they are present.
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Never

Sometimes

Always

Defendant’s statements







Co-defendants’ statements







Names of witnesses







Witness statements







Witnesses’ criminal records







Reports or written
statements of potentially
testifying experts







Reports or written
statements of non-testifying
experts







Search warrant affidavits







Defendant’s criminal record







Police report about the
underlying incident







Materials relating to
identification procedures
(lineups, etc.)







Factually exculpatory
evidence that is in your
possession







Information in your
possession that might be
used to impeach the
credibility of a prosecution
witness







Exculpatory or
impeachment evidence that
is in the possession of
another government agency,
but which you are able to
request







Other (Please explain.)
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Q8 Does your decision to disclose exculpatory or
impeachment evidence before a guilty plea depend on whether
the evidence is material to the outcome?
 Yes
 No
 Sometimes (Please explain if you wish.) ____________________
Q9 Does your decision to disclose evidence depend on the timing
of the guilty plea?
 Yes (Please explain if you wish.) ____________________
 No (Please explain if you wish.) ____________________
 Sometimes (Please explain if you wish.) ____________________
Q10 Over the last year, in what percentage of felony cases
resolved by a guilty plea would you estimate that you provided a
defendant, before the guilty plea, with BROADER DISCOVERY
than required under an articulated office policy, court order, or
the law?
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Q11 For which of the following reasons did you provide
BROADER PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY than required under office
policy, court order, or the law?
Yes

No

To encourage a guilty plea in
a case





To avoid lengthy litigation
around discovery motions





Out of an abundance of
caution, in case any piece of
evidence is later judged by a
court to be exculpatory





Because the case was simple,
so it was easy to disclose
without worrying about
privileged information or
harm to the investigation





Because the evidence in the
case was voluminous, so it
was easier to disclose
everything instead of sifting
through evidence to identify
documents subject to
disclosure





To obtain a waiver of certain
pretrial motions in exchange
for broader discovery





To maintain or promote a
cooperative relationship with
defense counsel





In anticipation that the
judge would order broader
discovery anyway





To protect the conviction
from appellate and postconviction challenges





Other (Please specify):
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Q12 For which of the following reasons did you refrain from
providing broader pre-plea discovery than required under office
policy, court order, or the law?
Yes

No

No time to check with all
relevant government agencies to
determine whether they had
discoverable evidence





Concern about witness safety





Concern about witnesses’
willingness to testify





Concern about harm to ongoing
investigations





Lack of time or resources to
review the evidence to ensure
that no privileged evidence or
evidence that might harm the
investigation was disclosed





Concern that pre-plea discovery
would stand in the way of an
expeditious resolution of the case





Evidence was so strong that
there was no need to provide
broader discovery; providing a
few documents sufficed to
convince defendant to plead
guilty





Concern about the financial
costs of discovery





Lack of a good working
relationship with defense
counsel





Concern that the defendant
would manipulate the evidence





Concern about the strength of
the evidence at the pre-plea
stage





Other (Please specify):
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Q16 For which of the following reasons did you request
a DISCOVERY WAIVER as part of plea negotiations?
Yes

No

Concern about the time and
effort needed to obtain evidence
from the police/ investigating
agencies





Concern about witness safety





Concern about witnesses’
willingness to testify





Concern about harm to ongoing
investigations





Lack of time or resources to
review evidence to ensure that
no privileged evidence or
evidence that might harm the
prosecution was disclosed





Concern that pre-plea discovery
would stand in the way of an
expeditious resolution of the
case





Concern about the financial
costs of discovery





Desire to protect the conviction
from post-conviction challenges





Lack of a good working
relationship with defense
counsel





Concern that the defendant
would manipulate the evidence





Concern about the strength of
the evidence at the pre-plea
stage





Other (Please specify):
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Q17 Do you believe that pre-plea discovery in your jurisdiction
(either by law or office policy) works well? Why or why not?
Q18 What do you think are the major advantages of “open-file”
pre-plea discovery?
By “open-file” discovery, we mean a system under which the
defendant has access to the entire prosecutorial file, except for
attorney work product and information exempt from disclosure by
a protective order.
Q19 What do you think are the major disadvantages of “open-file”
pre-plea discovery?
Q20 Do you believe the defense should be required to provide
broader reciprocal discovery in criminal cases? Why or why not?
Q21 Please feel free to make any other observations about
pre-plea discovery that you might have.
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Q22 Demographic Information (Optional):
How long have you been practicing as a prosecutor?
 0–2 years
 2–5 years
 5–10 years
 10–15 years
 15–20 years
 20–25 years
 25–30 years
 More than 30 years
Q23 What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
Q24 What is your race/ethnicity? (Please check all that apply.)
 White
 African American
 Hispanic
 Asian
 Native American
 Pacific Islander/Alaska Native
 Other (Please specify.) ____________________
Q25 Thank you very much for your time and responses! We
appreciate your participation.
We would also be interested in your response to three discoveryrelated hypothetical scenarios, which would take about another 5
minutes to answer.
If you are willing to consider them, please click YES below.
Otherwise, please click NO, and thank you again for taking the
time to complete the survey.
 Yes
 No
Q26 Thank you for agreeing to consider these three hypothetical
scenarios. Here are the basic facts:
The defendant has been charged with armed robbery. The
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incident in question occurred at 10 pm, on a well-lit street next to
an ATM. The robbery was captured on a surveillance camera. The
assailant’s face is clearly visible on the video. The victim, who is a
22-year old man, picked out the defendant from an initial photo
array and again in a subsequent lineup. You also plan to rely on
an eyewitness—a woman who observed the robbery from a
window located on the same side of the street as the ATM, about
20 feet away from the robbery. The eyewitness also picked out the
defendant from a lineup. The defendant is detained in jail.
Please consider the following three scenarios occurring in your
jurisdiction. Each scenario, while relevant to the armed robbery
case, is independent from the others and should not be viewed as
cumulative information.
Q27
1. One month after the defendant’s arraignment (at which you
provided the defense with an initial discovery packet), you obtain
information from the police that your prospective eyewitness has
a prior fraud conviction. The following week (two months before
trial is set to begin), you plan to discuss a plea offer with the
defense attorney.
Would you disclose the prior conviction either before or during
plea negotiations?
Please note: In this and subsequent questions, we are NOT asking
you whether you would disclose this information before a pretrial
discovery deadline, if the case goes to trial. We are instead
focusing on disclosures before and during plea negotiations
occurring two months before trial is set to begin.
 Yes, I would disclose the prior conviction either before or
during plea negotiations.
 No, I would not disclose the prior conviction either before or
during plea negotiations.
 Please explain if you wish. ____________________
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Q28
2. Imagine a different scenario. One month after the defendant’s
arraignment (at which you provided the defense with an initial
discovery packet), you obtain information that the eyewitness had
initially failed to pick out the defendant from a photo array, even
though she was later able to pick him out in a lineup. The
following week (two months before trial is set to begin), you plan
to discuss a plea offer with the defense attorney.
Would you disclose this information either before or during plea
negotiations?
 Yes, I would disclose to the defense, either before or during
plea negotiations, that the eyewitness did not pick out the
defendant in the photo array.
 No, I would not disclose to the defense, either before or during
plea negotiations, that the eyewitness did not pick out the
defendant in the photo array.
 Please explain if you wish. ____________________
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Q28
3. Consider a different scenario. One month after the defendant’s
arraignment (at which you provided the defense with an initial
discovery packet), you obtain information that a jailhouse
informant is claiming that someone else committed the crime.
You believe the informant is lying because, in addition to your
strong eyewitness and video evidence that implicates the
defendant, you know that the informant is a friend of the
defendant. Nonetheless, the informant claims that another jail
inmate with whom he has been sharing a cell bragged that he
committed the ATM robbery alone and that the defendant was
not involved.
Would you disclose this information either before or during the
plea negotiations (two months before trial)?
 Yes, I would disclose the existence of the jailhouse informant,
either before or during plea negotiations.
 No, I would not disclose the existence of the jailhouse
informant, either before or during plea negotiations.
 Please explain if you wish. ____________________
Q29 Thank you again for taking the time to participate! If you
wish to go back and review your answers on previous pages,
please use the blue back button on the bottom of the page. Once
you press the blue forward button, your answers will be recorded
and you will not be able to change them.
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Appendix B: Table of Select Discovery Rules by Jurisdiction
Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
Federal Rules None in the rules
No
No 410
No
of Criminal
(upon request)
Procedure, R.
16; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500
No
No
No
Alabama Rules 14 days after
request
(only
co-Ds’,
of Criminal
accomplices’)
Procedure, R.
Jurisdiction

16

Alaska Rules
of Criminal
Procedure, R.
16

Arizona Rules
of Criminal
Procedure, R.
15.1
Arkansas
Rules of
Criminal
Procedure, R.
17

Timing

Model
Closed-File

Closed-File

No specific time
limit, other than
expert witness
info 45 days
before trial

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

In Superior
Court, no later
than 30 days
after
arraignment;
police report at
arraignment or
preliminary
hearing
Upon request

Yes

Yes

Yes

Open-File

Yes

No
(only co-Ds’)

No

Intermediate

409. Even when a state provides for the disclosure of witness names,
statements, or police reports, rules typically provide for the withholding of such
information where disclosure may pose a risk to the witness’s safety. See supra
note 50 and accompanying text (citing state rules that grant prosecuting
attorneys the ability to refrain from disclosing a witness’s name when doing so
would put that witness at risk).
410. But cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1948):
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the
United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of
the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to
the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.
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Jurisdiction
California
Penal Code
§ 1054

Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
At least 30 days
Yes
Yes
No
before trial
Timing

Recorded
statements of D
or co-D—not
more than 21
days after first
Colorado Rules appearance; all
other info—not
of Criminal
more than 35
Procedure, R.
16
days before trial
Connecticut No later than 45
Gen. Stat.
days after D’s
§ 54-86a;
request
Connecticut
Practice Book
§§ 40-11, 4013, 40-13A
Delaware
Not later than 10
Rules of
days after
Criminal
arraignment or
Procedure, R. as ordered by the
16 (Del. Super.
court
Ct. Crim. R.
16)
Within 15 days of
Florida Rules
request
of Criminal
Procedure, R.
3.220
Not later than 10
Georgia Code days before trial
of Criminal or as court orders
Procedure,
§ 17-16-4
Hawaii Rules 10 calendar days
following
of Penal
arraignment
&
Procedure, R.
plea of D
16

Model
Intermediate

Yes

Yes

Yes

Open-File

Yes

Yes 411

Yes

Open-File

No

No
(only co-Ds’)

No

Closed-File

Yes

Yes

Yes

Open-File

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

411. The rules were amended in 2010 to allow discovery of “all statements,
law enforcement reports and affidavits within the possession of the prosecuting
authority and his or her agents, including state and local law enforcement
officers, which statements, reports and affidavits were prepared concerning the
offense charged.” CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 40-13A (2015).
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Timing

Idaho Criminal Any time after
Rules, R. 16 filing of charges,
upon request

Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
Yes
Yes
Yes

Model
Open-File

Illinois Code of
Criminal
Procedure
§ 114-9
Indiana, no
state-wide
discovery
rules;
RCCPP,
Randolph
County, LR68CR00-202
Iowa Rules of
Criminal
Procedure, R.
2.11(12), 2.14
Kansas Code of
Criminal
Procedure, art.
32, 22-3212

As soon as
practicable,
following motion
of D
30 days for State
to disclose; 15
days after that
for D to disclose

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

Upon motion of
D, as ordered by
the court

Yes

No 412
(only co-D’s)

No

Intermediate

No later than 21
days after
arraignment (or
later if court
permits)

No

No

No

Closed-File

Kentucky
Rules of
Criminal
Procedure, R.
7.24
Louisiana
Code of
Criminal
Procedure,
arts. 716–729

Upon request

No

No

Yes

Intermediate

Upon motion of
D, as ordered by
the court

No

Yes 413

No

Intermediate

412. The Rules do require, however, the prosecution to provide, when
proceeding by information, “a full and fair statement of [a witness’s] expected
testimony” or when proceeding by indictment, “a full and fair statement” of the
witness’s grand jury testimony. IOWA R. CRIM. P. R. 2.4, 2.5. The Rules also allow
for witness depositions. Id. at R. 2.13 (allowing depositions of “witnesses listed
by the state on the indictment or information or notice of additional witnesses in
the same manner and with like effect and with the same limitations as in civil
actions except as otherwise provided by statute and these rules”).
413. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 716 (stating that the “state need not provide
the defendant any written or recorded statement of its witnesses until
immediately before the opening statement at of trial”).
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Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
Maine Rules of Within 10 days of
Yes
Yes
Yes 414
Unified
D’s request
Criminal
Procedure, R.
16
Maryland
Upon request;
Yes
Yes
Yes
Rules of
Within 30 days
Procedure, R. after the earlier
4-262, 4-263
of the
appearance of
counsel or first
appearance of D
Massachusetts At or before the
Yes
Yes
Yes
Criminal
pretrial
Procedure, R.
conference
14
Michigan
Within 21 days of
Yes
Yes
Yes
Rules of Court,
a request
R. 6.201
Jurisdiction

Timing

Model
Open-File

Open-File

Open-File

Open-File

Minnesota
Upon request
Court Rules,
and before the
Criminal
Rule 11 Omnibus
Procedure Rule
Hearing
9, Minn. R.
Crim. P. 9.01

Yes

Yes

Yes

Open-File

Mississippi
Upon request
Uniform Rules
of Circuit and
County Court
Practice, R.
9.04
Missouri Rules Requests/motions
of Criminal not later than 20
Procedure, R.
days after
25
arraignment;
answer within 10
days after service
of request
Montana Code
Upon request
Annotated,
Art. 46-15-322

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

414. Although the rules do not specifically mention police reports, such
reports would appear to fall under the category of reports “material and
relevant to the preparation of the defense.” ME. R. U. CRIM. P. 16(c)(1).
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Jurisdiction

Timing

Nebraska
Revised
Statutes,
§§ 29-1912–
1919

Upon request
any time after
indictment,
information, or
complaint

Nevada
Revised
Statutes, Title
14, Chapter
174

Request within
30 days after
arraignment;
comply not less
than 30 days
before trial
(witness list not
less than 5
judicial days
before trial)
New
Not less than 20
Hampshire
calendar days
Super. Ct. R.
before final
98
pretrial
conference or not
less than 3 days
before a pretrial
evidentiary
hearing
New Jersey
Within 7 days of
Rules
the return or
Governing the
unsealing of
Courts of the
indictment
State of New
Jersey, Part
3:13-3
New Mexico
Within 10 days
Rules of
after
Criminal
arraignment
Procedure for
the District
Courts, 5-501,
5-502

Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
Yes
No 415
No

Model
Intermediate

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

Yes

Yes

Yes

Open-File

Yes

Yes

Yes

Open-File

Yes

Yes

Yes 416

Open-File

415. The Rules do allow witness depositions, however. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-1917 (1969) (allowing witness depositions where witness testimony “may be
material or relevant to the issue to be determined at the trial of the offense; or
may be of assistance to the parties in the preparation of their respective cases”).
416. Although the rules do not specifically mention police reports, such
reports would appear to fall under the category of reports “material to the
preparation of the defense.” N.M. R. ANN. 5-501(A)(3).
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Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
New York,
Written demand
No
No
No
Laws of New
within 30 days
(only co-D) 417
York, Criminal
after
arraignment or
Procedure,
initial
Title J, art.
appearance,
240
whichever is
later; compliance
within 15 days
after service of
demand
North Carolina
Within a
Yes
Yes
Yes
Gen. Stat.
reasonable time
§ 15A-903
before trial, as
specified by the
court
North Dakota Upon D’s written
Yes
Yes
No 418
Rules of
request
Criminal
Procedure, R.
16
Ohio Rules of Demand within
Yes
Yes
Yes
Criminal
21 days after
Procedure, R. arraignment or 7
16
days before trial,
whichever is
earlier; motion to
compel
compliance no
later than 7 days
before trial or 3
days after
opposing party
provides
discovery,
whichever is
later
Jurisdiction

Timing

405
Model
Closed-File

Open-File

Intermediate

Open-File

417. But cf. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 240.44–45 (providing for disclosure of
witness statements at the conclusion of pretrial hearing at which witness has
testified or at trial, after jury has been sworn in).
418. The rule does provide for the disclosure of reports “material to
preparing the defense,” which may include police reports. N.D. R.CRIM.P.
16(a)(1)(D)(i). On occasion, however, police reports may be excluded from
discovery under the “work product” exemption of Rule 16. See State v. Shipton,
339 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D.1983) (noting that “[w]hile some police reports might
qualify as prosecution work products, we are not prepared to hold that all
arresting officer reports automatically fall into that category”).
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Jurisdiction
Oklahoma,
Title 22 OK
Statute §222002

Oregon State
Statute,
§§ 135.805–
.865

Pennsylvania
Rules of
Criminal
Procedure, R.
573
Rhode Island,
R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 12-17-16
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Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
Motions may be
Yes
Yes
Yes
made at
arraignment or
later; discovery
should be
complete at least
10 days before
trial
Brady material
Yes
Yes
No
before guilty
plea; everything
else as soon as
practicable after
indictment or
information
Motion shall be Court has Court has
No
made within 14 discretion discretion to
days after
order
to order
arraignment,
unless extended
by the court
Upon D’s written
Yes
Yes
No
request
Timing

South Carolina No later than 30
Rules of
days after
Criminal
request
Procedure R. 5

No

No 419

No 420

Model
Open-File

Intermediate

Intermediate

Intermediate

Closed-File

419. While Rule 5(a)(2) excludes witness statements from disclosure
pretrial, it also provides that “after a prosecution witness has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the prosecution
to produce any statement of the witness in the possession of the prosecution
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified; and
provided further that the court may upon a sufficient showing require the
production of any statement of any prospective witness before the time such
witness testifies.” S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(2).
420. Although the Rules appear to provide for disclosure of reports material
to the defense, they also exclude from disclosure “reports . . . made by the
attorney for the prosecution or other prosecution agents in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of the case.” Id.
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Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
South Dakota Upon D’s written
No
No 421
No
Code, Chapter
request
23A-13
Jurisdiction

Timing

Tennessee
Upon D’s request
Rules of
Criminal
Procedure,
R. 16
Texas Code of
As soon as
Criminal
practicable after
Procedure,
request; expert
Chapter 39
witness info not
later than 20
days before trial
Utah Rules of
Before D is
Criminal
required to
Procedure, R.
plead; D
16
disclosures at
least 10 days
before trial
Vermont Rules
As soon as
of Criminal
practicable after
Procedure, R. request of D in
16
writing or in
open court
Virginia, Rules
of Supreme
Motion by D at
Court of
least 10 days
Virginia 3A:11
before trial

Model
Closed-File

No

No (only coD) 422

No

Closed-File

Yes

Yes

Yes

Open-File

No

No

No

Closed-File

Yes

Yes

No 423

Intermediate

No

No

No

Closed-File

421. But see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-13-6 (2015) (stating that no witness
statement “shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until such
witness has testified on direct examination in the preliminary hearing or in the
trial of the case”).
422. But see TENN. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a) (providing that a state is not required
to produce a witness statement until after the conclusion of witness testimony
at trial).
423. Although the Rules provide for disclosure of reports material to the
defense, they exclude from disclosure “reports . . . to the extent that they contain
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the
prosecuting attorney . . . or other agents of the prosecution, including
investigators and police officers.” VT. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
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Timing

Washington
Superior Court
Criminal
No later than
Rules, R. 4.7 omnibus hearing
West Virginia
Rules of
Criminal
Procedure, R. Upon the request
16
of D
Wisconsin
Within a
Code § 971.23 reasonable time
before trial
Wyoming
Upon D’s request
Rules of
Criminal
Procedure, R.
16

Witness
Witness
Police
Names 409 Statements Reports
Yes
Yes
No 424

Model
Intermediate

Yes

No 425

No

Intermediate

Yes

Yes

No

Intermediate

No

No 426

No 427

Closed-File

424. Police reports may be introduced if the prosecutor intends to use them
at a hearing or trial so they can be classified as “books, papers,
documents . . . which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or
trial.” WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(a)(1)(v). See also generally State v. Linden,
947 P.2d 1284 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
425. But see W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (allowing for the provision of witness
statements after a witness has testified on direct examination).
426. But see WYO. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (allowing for the court to order production
of written witness statements).
427. Although the Rules appear to provide for disclosure of reports material
to the defense, they also exclude from disclosure “reports, memoranda, or other
internal state documents made by the attorney for the state or other state
agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case.” Id. at R.
16(a)(2).

